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 Modèles de négociation client-fournisseur dans 
une chaîne logistique collaborative 
RESUME: Au sein de chaînes logistiques, les conflits pouvant exister entre d‟une part 
l‟autonomie et la coopération, et d‟autre part entre des objectifs locaux et globaux, définissent 
un contexte très complexe auquel les membres d‟une même chaîne doivent faire face, surtout 
lorsque les entreprises sont impliquées dans des chaînes d‟approvisionnement multiples ou 
des réseaux. Par ailleurs, ces problèmes sont de nature à provoquer une dégradation de la 
performance de la chaîne logistique, notamment dans un contexte de fabrication aussi 
complexe que celui du secteur aéronautique. De ce fait, organiser et bien gérer les relations 
inter-partenaires devient un facteur important de performance dans une chaîne logistique. 
Dans ce contexte, ce travail vise à proposer des modèles de négociation client/fournisseur en 
vue d‟aider à la formalisation de contraintes cachées, dans l‟optique de partager les risques 
entre partenaires et de faciliter de la sorte la synchronisation entre besoins locaux et impératifs 
globaux. Afin de rendre notre proposition réaliste, nous avons tout d‟abord détaillé des 
processus de négociation puis testé leur faisabilité pratique, d‟une part par des exemples 
d‟évaluation des coûts engagés et d‟autre part en les positionnant par rapport aux situations de 
coopération dans lesquelles ces processus de négociation peuvent exister. 
Mots clé: chaîne logistique, coopération, négociation, performance, partage de risque 
Models for customer-supplier negotiation in a 
collaborative supply chain  
ABSTRACT: In supply chains, the conflicts between autonomy and cooperation, local 
interest and global objective are important problems that supply chain members are currently 
facing, especially when enterprises are involved in multiple supply chains or networks. 
Furthermore, the growing complexity of supply networks has extended the risks of poor 
supply chain performance, particularly for complex manufacturing, such as aeronautic 
industry. Thereby, building and managing a good relationship between partners is an essential 
factor for supply chain performance. In this context, we suggest a negotiation process, helping 
supply chain member to publish hidden constraints, synchronize internal and external interests, 
and share risks with other supply chain members, finally improving the performance of 
cooperation. In order to make our suggestion realistic, we have firstly specified the detailed 
processes and then tested their practical feasibility, on one hand through the assessment of 
extra costs and on the other hand by matching them with identified cooperation situations, in 
which such negotiation process may exist. 
Key words: supply chain, cooperation, negotiation, performance, risk sharing 
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 1 
Introduction 
Nowadays, market environment is changing rapidly. Global purchasing and international 
manufacturing are very common situations. The ever changing customer‟s requirements and 
various customizations of products are more and more challenging the manufacturers. In that 
context, manufacturers are facing difficulties to earn money through producing goods at the 
best price, providing at the required time and in the required quantity. Therefore, 
manufacturers often choose to focus on their core business and take part in supply chains for 
obtaining from external partners the competences they do not have anymore. Ever since then, 
the interest of supply chains is widely recognized, which emphasizes the necessity to better 
address the conditions of an efficient co-working between partners within supply chains.  
Pushed by globalization and its consequent increased competition, supply chain 
managers have understood the importance of information sharing, joint decision-making, 
building effective partnership, and cooperation across supply chains. However, performing 
effective cooperation and maintaining good relationship are not easy tasks in the real practice, 
since the supply chain members are autonomous entities, pursuing their benefits based on 
local interests. Therefore, how to synchronize local activities through global processes, how 
to balance internal interests and overall objectives of the supply chain, and how to establish 
cooperative supply chain relationships are actual difficulties that supply chain members have 
to address. These problems are especially important in the aeronautical sector, in which many 
partners of different competence, size and culture are involved in more and more complex 
networks.  
During the last few years, our research team has been involved in several projects aiming 
at analyzing or improving cooperation in supply chains, among which the main one was 
performed with funding from an association of companies of the aeronautic industry and from 
a public body interested in Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) development. The 
objective of the project was to analyze the problems linked to the cooperation between 
partners of aeronautical supply chains, especially when SMEs were involved.  
In aeronautical supply chains, the difference between large enterprises and SMEs is 
emphasized due to the huge gaps between them, of course in terms of size or type of product, 
but also decision-making policy, production management tools, etc. In SMEs, the planning 
process may be less formal, and multi-functional planning takes place within individual minds. 
Managers and operatives are more likely to be directly involved with the customers. Two-way 
and face-to face communication is the norm in SMEs. Additionally, SMEs are more likely to 
be “people oriented” rather than “system oriented”, therefore SMEs are less oriented on 
information technology and management tools allowing long/middle term visibility. 
We have also seen during the case studies that many practices exist which differ from 
“theoretical” supply chain management principles, in an open way when they come from the 
customers, but in a more hidden way when they come from the suppliers, who often heavily 
depend on their customers. 
In addition, we have quite often seen during the interviews that people were putting some 
emphasis on other issues than purely technical ones, often speaking of trust, maturity, 
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involvement, goodwill etc. Looking back to the cases, the denoted practices are often linked 
to specific situations: relative weakness of a supplier, dependence of a customer towards his 
supplier, trust (or distrust) between partners, etc. It seems to us that these conditions are 
closely attached to different types of supplier-customer relationships and cooperation 
situations in the supply chain. 
Two approaches are possible when considering these problems: many customers, aware 
of them, consider that they are the proof of a lack of maturity of their suppliers (and 
sometimes of themselves). For them, the solution is then to increase this maturity through 
“supplier development”. In that purpose, many projects have been launched during the last 
five years aiming for instance are disseminating the principles of MRP and lean management 
in the SMEs of the aeronautic sector. This is indeed a long term approach, and we have 
decided in this thesis to explore another direction: for us, practices (even if they may have 
negative consequences) are linked to actual needs, closely attached to the relationship 
between supplier and customer. Therefore, the idea is to accept to analyze practices which are 
not consistent with present industrial habits, in order to better formalize them and objectively 
assess their possible area of interest. 
In this thesis, we suggest a series of negotiation processes, aiming at helping supply 
chain member to turn some of their hidden practices into negotiable items, in order to balance 
their local interests with those of the whole supply chain, and accordingly share 
information/risks and better cooperate with the other partners. Since our suggestions are 
mainly based on the results of our case studies in the aeronautic industry, the outcome of our 
proposals should hopefully be close to real practices. 
The thesis is structured as follows:  
In Chapter 1, a literature view on the context of supply chain is presented. We firstly 
introduce the concept of supply chain, including material flows and information flows, under 
different types of characteristic structures, especially in aircraft manufacturing industries. 
Secondly, we stress the concept of supply chain management and identify the existing models 
of supply chain management processes, tools and methods. With the present industrial context 
of sensitive competition, coordination, cooperation and collaboration between partners is 
emphasized as a key point for improving supply chain performance. We explain the 
conditions for cooperation in the last part of this chapter, which are identified as openness, 
mutual respect and trust, information sharing, jointly planning, resulting in improved 
customer-supplier relationship.  
In Chapter 2, case studies from the aeronautical industry are introduced, showing 
possible gaps between the theoretical principles and the real practices. We highlight some 
good practices in which cooperative supply chain members share information and perform 
protection actions based on real needs, instead of rigidly executing the contracts between 
partners. We also show some practices aiming at satisfying local interests which may prevent 
from a good performance of the global supply chain. Good or bad, we have chosen to take 
into account these practices in order to suggest more cooperative management processes, 
based on negotiation.  
In Chapter 3, we choose to firstly formalize the negotiation processes based on lessons 
learnt from the identified practices. Accordingly, we have chosen to focus on four aspects: 
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periods of forecast, load variation, price and cycle time, and order priority and lot size, and 
consider them as the objects of our suggested negotiation processes. Then, we bring out brief 
descriptions of these processes using business process models then specify the activities of the 
processes using UML sequence diagrams, trying to provide a clear view on: 
 When is there a need to negotiate these items? 
 At which level should these negotiations be handled? 
 What is needed to perform such negotiations? 
In addition, we give a short focus on the extra costs induced by negotiation, which are of 
course the main results allowing to assess its possible interest.  
In Chapter 4, as an illustration, we provide some numerical simulations of exchanges 
between partners at different levels (S&OP, MPS, and MRP), comparing the total 
cost/benefits of the normal case(s) and negotiation-based case. The results show the possible 
interest of negotiation, but of course not its technical and social feasibility. Indeed, a 
condition for adopting these processes is that the supply chain members are ready to go 
beyond their local interests, which, in our opinion, may paradoxically lead to win-win 
situations.  
In Chapter 5, we analyze this important constraint on the negotiation processes, which 
require a mutual trustful climate through real information sharing, actual constraints 
publishing, etc. Thereby, we identify a taxonomy of the cooperation situations based on 
existing ones and on important factors considered as impacting customer-supplier relationship 
in the literature. Then, we match the identified situations with our negotiation processes, 
trying to test the usefulness of the taxonomy of the cooperation situations, or on the opposite 
to identify the situations required by the negotiation processes. Finally, we briefly present 
some possible evolutions of the situations, showing that the suggested typology may help to 
have a better view on the dynamics of customer-supplier relationship, and accordingly of the 
negotiation processes.  
At the end, we conclude the presented work in a general conclusion and address the 
perspectives and further steps in the future.  
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Chapter 1 
Literature View 
To study the performance of a Supply Chain (SC) or Supply Network (SN), it 
is necessary to analyze the behavior of each entity (i.e. each partner) but also to 
analyze the link between the local performance of each entity and the global 
performance of the chain. Since each member may be an individual organization 
having its own autonomy and business strategies, making them cooperate on the 
base of common objectives is a major issue, which has been widely addressed in the 
literature. In order to better explain the underlying problems, we give an overview 
of the issues on supply chain cooperation in this chapter.  
1 Context of Supply Chain 
Nowadays, market environment is changing rapidly. Global purchasing and international 
manufacturing become common situations, while the ever changing customer‟s requirements 
and increased customization of the products create new difficulties for the manufacturers. For 
being more competitive, a possible answer is that the companies may focus on their core 
business, and take part in supply chains for obtaining from external partners the competences 
they do not have. Therefore, the interest of supply chains has increased through years, 
emphasizing the interest on the conditions of co-working between partners.  
1.1 Concept of supply chain 
1.1.1 Definitions of a supply chain 
Many definitions of a supply chain can be found in the literature, but they share many 
common points. The most popular definition is perhaps given by Christopher (1992):  
“The network of organization that are involved, through upstream and 
downstream linkages, in the different processes and activities that produce value in 
the form of products and services delivered to the end customers.” 
The use of the term “network” suggests that the companies involved in a supply chain 
could not only perform complementary activities but also pursue common objectives. Such 
common objectives stress that all the activities along a supply chain should be designed 
according to the needs of the customer to be served. As a consequence, the (ultimate) 
customer is at best an integral part of a supply chain (Stadtler, 2005). Normally, many 
independent firms belonging to a supply chain are involved for manufacturing a product and 
placing it in the hands of the end user (La Londe and Master, 1994). Raw material and 
components producers, product assembler, wholesalers, retailers and transportation 
companies are all members of a supply chain. These members are divided into upstream and 
downstream partners according to their position relative to a given enterprise (see Figure 1.1). 
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Other similar definitions are also provided by Lee and Billington, (1993); Mentzer et al., 
(2001); Min and Zhou, 2002; Swaminathan and Tayur, (2003).  
Some definitions of a supply chain are given not only considering the transformation of 
product or service, but also emphasizing the information flow, such as the ones of Govil and 
Proth, (2001) or Mahmood et al., (2003). They consider two distinct flows: product/material 
flows and information flows through the organization (see Figure 1.1).  
A supply chain is a global network of organizations that cooperate to improve 
the flows of material and information between suppliers and customers at the lowest 
cost and the highest speed. The objective of a supply chain is customer satisfaction 
(Govil and Proth, 2001). 
Supply chain encompasses all activities associated with the flow and 
transformation of goods and services as well as the attendant information flows 
from suppliers of raw material and components through manufacturing/assembly 
plants, through the distribution chain (transporters, warehouses, distribution 
centers, retailer), and down to the customers/ end user (Mahmood et al., 2003). 
 
Figure 1.1. Supply chain entities and flow (Chen and Paulraj, 2004, Mahmood et al. 2003) 
The product flow includes the movement of goods or services from a supplier to a 
customer, as well as any customer returns or service needs. The information flow involves 
transmitting orders/demand, updating statues of inventory, and technical data if necessary, 
such as capacity, schedule etc. Normally, the information is viewed as a main flow in the 
opposite direction of products, meaning that information mainly moves upstream whereas 
products mainly move downstream.  
Several authors include strategic decision making as a different emphasis aspect of a 
supply chain definition. For example, Oliver and Webber (1992) state that a supply chain 
should be viewed as a single entity guided by strategic decision making. Each chain 
member‟s performance is impacted by the quality of other supply chain members‟ decision 
making (Stecke et al., 2004). Besides, another definition considers the contract as an element 
of the supply chain which could control the material flow over a longer horizon 
(Swaminathan et al., 1998). For instance, Christopher (1998) stresses that a supply chain 
consists of a “network of organizations involved through upstream and downstream contract 
linkages, with each organization performing different processes and activities.”  
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From these various definitions of a supply chain, it could be outlined that the involved 
entities are normally suppliers, manufacturers (assemblers), distributors, retailers and end 
customers. They have a clear division of work, from delivering raw materials/processing 
semi-finished product/ producing finished product, to distributing to retailer or end customers. 
All of these works compose the product flow of a supply chain, transforming raw materials 
into final delivered products towards the end customer. Meanwhile, these individual entities 
are connected based on their agreements on demand and supply in terms of price, quantities, 
delivery time and etc., usually called "contract". Their local processes are partially integrated 
aiming at shorten the entire delivery time towards the customers and locally being more 
efficient. On the other hand, the information flow throughout the chain is an essential support 
that helps the supply chain members to act, make decisions and balance local perspectives and 
global interest. Transforming raw materials and components into finished products should be 
accompanied with sharing information on technical data, critical parameters, constraints, etc. 
in order to ensure that the local processes of different members are working concurrently and 
are capable to meet the global objectives.  
1.1.2 Structure of a supply chain 
The supply chain structure represents how business enterprises are organized, by 
upstream and downstream links, to form a supply chain. Several authors have achieved works 
on the classification of the supply chain structure. For instance, Huang et al., (2003) identify 
five perspective of supply chain structure: dyadic, serial, divergent, convergent, and network. 
Another more specific work is provided presenting four similar supply chain structures: 
convergent, divergent conjoined and network (Beamon and Chen, 2001). In these 
classifications, the network structure is different from other traditional structures since there is 
no clear tier boundary for each supply chain members. In a network structure, one supply 
chain member can be in multiple tiers, whereas one member should be in one certain tier in 
other structures, like serial, convergent, divergent and conjoined (see Figure 1.2). These 
structures will be discussed in next section.  
 
Figure 1.2. Structures of supply chains 
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1.1.2.1 Traditional structure 
 Serial structure 
A serial structure is a linear structure in which each supply chain node has only one 
successor and one predecessor. If raw materials are just changed in their sizes and shapes, but 
not assembled, a serial structure is obtained (Stadlter and Kilger, 2008). A typical serial 
supply chain studied in the literature consists of retailers, distributors, manufacturers and 
suppliers (Lau, 2007).  
 Convergent structure 
Convergent structures are assembly-type structures, in which each node (or facility) in 
the chain has at most one successor, but may have any number of predecessors (Beamon and 
Chen, 2001). It is a modification of serial supply chains, which basically represents a 
manufacturing supply chain in which several components and material provided by suppliers 
are assembled by a manufacture. The configuration of the convergent structure, like number 
of tiers, parts and number of suppliers and manufacturers in each tier, depends on the BOM 
(Bill Of Materials) of the end product (Lau, 2007). Examples of supply chains in convergent 
structures are some types of shipbuilding, aircraft manufacturing, automotive, building 
construction etc.  
 Divergent structure 
A supply chain may be classified as divergent if each node has at most one predecessor, 
but any number of successors (Beamon and Chen, 2001). It is another modified structure of 
the serial one. It is used to represent a more realistic distribution supply chain, in which one 
supplier (e.g. manufacturer) distributes stock to several downstream entities (e.g. retailer, 
distributor) (Lau, 2007). Among others, most types of mineral processing, chemical industry, 
petroleum oil, papermaking organizations are structured as divergent.  
 Conjoined structure  
A conjoined structure is a combination of convergent and divergent structure, where each 
comprised sub-structure (convergent and divergent) is combined in sequence to form a single, 
connected structure (Beamon and Chen, 2001). An assembly-type (convergent) structure in 
the procurement/assembly functions is often followed by a distribution-type (divergent) 
structure in the distribution part. Conjoined supply chain structures are common in farming, 
merchandise catalog, pharmacy and more generally in complex products manufacturing and 
distribution.  
1.1.2.2 Supply network 
A supply network does not fall into any of the preceding traditional structures. It is a 
general structure that is neither strictly convergent, divergent, nor conjoined. The structure of 
a supply network is much more complex and can be considered as a multi-directional network. 
It leads to unclear level or tier boundary, even loops, instead of bi-directional structure of a 
classical supply chain.  
For most manufacturers, the supply chain looks less like a pipeline or chain than like an 
uprooted tree, where the branches and roots are extensive networks of customer and supplier 
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(Cooper et al., 1997), as Figure 1.3 shows. A single organization or facility typically procures 
materials from numerous suppliers (divergent), even within the otherwise convergent portion 
of the chain (Beamon and Chen, 2001). One supplier can possibly serve multiple tiers 
members with different requirements of different products. 
 
Figure 1.3. Supply Network Structure (Lambert et al., 1998) 
1.2 Specificities of aircraft supply chains 
Aircraft manufacturing is a typical global industry (with partners, subcontractors, and 
suppliers all over the world) characterized by high capital investment and R&D costs, long 
development and production cycles (it may take up to 5-6 years from release to delivery) 
(Klepper, 1990). Aircraft manufacturers are obliged to deal with high technological, financial, 
and market barriers. In order to reduce these barriers, a complex network of relationships has 
been developed over time. In order to better understand the specificities of the aircraft supply 
chains, it is firstly necessary to be aware of the real structure of the aircraft supply networks.  
1.2.1 Global structure of aircraft supply networks 
The aeronautical industry has an oligopolistic market structure characterized by high 
technological, financial and market entry barriers (Tyson, 1992; EEC, 1991). To lower these 
barriers, the aircraft firms implement a production organization characterized by a pyramid-
shaped hierarchic structure (convergent network) including an assembly area where the parts 
and components coming from three sub-sectors (engines, equipment and avionics, and 
airframe) (Esposito and Passaro, 2009) and three different production levels (Esposito et al, 
1996).  
At the first level of the production pyramid is a leading firm (Airbus, Boeing...) carrying 
out aircraft assembly and responsible for the whole aircraft program (Esposito and Passaro, 
1997). The three sub-sectors (engines, equipment and avionics, and airframe) have their own 
structure and a degree of autonomy, but are connected to the details of the program. The 
leader firm, which directly operates in the airframe sub-sector, organizes the flow of parts, 
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components, systems and information and coordinates the program and assembly of the final 
product (Esposito and Passaro, 2009). Furthermore the leader firm has direct or indirect 
control of the whole production process, stores all the information relative to the product in 
order to be able to trace back the history of components, manages relations with the airlines, 
and is legally responsible for the aircraft (Esposito and Passaro, 2009). 
The firms of the second production level manufacture complex parts and components of 
the aircraft both for the sub-systems manufacturers and for the assembler (fuselage, wings, 
motors, land gears etc.). Generally, these large firms are leaders in their own program, so that 
they belong both at the first and second level. These firms manage a very complex network of 
relationships. They are at the core of the vertical flows system of material and information 
that characterizes the production pyramid (Esposito and Passaro, 1997). They receive 
information on parts and components to be produced from the leading firm (Airbus, Boeing), 
then decide what they will produce in-house and what will be outsourced to third level 
suppliers. They also choose the third level suppliers (always considering the specifications 
and the minimum requirements of the leader firm) and follow and assist them in their growth 
process. The second level firms deliver to the leader firm all the parts and components 
realized (including the defectives ones) and the related information on their production 
process. They are also obliged to store a record of all the parts and components realized and 
the related information in order to give the leader firm the chance to verify in a very short 
time that they respect the conditions of the contract and the accuracy of the production 
process (Esposito and Passaro, 2009). 
The third production level consists of Small and Medium Enterprises (SME), 
subcontracting firms who generally work for the second production level. From the second 
level firms, they receive the information on the production process, the manufacturing 
specifications, the technical service etc. When the manufacturing process is over, they transfer 
the ordered components and relevant information to the second-level customers. Suppliers in 
this level are also controlled by the leader firm that directly checks if they are able to meet the 
quality standards required and if the production process is realized according to the 
procedures imposed in the program. In the last few years, suppliers have become increasingly 
involved for sharing the risks of the programs and in the production of parts with high added 
value, including the management of their upstream suppliers (Esposito and Passaro, 2009). 
Generally speaking, the production system of the aircraft industry has an international 
scale and involves: (a) the companies belonging to the world oligopoly (Boeing in US, Airbus 
in Europe); (b) large national firms (Alenia/Italy, Bombardier/Canada, Dornier/Germany, 
Saab/Sweden, Embraer/Brasil, etc.) with specific sectorial know-how; (c) and SMEs 
operating in a multi-tier suppliers system (Esposito and Passaro, 2009), see Figure 1.4. 
1.2.2 Specificities 
The production of the aircraft industry is characterized by managing and manufacturing 
wide range and number of components, normally over 1 million parts, components, semi-
finished items, sub-systems etc. for one aircraft. A major difference with the automotive 
industry is the much higher diversity of the parts, since aircrafts are produced in much lower 
series, but contain much more different parts. These components have different and often very 
long lead times. The aircraft manufacturer is embedded in a network of subcontractors who 
supplies the parts of the aircraft. Most importantly, the engines, amounting to 20-30% of the 
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value of an aircraft (Klepper, 1990), are developed by outside companies. Avionics, systems, 
and components (brakes, tires etc.) are often subcontracted as well. Some production stages 
are not specific to a particular type of aircraft, which makes the production planning complex. 
Some partners, sub-contractors and suppliers may be involved not only in aircraft supply 
networks, but also with other industries.  
 
Figure 1.4. Aircraft manufacturing industry (Esposito and Passaro, 2009) 
Based on these characteristics, the general constraints are to plan the production 
including a large number of parts for different types of aircrafts and to make sure these parts 
are delivered in the required moment and in the satisfying quality. In order to achieve such 
constraints, three important aspects can be emphasized:  
 Long term planning  
Since the aircraft production cycle is much longer than for other products, it requires the 
involved partners (subcontractor, supplier) to have a long term and well planned procurement, 
manufacturing, transportation etc., as well as to monitor the changes during a long period.  
 High flexibility production 
Manufacturing an aircraft is not a mass production process; every component is possibly 
different depending on the type of aircraft. This requires a high flexibility of each supply 
network member considering their production processes.  
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 Efficient relationship 
As an industry dealing with many diverse parts, inventories are to be kept at the 
minimum level while ensuring a good availability of each component, since shortage may 
have tremendous consequences. Thereby, the storage and delivery of raw material, 
components, semi-finished products, and sub-systems should be exactly as required, which 
highly depends on the efficiency of the relationship between supply network members. 
1.2.3 Specificities of the SMEs 
In the aircraft industry, many small and medium-sized (SME) firms are involved at 
different production levels. These SMEs are very important in the entire supply chain. 
Therefore, it is interesting to compare the differences between Large Enterprises (LEs) and 
SMEs and clarify the SMEs‟ specificities.  
Welsh and White (1996) succinctly summed and suggest that differences exist in 
structure, policy making procedures, and utilizations of resources to the extent that the 
application of large business concepts directly to small businesses may border on the 
ridiculous. In LEs, there are several layers of management between the manager at the 
strategic apex and operatives, resulting in the creation of a hierarchy of authority. This means 
that top managers, in large organizations, are far from the points of delivery. Thus, they are 
fully aware of the customer‟s needs, of strategic constraints and on the evolution of the 
competitive environment, but may be more far from operational issues (Ghobadian and 
Gallear, 1996). The operational processes and daily relationship with the suppliers is devoted 
to lower decisional levels, which receive their decision frames from the higher level decision 
makers. Therefore, these operational decision makers have to cope at the same time with the 
constraints coming from the upper decisional levels, mainly aiming at improving the 
efficiency of the supply network, and with the operational constraints coming from their 
suppliers, mainly linked to technical issues. 
Compared with LEs, SMEs have traditionally been modeled with characteristics 
including having few products, few customer and low volume, lacking economies of 
experience and learning capacity, being bounded rational, having higher capital and 
transaction costs, having a reactive nature, being technologically focused with weak 
marketing skills, having limited resources and high strategic reliance on CEO perceptions of 
market forces and generally being more vulnerable (Coviello and McAuley, 1999; O‟Gorman, 
2001). To the difference with large companies, SMEs often rely heavily on a low number of 
very polyvalent persons. Therefore, the distinction between the roles and decisional levels is 
much lower than for large companies. SMEs‟ funds are weak, they have usually very 
important technical skills on their specialty but a lower maturity on information technology. 
Some of the traditional approaches and methodologies promoted by large companies (lean 
manufacturing, MRP...) are considered by some authors as not suitable for SMEs because 
they prefer logical reasoning approaches over systematic planning approaches, like aggregate 
production plans, production forecast, etc. (Thakkar et al., 2008). 
In aeronautical supply chains, the difference between LEs and SMEs is emphasized due 
to the huge gap between the companies in terms of size, type of product, decision-making 
policy, production management tools etc. In SMEs, the planning process is not formal and 
multi-functional planning takes place within individual minds. Managers and operatives are 
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more likely to be directly involved with the customers. Two way and face to face 
communication is the norm in SMEs (Ghobadian and Gallear, 1996). On the other hand, 
SMEs are more likely to be “people oriented” rather than “system oriented”, and flexible. In 
fact, research shows (see (Appiah-Adu and Signh, 1998; Qualye, 2003)) that SMEs are more 
responsive to market needs, more adaptable to change, and more innovative in their ability to 
meet the customers‟ demand, but less oriented on information technology and management 
tools allowing long/middle term visibility. 
2 Supply Chain Management  
The first section of this chapter has tried to provide a general view of supply chains and 
to specify the common existing structures. Additionally, from the description of the 
specificities of aircraft supply chains, as well as from the particular specification of SMEs‟ 
characteristics involved in the industry, it is clear that management issues in such context 
require substantial efforts. Therefore, we are going to focus on supply chain management in 
the following section. 
2.1 Concept of supply chain management 
The traditional definition of supply chain management (SCM) as developed and used by 
the Global Supply Chain Forum (GSCF) is as follows: 
“Supply chain management is the integration of key business processes from 
end user through original suppliers that provides products, services, and 
information that add value for customers and other stakeholders.”  
This broad understanding of SCM concept depicts a simplified supply chain network 
structure, information and product flow, and the key supply chain business processes 
penetrating functional silos within the company, so that the various corporate silos across the 
supply chain. Thus, business processes become supply chain business processes linked across 
intra- and intercompany boundaries (Lambert and Cooper, 2000).  
There are also plenty of other definitions of SCM in the literature, coming from different 
points of view. For some authors for instance, managing a supply chain requires each member 
to have a chain-oriented attitude and at the same time to perform a specific set of collective 
actions and functions across the entire supply chain (Min and Mentzer, 2004). Thereby, 
Mentzer et al. (2001) define supply chain management as:  
“SCM is the systemic, strategic coordination of the traditional business 
functions and the tactics across these business functions within a particular 
company and across businesses within the supply chain, for the purposes of 
improving the long-term performance of the individual companies and the supply 
chain as a whole.” 
To be more operational, various implemental issues are emphasized to maintain a chain-
oriented attitude and manage a supply chain as a whole. Bowersox and Closs (1996) suggest 
that supply chain members should expand their integrated behavior to customers and suppliers, 
for instance through integration of processes from sourcing to manufacturing and to 
distribution across the supply chain.  
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Related to this integrated behavior, mutual sharing of information during planning and 
operational processes is another emphasis addressed by Cooper et al., (1997) or Tyndall et al., 
(1998). These authors suggest that frequent information updating and sharing at different 
levels (Cooper et al., 1997), such as inventory level, forecasts, sales promotion strategies, 
marketing strategies etc. reduce the uncertainty between supply partner (Yu et al., 2001) and 
result in enhanced performance (Andel, 1997; Salcedo and Grackin, 2000). 
Besides, it requires partners to build and maintain long-term relationships to perform 
successful SCM (Cooper et al. 1997; Tyndall et al. 1998; Lambert et al., 2004). Cooper et al. 
(1997) believe that the time horizon of relationship extends beyond the life of the contract, 
perhaps indefinitely, and consequently long term relationships are more efficient and effective  
than shorter ones (Lambert et al., 2004). 
2.2 Supply chain management processes 
The definitions of supply chain management lead to the notion of process. Successful 
supply chain management requires a change from managing individual functions to 
integrating activities and then to key supply chain business processes (Lambert et al., 1998). 
Therefore, many works suggest reference models for the processes of the supply chains. In 
this section, we choose to introduce some popular and widely recognized works.  
2.2.1 GSCF frameworks  
The GSCF (Global Supply Chain Forum) has suggested a framework for understanding 
Supply Chain Management based on the works of Cooper et al. (1997). This framework 
consists of eight key business processes that are both cross-functional and cross-firm in nature. 
Each supply chain management process has both strategic and operational sub-processes. The 
strategic sub-processes provide the structure for how the process will be implemented while 
the operational sub-processes provide the detailed steps for implementation. The initial 
detailed processes are:  
 Customer relationship management 
 Customer service management 
 Demand management 
 Order fulfillment 
 Manufacturing flow management 
 Procurement 
 Product development and commercialization 
 Return 
There are a lot of different terms used by authors considering the same or similar 
processes. The latest version of GSCF framework is presented by Lambert (2008), as Figure 
1.5 shows. Lambert states that the value of having standard business processes in place is that 
managers from organizations across the supply chain can use a common language and can 
link-up their firms‟ processes with other members of the supply chain, as appropriate. 
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Figure 1.5. Integrating and managing business processes across SC (Lambert, 2008). 
2.2.2 SCOR 
The Supply Chain Operations Reference Model (SCOR), developed by the Supply-Chain 
Council (SCC), provides an operations reference model that links business processes, metrics, 
best practices and technology into a unified structure (SCOR, 2008) (see Figure 1.6). The 
SCOR model has been developed to describe the business activities associated with all phases 
of satisfying a customer‟s demand. SCOR allows companies to communicate using common 
terminology and standard descriptions of the process elements that help understand the overall 
supply chain management process and the best practices that yield the optimal overall 
performance (Huang et al., 2005). It provides a decomposition of five generic processes from 
the suppliers‟ suppliers to the customers‟ customers, all aligned with the company‟s 
operational strategy, material, work, and information flows. In addition, an “enable” process 
element is added to the model in order to prepare, maintain, and manage information or 
relationships on which the other processes rely.  
 
Figure 1.6. SCOR five major management processes 
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The five processes are the followings:  
 Plan 
 Source 
 Make 
 Deliver 
 Return 
2.2.3 Supply chain operation model  
Another model for supply chain operations is suggested by Gilmour (1999) focusing on 
the logistics operation of the involved companies. This strategic model describes both a 
framework, which can be used to evaluate supply chain processes, and a group of benchmark 
measures, which can be applied to supply chain processes. The measures are based on a set of 
capabilities, which incorporate the extent of integration, and the use of technology in the 
logistics processes of an organization. It consists of six functional process capabilities (A):  
 Customer driven supply chain (A1) 
 Efficient distribution (A2) 
 Demand-driven sales planning (A3) 
 Lean manufacturing (A4) 
 Supplier partnering (A5) 
 Integrated supply chain management (A6) 
These processes are supported by enabling capabilities in information technology (B) and 
organizational characteristics (C), see Figure 1.7. 
 
Figure 1.7. The integrated supply chain model (Gilmour, 1999) 
2.2.4 ASLOG 
The ASLOG (Association française pour la LOGistique) Audit is a reference method 
provided by the French ASLOG association, which aims to improve the performance of 
overall enterprise supply chain logistics (ASLOG, 2006). The ASLOG Audit is a kind of 
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quality audit approach oriented on key processes of supply chain logistics, and on the 
development of continuous improvement plans. The ten supply chain processes suggested by 
ASLOG Audit are:  
 Management, strategies and planning 
 Design 
 Sourcing 
 Production 
 Transportation 
 Stock 
 Sales 
 Return and maintenance 
 Management of indicators 
 Permanent progress 
2.2.5 GLOBAL EVALOG 
GLOBAL EVALOG is the combination of EVALOG (Guide d‟EVAluation LOGistique) 
from global GALIA Odette and MMOG (Materials Management Operations Guideline) from 
AIAG (Automotive Industry Action Group). It allows self-assessment or audit of supply chain 
partners in the form of a questionnaire and calculating a score in the automotive industry 
(EVALOG, 2006). EVALOG focus on four processes (Gruat la Forme, 2007):  
 Customer relationship 
 Supplier relationship 
 Manufacturing 
 Product development  
These various frameworks have been compared by Gruat La Forme, (2007) and Estampe 
et al., (2011), showing their characteristics and consistence. In practice, SCOR appears to be 
the most widely used, mainly because of the large influence of the Supply Chain Council. It is 
firmly rooted in industrial practices and is poised to become an industrial standard. It is 
interesting to notice that the management of the supply chain through SCOR is performed 
using a “point-to-point” logic by connecting the “source” process of one company to the 
“deliver” process of his upstream partners. 
Despite of supply chain management processes, different type of decisions play 
important roles in synchronizing local processes and global ones, and ensuring the smooth 
workflow of supply chain management. Therefore, we are going to introduce supply chain 
management decisions in the following section.  
2.3 Supply chain management decision 
2.3.1 Decision levels  
SCM requires making decisions at various levels of a firm‟s activities (Mahmood et al., 
2003): strategic, tactical, and operational which have been defined as early as 1965 (Anthony, 
1965). These three planning levels differ in their level of aggregation and planning horizon 
(Chopra and Meindl, 2004).  
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 Strategic level  
Strategic decisions are the longest horizon activities (one year or more) allowing the firm 
to meet its defined objectives and assuring that it has the proper resources and assets 
necessary to support its long term objectives (Miller, 2001). The SC strategy has to be 
specific in considering a given SC‟s potentials and will guide the specific design of building 
blocks best serving a SC‟s needs (Stadtler and Kilger, 2007). To be precise, these decisions 
pertain to how to structure the supply chain (Lamothe et al., 2004) including the number, 
location, and capacities of manufacturing and warehousing facilities; types of products to be 
manufactured and stored at the various facilities; and the modes of transportation of materials 
through the logistic network, as well as the type of information system to be used (Mahmood 
et al., 2003).  
 Tactical level 
Tactical decisions include the medium planning (one to six months or more) focusing on 
resource allocation and resource utilization (Anthony, 1965). At the tactical level, the focus is 
on how to most effectively utilize the infrastructure and capacity that the implementation of 
strategic decisions has created (Miller, 2001). These decisions relate to defining operating 
policies that govern short-term operations. These policies may be updated anywhere between 
once quarterly and once yearly, and would pertain to such decisions as, among others, 
purchasing and inventory replenishment policies, which markets to be supplied from which 
locations, aggregate production volumes by product category at each manufacturing plant, 
and the planned buildup of inventories (Mahmood et al., 2003).  
 Operational level 
Operational decisions are day-to-day or weekly activities related to planning, scheduling 
and execution that assure that the organization performs individual tasks efficiently and 
effectively, supporting the higher level tactical plans (Anthony, 1965). At the operational 
level, the firm executes its daily decisions of operations using the resources made available by 
the tactical planning process (Miller, 2001). According to (Mahmood et al., 2003), these 
decisions are made with respect to placing replenishment orders, scheduling production, 
allocating product to individual customer orders, specifying the shipping date, and packing 
and loading each order, among many others.  
2.3.2 Decision making policy 
Supply chain is considered as an overall system, thereby supply chain management 
requires a high level of consistency between information flow and decision making processes. 
Since supply chains involve multiple members who have local objectives and global 
responsibilities, the policy of decision making considering the local decision making, supply 
chain global decision making and the relationship between these two has important effects 
towards supply chain management.  
Trentesaux (2002) suggests four classes of arrangement of the decisions: the Class 0 
(centralized form), Class 1 (proper hierarchical form), Class 2 (modified hierarchical form) 
and Class 3 (heterarchical form), see Figure 1.8.  
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Class 0 is defined as a centralized structure in which there is only one decision center 
that concentrates all the information and makes all decisions.  
Class 1 defines a hierarchical system. At each level, there are local decision centers that 
are connected with the higher level ones. It is characterized by a rigid structure in which the 
higher level centers define constraints, goals etc. and transfer these down to lower levels. 
Decision-making process is realized by means of unidirectional decisions that are passed in a 
structure looking like a decision tree. 
 
Figure 1.8. Classes of decisional arrangement (Trentesaux, 2002) 
Class 2 defines an integrated system. Compared to the hierarchical architecture, this 
architecture offers an opportunity for coordination of the decisions on the hierarchical level. 
The decision-makers on the same level can exchange information, giving rise to coordination.  
Class 3 defines a pure distributed system. It constitutes a heterarchy in which decisions 
are no longer subordinated by decisions hierarchically superior. This structure is a 
decentralized form that also offers coordination of decision-making on each level.  
According to Pujo and Kieffer (2002), hierarchical form could be considered as an 
extension of the first class, centralized form (class 0). Similarly, in the thesis of R. Affonso 
(2008), it is suggested that the modified hierarchical form (also named as coordinate structure, 
class 2) could be decomposed into proper hierarchical form (class 1) and heterarchical form 
(also named decentralized structure, class 3). Thus, centralized and decentralized forms 
(heterarchical form) are the most basic structures of decision making. In the context of supply 
chain management, these two structures are the most widely adopted for implementing the 
decision making policy. 
We shall now see how these frameworks can be applied to the case of supply chain 
management. 
 Centralized decision making in SCM 
Centralized decision making assumes that the supply chain is managed by a single 
decision maker (company) which has access to all the information and makes system optimal 
decisions (Whang, 1995; Fugate et al., 2006) (see Figure 1.9). It aims to support corporate 
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planning and purchasing, optimize system performance and better meet the global objective 
of the supply chain (Sahin and Powell, 2005). 
 
Figure 1.9. Centralized decision making in supply chain (Pujo and Kieffer, 2002) 
Centralized decision making policy focuses on determining the global plans in one single 
decision center and then decomposes them towards each supply chain member. Such policy is 
mainly implemented for managing a set of workshops or distributors belonging to the same 
company, in which case transaction data are easily collected and integrated. Furthermore, 
centralized decision making requires supply chain members to share multiple levels of 
internal data and keeps a poor level of business autonomy. This can hardly be accepted by 
independent companies, especially when they are involved in multiple supply chains or 
supply networks. 
 Decentralized decision making 
Decentralized decision making differs from centralized one in that supply chain members 
act independently to optimize their individual performance. Meeting common objectives 
requires in addition a cooperative effort among the supply chain members, who have limited 
shared information but work together, communicate and coordinate their activities to achieve 
system optimization (Whang, 1995). Each supply chain member keeps his individual decision 
center for managing his plans and operational processes. Along the entire chain, it requires to 
communicate and share some information among the members, as summarized in Figure 1.10. 
 
Figure 1.10. Decentralized decision-making in supply chain (Pujo and Kieffer, 2002) 
Decentralized decision making is widely adopted by supply chain partners aiming at 
keeping business autonomy and confidential data. However, it requires sharing information in 
multiple levels to synchronize the local decision making, and accordingly, optimize the 
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performance of the entire supply chain. Therefore, the key points of decentralized decision are 
communication, level of information sharing, and adjustment of local decision making 
according to global perspectives. Since supply chain members are individual entities pursuing 
maximum benefits, their attitude for balancing local benefits and global perspectives is the 
crucial issue to perform the decentralized decision making policy.  
2.4 Tools and methods for supply chain management 
As mentioned, supply chain management deals with two main interrelated issues: 
product flow and information flow. The main purpose is to ensure that each supply chain 
member contributes and adds value to transforming raw material into finished product 
towards the customer through coordinating local product flow and related information in 
parallel. For instance, determining the manufacturing orders (MO) according to the sales 
orders forecast and inventory level, furthermore generating the purchase orders (PO) for the 
suppliers are the routine activities of manufacturers in a supply chain. These are not easy tasks, 
especially when aiming at satisfying deliveries (at the right time, with the right quantity and 
quality, to the right places) with the imperative of lower costs. Thereby, tools, methods and 
software for supply chain management are widely suggested in the literature and in the 
industry. We choose to introduce four of them, APS, MRP/ERP, JIT/LEAN and TOC in this 
section, which are the most commonly used tools or methods in supply chain management.  
2.4.1 APS 
An APS (Advanced Planning System) is a software allowing decision making on supply 
chain design then planning and scheduling, for industries federated and synchronized between 
different divisions, within or between enterprises, to achieve total and autonomous 
optimization (Nishioka, 2005). An APS includes a range of capabilities, from finite-capacity 
scheduling at the shop floor level through to constraint-based planning (Turbide, 1998). It 
necessitates deciding when to build each order, in what operation sequence, and with what 
resources to meet the required due dates (Lee et al., 2002). Standard APS modules stem from 
the many in-house developed Decision Support Systems (DSS) that aid planners at various 
levels in the decision hierarchy (de Kok and Graves, 2003). 
APS are widely used to assist the tactical supply chain planning in centralized supply 
chains. APS can give supply chain decision makers the information on demand forecast and 
decision support capability they need, since APS tools are designed to help companies to 
balance plans and schedules, most of the time based on constraint propagation. An APS is 
also capable to monitor very detailed data about the status and constraints of each supply 
chain member and to broadcast such information to the entire supply chain through optimized 
planning (Lendermann et al., 2001). Nevertheless, it is clear that the use of an APS, requiring 
centralized supply chain management, is not adapted to our context where the problem is to 
coordinate autonomous/independent entities of the aeronautic sector. 
2.4.2 MRPII/ERP 
The MRPII (Manufacturing Resource Planning) method (Orlicky and Plossl, 1994) is an 
extension of MRP (Material Requirement Planning), both at higher and lower decisional 
levels. Its aim is to progressively build a feasible production planning, taking into account not 
only the availability of materials but also the capacity of the resources, then to monitor the 
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execution of this plan. In that purpose, the MRPII method uses the principles of hierarchical 
production planning (see right part of Figure 1.11), i.e. it checks for the feasibility of a 
progressively refined production planning at different time horizons, the accuracy of the plan 
increasing while the period of times decreases. In that way, it is possible to cope with the 
uncertainty of the demand (since the higher level plan only deals with families of products for 
which the demand is more predictable than for precise products) and to control the complexity 
of the plan (since the amount of data to take into account remains rather constant for each 
level).  
Figure 1.11 shows an example of a point-to-point supply chain management (one simple 
case of decentralized management) using a cascade of MRPII modules. The Sales and 
Operations Planning (S&OP) (Wallace, 2004), first step of MRPII, is a cross-functional 
communication and decision making process aiming at balancing demand and supply at the 
volume level. At the S&OP level, it is paid more attention to the bottlenecks and critical 
resources with a long time horizon (months or trimester). The S&OP connects the business 
planning and the lower level planning, namely the Master Production Scheduling (MPS), 
through balancing the demand and rough cut capacity. Down to the next level of planning, the 
S&OP combined with firm orders and forecast from both known customer and new ones is 
translated into a realizable production plan. At the MPS level, planning is not anymore on 
product families but on finished product, with shorter time horizon (months or weeks) ; rough 
cut capacity is adjusted from factory/workshop into more precise balancing within production 
lines or cells. Afterwards, the Material Requirement Planning (MRP) is generated, fed by the 
MPS located at the upper level. At the MRP level are generated requirements on materials 
based on the requirements on finished products created at the upper level, using the Bills of 
Material (BOM), taking into account lot sizing constraints. The MRP level generates both 
suggested production orders and suggested replenishment orders: based on the latter, the 
upstream supply chain members receive orders/forecast/supply programs generated from the 
MRP plan of their downstream partners. The final steps of the MRPII method concern the 
operational decisions aiming at managing the internal production resources: Load planning, 
where a precise load/capacity balance is performed, and Scheduling, where operations are 
sequenced before being released. 
The MRPII method requires dedicated information processing capabilities, provided in 
the past by dedicated production management tools. Nowadays, these tools are most often 
included in ERP systems. 
An ERP (Enterprise Resource Planning) is a comprehensive industrial software focusing 
on the integration of traditional functions, such as human resources, finance, sales, production, 
in business processes (Kelle and Akbulut, 2005). Built on a centralized database and normally 
utilizing a common computing platform, ERP systems consolidate all business operations into 
a uniform and enterprise wide environment. As such, they include the MRPII but also 
additional tools aiming for instance at selecting or assessing suppliers, communicating with 
the customers, etc. An ERP system could potentially enhance the data collection and 
transparency of each member across the supply chain, by eliminating information distortions 
and increase information velocity by reducing information delays. Hence, there are reasons to 
believe that ERP adoption could be associated with significant gains in supply chain 
effectiveness (Akkermans et al., 2003). 
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Figure 1.11. A point-to-point supply chain planning using MRPII method (Marcotte, 2009) 
In a decentralized supply chain, a cascade of ERP systems is considered as a mean to 
exchange information with partners, due to its advantage of local information integration. 
Since production data is clearly visualized and well formatted in ERP system, supply chain 
members have better pictures of information to exchange or to keep. MRPII (Manufacturing 
Resource Planning), the core production model of an ERP system, is usually used to perform 
and organize planning during cooperation processes, including sharing information in 
different levels of operation plans and purchase orders. On the other hand, a difficulty is of 
course the global optimization of the supply chain performance. 
2.4.3 LEAN/JIT 
Lean Manufacturing (Warnecke and Hüser, 1995) is a generic philosophy derived mostly 
from the TPS (Toyota Production System), consisting mainly in waste elimination and 
process streamlining techniques. One of the mottos of Lean is to only do “what is needed, 
when it‟s needed, in exactly the right quantities, with a minimum amount of resources”. Lean 
production is supposed to use half the human effort in the factory, half the manufacturing 
space, half the investment in tools, half the engineering hours to develop a new product in half 
the time if compared to previous methods. Also, it requires keeping far less than half the 
needed inventory on site, results in fewer defects, and produces a greater and ever growing 
variety of products (Womack et al., 1990). There is a strong emphasis in Lean Production on 
reducing the use of all resources, not only in the factory, but also in activities extending 
beyond the shop floor such as product development and supplier relations (Bruun and 
Mefford, 2004). The primary goal of Lean Production (Lamming, 1996) is to re-range the 
work flow and generate flexibility in order to achieve zero waste, such as, the lead time of 
purchasing, working in progress, storing cost in inventory.  
Lean is achieved through a set of mutually reinforcing practices, including just-in-time 
(JIT) (Crawford and Cox, 1990; Monden, 1993), total quality management (TQM), total 
productive maintenance (TPM), continuous improvement, design for manufacturing and 
assembly (DFMA), supplier management, and effective human resource management (de 
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Treville and Antonakis, 2006; Narasimhan et al., 2006; Shah and Ward, 2003, 2007). Among 
these, JIT is a principle that is closely associated with lean manufacturing. According to 
Monden (1998) and Levy (1997), JIT is the backbone of lean manufacturing, which is 
considered as a system where a customer initiates demand and the demand is then transmitted 
backward from the final assembly all the way to raw material, thus “pulling” all requirements 
just when they are required (Monden, 1998; Feld, 2000; Nahmias, 2001).  
JIT requires drastic conditions for being used, and especially a stable and mass 
production which is not really the case in the aeronautic sector. Manufacturing by small lots is 
one the key conditions for producing in JIT, but its full impact will only be obtained if raw 
materials are provided often, but in small quantities (in order to decrease raw material 
inventories) and if the customer also accepts to be delivered often and in small quantities (in 
order to decrease the finished products inventories). A full benefit of JIT requires so that this 
technique is adopted all along the supply chain: the effort of the large companies for having 
their suppliers close to their factories in the automotive sector illustrates it. Decreasing 
delivery costs and increasing reliability in deliveries require to have particular relationship 
with privileged suppliers. Real JIT is unusual for the aircraft industry, which is characterized 
by small series and quasi-craft production, high quality standards and a long time-to-market. 
Nevertheless, the principles of lean manufacturing are promoted by the large companies of the 
aeronautic sector as a key mean of improvement of the supply chain performance.  
2.4.4 TOC 
The Theory of Constraints (TOC) (Goldratt, 1990) is an extension of the OPT 
(Optimized Production Technology) method which has been suggested at the beginning of the 
1980‟s by E. Goldratt (Goldratt and Cox, 1984; Goldratt and Fox; 1986, Goldratt; 1988). The 
base of the TOC method is the interpretation of the problem of load/capacity balance 
according to three operational indicators: the rate of sale or throughput, the inventory, and the 
operating expenses. TOC focus on bottlenecks (considered as manufacturing resources in 
OPT, then as constraints with different origins in TOC), and provides a total solution for 
managing a factory in order to optimize on time delivery, inventory and operating costs 
(Pérez, 1997).  
Within a supply chain too, the global efficiency is determined by the bottleneck(s), i.e. 
the lowest productivity node(s). In a supply chain, TOC may help to specify the data elements 
(linked to the limiting constraint) that are necessary to manage the interaction among non-
constrained and constrained partner to achieve supply chain goals (Pérez, 1997). The purpose 
of supply chain management is to deal with these supply chain constraints and bring the 
supply chain performance to a higher level. TOC suggests a five-step approach to deal with 
the system‟s constraints. By this mean, TOC supports a continuous improvement philosophy, 
which considers supply chain as an ongoing process (Kampstra et al., 2006). 
The successful usage of TOC in supply chain cooperation requires to envisage the 
constrained node of supply chain and deeply dig its capabilities and potentials according to 
different requirements. It also needs to balance the constrained node and others in order to 
ensure the consistency of every stage of the supply chain. In case of movement of the 
constraining partner, the key points are re-targeting the new position of the limiting constraint 
and rebuild a balanced, efficient supply chain system. The application of TOC in supply chain 
cooperation is not an easy task and is even questioned by practitioners. One problem is that it 
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requires a heavy real time monitoring of all the supply chain resources and individual 
processes, which is rather unrealistic. Other problems are also complicated, such as how to 
determine a constraining partner in a supply chain by balancing local perspective and global 
purpose. Whether the supply chain member is willing to contribute efforts to achieve the TOC 
goals, which is the responsibility of a committed supply chain partner, is also a question.  
3 Cooperation in Supply Chain 
Although supply chain management issues have been widely considered by both 
academics and practitioners on the technical point of view, this way to address the problem is 
not sufficient to deal with the new changes of market environment. In recent decades, 
intensive competition in the market place has forced companies to respond more quickly to 
customer needs through faster product development and shorter delivery time (Simatupang 
and Sridharan, 2002). Product customization without a corresponding increase in costs is the 
new frontier in business competition for both manufacturing and service industries. To 
survive in this competitive context, manufacturers are forced to maintain high level of 
efficiency, agility, flexibility and a clear vision of entire supply chains which requires to make 
quick responses to customer‟s requirement or changes and ensure a satisfying delivery. These 
capabilities are hardly achieved by a single supply chain member, but require developing an 
increased partnership allowing information sharing, joint planning and decision making, 
favorable customer-supplier relationship and other co-working activities across the entire 
supply chain. Therefore, the term “management” is growingly completed in the literature by 
terms like coordination, cooperation, collaboration, these terms becoming more and more 
popular in research papers of several fields (industrial engineering but also social sciences or 
management). Many authors, for instance Telle, (2003) and Parrod, (2005) focus on the 
development of relevant co-working activities through determining models, methods, tools etc. 
but few of them have been interested in making a clear distinction among these terms. In the 
following section, we shall try to distinguish these terms based on the existing literature and 
on our view of the co-working among supply chain members. 
3.1 Concept of cooperation 
3.1.1 Synthesis of different terms 
All the mentioned terms, coordination, cooperation, and collaboration, represent various 
degrees of “working together” among supply chain members. However, the meaning attached 
to each word varies according to the different authors (see Table 1.1). 
3.1.1.1 Coordination 
 Etymological analysis  
Coordination is defined as the problem of mastering the numerous degrees of freedom 
involved in a particular system for reducing the number of independent variable to be 
controlled (Bernstein, 1967). The coordination problem as defined by Singh (1989) refers to 
the integration and harmonious adjustment of individual work efforts toward the 
accomplishment of a larger goal.  
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Coordination is also managing dependencies among activities performed to achieve a 
goal from coordination theory (Malone and Crowston, 1990; Malone and Crowston, 1994; 
Malone et al., 1999; Castelfranchi, 1998; Raposo et al., 2001). Coordination is the act of 
working harmoniously in a concerted way; nevertheless, each entity might have a different 
goal and use its own resources and methods (Camarinha-Matos et al., 2009). It is necessary to 
find a decomposition of the goal into independent sub goals and corresponding networks 
without mutual impediments.  
Table 1.1. Various terms on supply chain co-working 
Terms Contents Author (Year) 
Coordination  Supply Chain coordination is a vehicle for redesigning decision rights, 
workflow, and resources between chain members to leverage better 
performance.  
Lee and Whang, 
2000 
Coordination within a supply chain is a strategic response to the challenges 
that arise from these dependencies. 
Xu and Beamon, 
2006 
Coordination can be achieved when the supply chain members jointly plan 
a number of promotional activities and work out synchronized forecasts, 
on the basis of which the production and replenishment processes are 
determined. 
Hill and Omar, 
2006 
Cooperation  Cooperation refers to similar or complementary, coordinated activities 
performed by firms in a business relationship to produce superior mutual 
outcomes or singular outcomes that are mutually expected over time. 
Anderson and 
Narus,  
1990 
Cooperation is not limited to the needs of the current transaction and 
happens at several management levels (e.g., both top and operational 
managers), involving cross-functional coordination across the supply chain 
members. 
Cooper et al., 
1997 
Cooperation produces several benefits for the SC actors which have been 
identified as a list of possible advantages of the cooperative SC 
relationships including time and cost reduction, better product design, and 
improved quality. 
Albino et al., 
2007 
Collaboration A collaborative supply chain simply means that two or more independent 
companies work jointly to plan and execute supply chain operations with 
greater success than when acting in isolation.  
Simatupang et 
al., 2002 
Collaborations in supply network mean long-term relationships among 
members through reductions in transaction costs, and increase in resource 
sharing, learning, and sharing of knowledge. 
Cousins, 2002 
Collaboration provides an effective mechanism for the joint creation and 
promotion of new technical standards. 
Bahinipati et al, 
2009 
Mixed Terms Collaboration includes knowledge integration and cooperation between 
organizations, which are recognized as resources that might generate 
competitive advantage. 
Grant, 1996 
Collaborative working for joint planning, joint product development, 
mutual exchange information and integrated information systems, cross 
coordination on several levels in the companies on the network, long term 
cooperation and fair sharing of risks and benefits. 
Larsen, 2000 
Besides, coordination involves aligning/altering activities so that more efficient results 
are achieved. The work which is coordinated involves more than one person, includes shared 
objectives, requires an understanding of personal roles and responsibilities, and is generally 
overseen by someone (e.g. coordinator). There is a general assumption that there may be 
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overlaps in the work, even though different people/units come into the process working on 
specific pieces. Coordination of joint activities occurs as businesses become entwined in a 
real-time exchange of information on goals, tasks and resources in many areas, such as 
demand planning, distribution, transportation and manufacturing (Seifert, 2002).  
 Supply Chain contextual analysis 
In the context of a supply chain, authors hold various opinions. Simatupang et al., (2002) 
consider that coordination among independent supply chain members, such as raw-material 
suppliers, manufacturers, distributors, third-party logistics providers and retailers, is the key 
to attaining the flexibility necessary to enable them to progressively improve logistics 
processes in response to rapidly changing market conditions. Poor coordination among the 
chain members can cause dysfunctional operational performance. According to Simatupang et 
al., coordination in supply chain should deal with the entire processes and operational 
performance. In the same manner, Konijnendijk (1994) examined the coordination process at 
the tactical and operational levels in terms of product specification, volume, mix and lead-
times between sales and manufacturing in engineer-to-order (ETO) companies. Stank et al. 
(1999) studied coordination processes characterized by effective communication, information 
exchange, partnering and performance monitoring in food industry supply chains.  
Different from the above statements, Arshinder et al. (2007) suggest that supply chain 
coordination relate to an effective management of disparate but dependent members/processes, 
not only through coordinating different and complex processes of supply chain involving 
human system (as supply chain members), but also different difficulties and interests, like 
opportunistic behavior, disagreements over domain of decisions and actions, inappropriate 
performance measures, misalignment of performance measures with overall supply chain, 
traditional and outdated policies, failure to differentiate with whom to coordinate, lack of trust 
etc.  
3.1.1.2 Cooperation 
 Etymological analysis  
Groves (1985) perceives cooperation as the association of a number of persons for their 
common benefit; as a collective action in the pursuit of common wellbeing, especially in 
industry or business. Cooperation requires division of labor among participants, meaning that 
each person is responsible for a portion of the problem solving. The task is split hierarchically 
into independent subtasks (Dillenbourg et al., 1996; Dillenbourg, 1999; Roschelle and 
Teasley, 1995). Cooperation is also considered as a structure of interaction designed to 
facilitate the accomplishment of a specific end product or goal through people working 
together in groups (Panitz, 1997). It suggests compliance in some manner, sharing something, 
all for mutual benefit, thereby, the motives and the actions in cooperation are parallel and 
mutual (Taylor, 1957).  
Cooperation is a function of mutual dependence: in cooperation, in the strict sense, 
agents depend on one another to achieve the same goal. They are co-interested in the 
convergent result of the common activity (Castelfranchi, 1998). Minimum requirements for 
cooperation include partial goal agreement, joint usage of limited resources, coordination of 
individual actions and definitions of goals and conventions relevant to the joint tasks. 
Cooperation involves not only communication, information exchange, and adjustments of 
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activities, but also resources sharing for achieving compatible goals (Camarinha-Matos et al., 
2009).  
 Supply Chain contextual analysis 
In the context of supply chain, Albino et al. (2007) consider cooperation as suppliers and 
buyers becoming strategic partners, sharing risks and benefits, exchanging operating and 
financial information, making joint investments in facilities and systems, jointly involved in 
continuous improvement and new product development programs, and making their success 
interdependent. Such cooperation is based on a “strategic partnership” also called cooperative 
SC relationships (Scott and Westbrook, 1991; Ellram, 1991). In such business relationship 
(Anderson and Narus, 1990), cooperation starts with joint planning and ends with joint 
control activities to evaluate performance of the supply chain members as well as the supply 
chain as a whole (Ellram and Cooper, 1990; Cooper et al., 1997; Tyndall et al. 1998). 
Cooperation between organizations to manage logistical, financial, technical and design 
interdependencies means that a product market supply chain behaves as one unit - the 
competition between individual organizational units diminishes and is replaced by 
competition between supply chains (Holland, 1995). 
3.1.1.3 Collaboration 
 Etymological analysis  
Collaboration is the most formal inter-organizational relationship involving shared 
authority and responsibility for planning, implementation, and evaluation of a joint effort 
(Hord, 1986). Collaboration is also a philosophy of interaction and personal lifestyle where 
individuals are responsible for their actions, including learning and respect the abilities and 
contributions of their peers (Panitz, 1997). Nokkentved (2000) views collaboration as 
negotiated cooperation between independent companies, by exchanging capabilities and 
constraints to improve collective responsiveness and profitability. He specifically defines 
inter-organizational collaboration as the process by which organizations exchange 
information, alter activities, share resources and enhance each others‟ capacity for mutual 
benefit and common purpose by sharing risks, responsibilities and rewards. Collaboration is 
accomplished by involving the mutual engagement of participants in a coordinated effort to 
solve the problem together. Successful collaborative work requires a culture of collaboration, 
leadership, common vision, information support systems and teamwork. A collaboration 
process happens for instance in concurrent engineering, when a team of experts jointly 
develop a new product (Camarinha-Matos et al., 2009). 
The goal of collaboration is not to establish a positive relationship between partnering 
groups, but the pursuit of a specific result. Collaboration relies on both cooperation and 
coordination of efforts, but goes far beyond these two working relationships. Collaboration is 
not about consensus building. A true collaborative effort creates something new with a 
collaborative brainstorm (e.g. a new philosophy, way of doing something, changes in overall 
personnel roles) and is ever evolving and dynamic in nature. Creating collaboration requires a 
hard work, and needs constant tending. It requires a great deal of time and communication.  
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 Supply Chain contextual analysis 
For some authors, a collaborative supply chain simply means that two or more 
independent companies work jointly to plan and execute supply chain operations with greater 
success than when acting in isolation (Simatupang et al., 2002). For others, collaborations in 
supply networks mean long-term relationships among members (Lauras et al., 2003) through 
reductions in transaction costs, and increase in resource sharing, learning, and sharing of 
knowledge (Cousins, 2002). Collaboration is more than sharing information and horizontally 
integrating the operations of the network, since collaboration is largely a social process while 
information sharing is largely a technological process (Shore and Venkatachalam, 2003). In 
order to achieve collaboration in a supply chain, the manufacturer and the supplier exchange 
information and goals on demand plans, customer patterns, product design and development, 
as well as incorporating bulk buying discount and availability. Collaboration, which is most 
appropriate when issues or opportunities faced by supply chain partners are too difficult or 
complex to be resolved individually, requires joint planning and decision-making; open 
sharing of information; a free flow of creative ideas and rich communication through face-to-
face meetings (Nix et al., 2004). 
3.1.1.4 Synthesis 
It can be seen from the previous statements of coordination, cooperation and 
collaboration in both etymological and supply chain context, that various (and sometimes 
inconsistent) definitions of these terms have been given in the literature. Often, supply chain 
academics and professionals use the words collaboration, coordination, and cooperation 
interchangeably. For instance, Arshinder et al. (2007) suggest that coordination in supply 
chain is not only to coordinate process, but also to coordinate the difficulties and interests, 
like opportunistic behavior, lack of trust etc, which are also considered as the element of 
cooperation. Similarly, some authors use the term “coordination” (Lee and Whang, 2000; Hill 
and Omar, 2006), however communicate on the concept of co-working, not only managing 
the interdependency of supply chain members, but also sharing resource/risks, joint planning, 
building a long term and efficient partnership, which seems to be closer to issues of 
cooperation. Lauras (2004) proposes to distinguish terms like coordination, cooperation, 
collaboration, partnership through their characteristics in data processing (exchange 
information, exchange processes and exchange both information and processes). Comparing 
with other authors, this distinction of different terms pays less attention to other critical 
elements, such as relationship, joint decision making, trust etc. Another work proposed by 
Camarinha-Matos and Afsarmanesh (2008) separates terms like networking, coordination, 
cooperation and collaboration based on their interaction maturity levels considering common 
goal-oriented risk taking, commitment, and resources that participants must invest into the 
joint endeavor. 
Based on the original etymology of these terms, we have tried to clarify what 
characterizes these different situations. The primary difference between these terms is that 
coordination emphasizes the efficiency of local processes combined with clear definitions of 
assignments and roles of each member. Individuals or organizations that achieve coordination 
are interdependent and use their local resources and methods. More than coordination, 
cooperation and collaboration aim to pursue mutual benefits through sharing resource. The 
concept refers not only to efficiency but also to global responsibilities, joint planning and 
moreover relationship between co-working members. The cooperative attitude and motivation, 
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mutual respect and trust, communication, and sharing information are crucial for both 
cooperation and collaboration; we shall investigate this point in further details in Chapter 5. In 
addition to cooperation, collaboration also stresses the collaborative brainstorm to new 
creation or innovation. Detailed different attributes of coordination, cooperation and 
collaboration are showed as Figure 1.12. 
 
Figure 1.12. Attributes of different terms of working together 
In nowadays context, organizations have recognized long term and better partnership as 
very important to develop powerful competitiveness. Therefore, cooperation with partners in 
supply chains means no longer only coordinating individual assignments nor behaving 
dependently. It requires a cooperative environment and global responsibilities through sharing 
resource, joint planning, mutual respect and trust, motivation etc. On the other hand, it is 
normally not obliged to create a collaborative brainstorm environment in order to maintain the 
satisfied performance of the global supply chain. Therefore, in the following sections, we 
choose to utilize term of “cooperation” to describe the activities and behaviors when supply 
chain members work together and pursue mutual benefits, furthermore maintain a high level 
of efficiency, agility and flexibility.  
3.1.2 Objectives of supply chain cooperation  
As mentioned, we propose to adopt the term “cooperation” which emphasizes the 
management of interdependent supply chain members who pursue common goals and mutual 
benefits. A cooperative environment is very important and has significant impact on supply 
chain members‟ behaviors, including sense of global responsibilities, mutual respect and trust, 
motivation and etc. In the context of supply chains, cooperation among supply chain members 
is an efficient way to maintain an agile and flexible network of procurement, manufacturing 
and distribution. Consequently, the involved members should be able to better visualize the 
entire functions of the supply chain or supply network and should be capable to make quick 
response and adjustment to the customer‟s requirements.  
Thereby, the primary objective of supply chain cooperation is to ensure that the involved 
members perform their operational activities and cooperative behaviors coherently in order to 
achieve the common goals and mutual benefits. Secondly, since technical aspects are not 
sufficient for a cooperative performance, supply chain cooperation needs to establish a better 
customer-supplier relationship in which behavior issues (like trust, power, etc.) play important 
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roles. Such customer-supplier relationship is an essential prerequisite for supply chain 
members working together coherently, furthermore being more agile and flexible as an 
alignment which could improve the satisfaction of customers.  
3.2 Practical methods for supply chain cooperation  
Since supply chain cooperation has gained substantial attention both in literature and 
practice, relevant methods for cooperation are growingly highlighted and successfully 
achieved by practitioners. In the following section, we will introduce some of these methods 
which are practically used in companies.  
3.2.1 Efficient Customer Response 
Efficient consumer response (ECR) is a U.S. supply chain management strategy which 
attempts to address the inefficiencies which have led to excessive inventory and unnecessary 
costs at all levels within the grocery industry supply chain (Harris, 1999). The concept of 
ECR is based on vertical cooperation in manufacturing and retailing with the objective of an 
efficient satisfaction of consumer needs (Seifert, 2003).  
There are four focus areas under ECR: Demand management, Supply management, 
Enablers and Integrators, which are intended to be addressed as an integrated set. These areas 
compose the basis of the ECR Global Scorecard 1 . On the supply management side, 
cooperation in logistics between manufacturers and retailers should result in optimal supply 
chain management. On the demand management side, collaboration in marketing via category 
management (Zenor, 1994) and the exchange of customer data makes it possible for all parties 
to achieve a more efficient marketing mix. ECR called for the creation of a timely and 
accurate flow of information, which heavily relies on Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) and 
strategic alliance between supply chain members (Sansolo, 1993). 
3.2.2 Collaborative Planning, Forecasting and Replenishment  
The CPFR (Collaborative Planning, Forecasting and Replenishment) (CPFR, 2000) is a 
business practice that aims at involving multiple trading partners in the planning and 
fulfillment of the customer demands. CPFR links sales and marketing best practices, such as 
category management, to supply chain planning and execution processes in order to increase 
availability while reducing inventory, transportation and logistics costs. CPFR is considered 
as a concept that emphasizes supply chain cooperation by supporting and assisting joint 
practices of cooperative management of inventory through joint visibility and replenishment 
of products throughout the supply chain. CPFR is the further development of ECR on the 
supply side. The purpose of CPFR is so to improve reaction time to consumer demand, direct 
and lasting communication (Seifert, 2003), and the performance of collaborative activities 
between manufacturer, seller and retailer while performing the following processes:  
 Strategy & Planning: establishes the rules for the collaborative relationship. It 
determines product mix and placement, and develops event plans for the period.  
                                                          
1
 http://www.globalscorecard.net 
Chapter 1 Literature View 
32 
 Demand & Supply Management: defines the project consumer (point-of-sale) 
demand, as well as order and shipment requirements over the planning horizon. 
 Execution: places orders, prepares and delivers shipments, receives and stores 
products on retail shelves, records sales transactions and make payments. 
 Analysis: monitors planning and execution activities for exception conditions. 
Aggregates results, and calculates key performance metrics. Shares insights and 
adjust plans for continuously improved results. 
CPFR establishes guidelines for enterprises to integrate their planning processes across 
corporate boundaries. CPFR intends to ensure that the industry actually captures the benefits 
of inter- and intra-enterprise collaboration through a common, pragmatic approach. CPFR 
helps trading partners generate the most accurate forecast possible and set highly effective 
replenishment plans. Practitioners report major benefits in higher service levels, decreased 
inventories and increased sales (CPFR, 2000). Other benefits of CPFR include drastically 
improved reaction time to consumer demand and direct and lasting communication (Seifert, 
2003).  
3.2.3 Vendor Managed Inventory  
VMI (Vendor Managed Inventory) is a supply chain strategy where the vendor or 
supplier is given the responsibility of managing the customer‟s stock (Disney and Towill, 
2003). In VMI strategy, the buyer of a product provides information to a supplier on that 
product and the supplier takes full responsibility for maintaining an agreed inventory of the 
material, at the buyer‟s consumption location (usually a store). A third party logistics provider 
can also be involved to make sure that the buyer has the required level of inventory by 
adjusting the demand and supply gaps. Keys to making VMI work is shared information and 
cooperation trustworthy relationship between partners.  
VMI changes the approach for solving the problem of supply chain cooperation. Instead 
of just putting more pressure on suppliers‟ performance by requiring ever faster and more 
accurate deliveries, VMI gives the supplier both responsibility and authority to manage the 
entire replenishment process (Kaipia et al., 2002). The advantages of VMI are to decrease 
cost, inventory level and complexity of supply and delivery, meanwhile, increase efficiency 
and service ratio with a clearer view of market requirements.  
3.3 SME’s specific problems towards supply chain cooperation 
As previously mentioned, supply chain cooperation requires to maintain consistent 
working processes and a good customer-supplier relationship in order to perform and behave 
coherently and efficiently, but also require the use of enabling methods (like MRPII) and 
tools (like ERP systems). Normally, large companies have a good competence on these 
enabling methods and tools and are willing to invest and input resource to develop their 
relationship with other supply chain members and make it operational. SMEs are often in a 
different situation.  
According to Dangayach and Deshmukh (2001), from the manufacturing strategy point 
of view, the key strengths of SMEs are flexibility, quick decision-making, high skilled 
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competence and cooperation from employees, while weakness are the lack of technical 
superiority, lack of infrastructural facility and financial resources. Globalization has brought 
increased pressure on manufacturing SMEs who have to continually reduce prices against a 
backdrop of improving quality and services. For many SMEs, the expenditure on goods and 
services account for a high production of turnover and it is influential in the achievement of 
business objectives (Morrissey and Pittaway, 2004). In practice, the differences between 
SMEs and LEs are likely to influence the efficiency of the supply chain management, since 
building relationships with suppliers may be more difficult for SMEs than for large firms. 
SMEs do not always have a clear supply chain strategy and highly dependent on 
subcontracting, supplier‟s deliveries etc. Being under hard financial pressure, SMEs are 
sometimes considered as more cash focused (Brynjolfsson, 1994), more oriented on 
maximizing benefits in order to survive in competitions.  
From the implementation point of view, the literature on supply chains suggests that 
SMEs and LEs implement SCM differently. Apparently, this difference in implementation is 
significantly associated with SME performance in supply chain (Arend and Wisner, 2005). 
Due to the low number of levels of the hierarchy and on the overlapping of responsibilities 
between the managers and planners, SMEs seems to be more flexible. In addition, the 
information needs of manufacturing SMEs in planning their internal supply chains are 
different from the large organization (Huin et al., 2002). Meanwhile, lack of effective 
adoption of SCM techniques was clearly pointed out in a study of 288 UK small to medium-
sized industrial enterprises in (Quayle, 2003). Large companies commonly adopt different 
kind of information systems. For instance, in the aeronautical industry, most of the large 
companies use MRPII systems to organize and plan their procurement, production, 
distributions processes. However, SMEs do not always have the motivation for implementing 
such production management systems. Instead, they often define their own empirical way to 
process information, sometimes using Excel sheets or Access applications. Such differences 
have an important impact on coherent activities across supply chains, like information sharing, 
joint planning etc. 
A group of studies focused on management components of the supply chain (Lambert et 
al., 1998) suggests some considerations on the behavioral side of the management that 
influences the SMEs towards SCM, including power aspects between companies, risk, reward 
structures, etc. Some findings suggest that since LEs consider SMEs as being easy to replaced, 
buyers may be reluctant to form partnerships with SMEs (Arend and Wisner, 2005). With a 
more positive point of view, “supplier development” (Leenders, 1996) is growingly capturing 
attentions in the buyer side. LEs may be willing to donate efforts in order to increase the 
number of viable suppliers and improve supplier‟s performance or capacity (Krause et al., 
2007) through supplier development programs (Jensen and Jensen, 2007; von Axelson, 2009). 
From the supplier‟s side, SMEs do not deploy SCM; rather they often keep an arm‟s length 
relationship with large customers (Quayle, 2003; Arend and Wisner, 2005). Some cases show 
that the SMEs may view the SCM as the exertion of power by customers and consequently as 
a one-way process. One study claims, for example, that if a key partner forces a less powerful 
SME supplier to implement SCM, the performance in the chain will decrease (Arend and 
Wisner, 2005). In addition, since many SMEs are not used to or trained in wide-ranging risk 
assessments, SMEs desire clear and sufficient communication to decrease their own risks 
according to their roles in the entire supply chain. Besides, SMEs hold quite different attitudes 
towards cooperation with LEs. SMEs are always sensitive about the turnover from LEs, 
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especially in high level of management, since such changes in LEs may lead to unstable 
cooperation towards suppliers. Therefore, SMEs often prefer to cooperate in more formal 
manners, such as fixing all the issues into the contract, rather than informal cooperation with a 
single high level manager from LEs.  
4 Conclusion of chapter 1 
In chapter 1, we have firstly introduced the concept of supply chain which involves a set 
of individual organizations working together for achieving products. These organizations 
operate on a product flow transforming raw materials into several semi-finished articles (parts, 
components, sub-systems) and finally into finished products towards customers. In parallel, 
information flows consists of orders/demand, updating status of inventory, and technical data 
mainly processed from downstream to upstream. Traditionally, the structure of supply chains 
is characterized by serial, convergent, divergent and conjoined structures. Each type of 
structure is applicable to different industries. Along with the changes of market and the ever 
growing competition, these traditional structures are evolving towards a more complex 
structure, the supply network. Supply networks are now usual in many sectors, including 
aircraft manufacturing industries. In addition, we have discussed the specificity of 
aeronautical supply chains, and described the involvement of the SMEs in such chains.  
Secondly, we have stressed the concept of supply chain management and identified the 
existing models of supply chain management processes. In order to better organize the 
integrated processes, different levels of decision making (strategic, tactical and operational) 
have been introduced in the literature through several decision making policies, such as 
centralized decision making and decentralized decision making. Besides, many tools and 
methods are suggested to support supply chain management. The most popular ones are APS, 
MRPII /ERP, Lean/JIT and TOC (the latter being marginal).  
With the present industrial context, characterized by more sensitive competition, highly 
customization and globalization, it is necessary for manufacturers to have a better 
visualization of the entire supply chain functions and maintain high level of efficiency, agility 
and flexibility. Therefore, cooperation between partners is emphasized as a key point for 
improving supply chain performance. We introduced the concept of cooperation in the last 
part of this chapter, trying to explain the different meanings attached to several close terms, 
like coordination, cooperation and collaboration. Accordingly, we suggested using the term 
“cooperation” in this study, representing the co-working among supply chain member 
pursuing the common goals and mutual benefits under an open and cooperative environment 
of motivation, mutual respect and trust, information sharing, jointly planning and decision 
making and better customer-supplier relationship. In practice, many methods, like ECR, 
CPFR, VMI etc. are proved as efficient ways to support cooperation in supply chains for 
different industries, but do not address all the aspects of the customer-supplier relationship.  
In the next chapter, we will describe some case studies from the aeronautical industry, 
showing the actual situations of cooperation between customers and suppliers at different 
operational levels. From these cases, we would like to show that real practices are not always 
consistent with theoretical methods.  
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Chapter 2 
Case Studies and Lessons Learnt 
The efforts of academics and practitioners, as introduced in chapter 1, have 
already helped supply chain members to better perform and manage their 
cooperation with others. Because of the growing complexity of supply chains 
structure, of the increasingly sensitive competition and of the changeable market 
environment, analysis of real cases often shows the distance between theoretical 
models and the industrial reality. Aiming at better understanding the problems in 
real industrial situations, especially in the aeronautic sector, some examples of 
situations taken from cases studies are described in chapter 2.  
1 Case studies  
During the last few years, several members of our research team have been involved in 
projects aiming at analyzing or improving the cooperation in supply chains, among which 
APOSAR2, which ended in 2010, is the most recent. APOSAR was conducted by the IODE 
federative structure3, with partial funding from an association of companies of the aeronautic 
sector and from a public body interested in SMEs development. The objective of the project 
was to analyze the problems linked to the cooperation between partners of aeronautical supply 
chains on two main domains: collaborative design and product flow management (only the 
results concerning product flow management will be detailed here). Twenty companies were 
visited in that purpose: 7 large ones and 13 of middle (around 200 employees) or low (less 
than 100 employees) size. If the relatively low number of visited companies does not allow to 
fully guaranteeing the generality of the identified problems and situations, it is consistent with 
the results of previous projects on the same domain (Affonso, 2008) and shows that some 
existing problems are not yet fully taken into account by the methods promoted in the sector.  
The main processes defining the relationship between customers and suppliers in the 
visited supply chains will be first presented. These processes are based on the interviewed 
companies‟ description of their working procedures at different levels. They will allow us to 
locate as a second step several problems showing the difficulties appearing in practice. 
1.1 Practical structure of supply and demand process 
1.1.1 Considered processes 
The results of the interviews performed in the companies have been structured according 
to four main processes (Ming et al., 2009; Grabot et al., 2010): 
 Request For Quotation (RFQ) 
 Forecasts processing (middle term planning) 
                                                          
2 APOSAR stands for Analysis of Organizational Problems in the Regional Aeronautical Sector 
3 IODE is a group of researchers in Industrial Engineering in the South West of France 
(http://idce.enit.fr/iode/) 
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 Short term planning - Execution 
 Audits/management of changes 
Only the first three ones will be detailed here. These three levels are consistent with the 
basic framework described in chapter 1 (see Figure 1.11) but are more detailed and include 
some specificities of the aeronautic sector. 
The RFQ, aiming here at defining long lasting collaborations, is a long term and high 
level supply chain process (see Figure 2.1, all the processes being described using the ARIS 
model (Davis, 2008)). A RFQ describing the required part and the conditions of the program 
(prices, cycle times etc.) is sent to possible suppliers. The suppliers analyze this RFQ and 
send an answer, or detect problems either on the part definition or on the conditions, which 
they will try to negotiate. The customer receives the answers, compares them and selects one 
(or several) supplier based on his answer and on his previous performance, if the supplier is 
already known. A contract is then prepared, defining rough quantities to be ordered and prices 
through time. The selected supplier tries then to organize its production for the last 
months/years according to all the programs in which he is involved, for all the supply chains 
to which he belongs. 
 
Figure 2.1. Request for quotations (ARIS formalism) 
Forecasts processing is a middle term process (see Figure 2.2). It is based on an agreed 
standard about the various periods of the forecasts: firm period, flexible period and free 
period. In the firm period, the orders are confirmed by the customer. In the flexible period, 
supplier and customer agree on the limits of possible variations, e.g. ±20%. Within such limits, 
any orders changes have to be accepted. Any change can be performed in the free period, 
which is only considered as informative. The total of the three horizons may cover a period of 
two to three years in the aeronautic sector, to be compared to the cycle time of an aircraft, 
which is close to one year. The forecasts are updated every month or every two months. 
After receiving orders forecasts from his customers, the supplier enters these forecast in 
his local information system (production management system based on MRP, planning on 
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Excel, etc.) in order to make a production plan. Accordingly, middle-term organization, raw 
material purchasing and supplier selection are performed to prepare the execution of this plan.  
 
Figure 2.2. Forecasts processing 
Execution is a short term process (see Figure 2.3). On the customer‟s side, the short term 
planning is made according to the mid-term planning, in accordance with the programs and 
terms defined in the contracts with the suppliers. The firm orders are confirmed regularly, 
allowing the supplier to build his own short term planning by taking into account the local 
inventories, available raw material and actual delivery performance of its own suppliers. In 
the aeronautic industry, urgencies (see top of Figure 2.3) can concern up to 30% of the parts 
for companies which are at the end of the supply chain, performing activities like thermal 
treatment. The most critical urgency is called “AOG” for Aircraft On Ground. These 
urgencies require quick adjustments at the supplier‟s side, usually combined with quick 
delivery from the supplier‟s supplier.  
 
Figure 2.3. Short term planning – Execution 
1.1.2 Basis of the contracts  
It is clear that the management of supplier-customer interactions at different levels of the 
process is firstly governed by formal contracts, usually fixed in the RFQ process. Our primary 
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focus here is the agreed items in the contract, which are related to demand and supply 
material/components, as well as the corresponding information flow.  
We have positioned the information extracted from the interviews in the framework 
suggested by Anupindi and Bassok (2003), defining a set of parameters over which supply 
and demand contract is observed:  
Horizon Length: This specifies the duration for which the contract is valid. 
Case studies: Very different cases have been encountered during the interviews, 
but mainly contracts on several years, which can be broken at any moment if 
the customer finds better conditions elsewhere. 
Pricing: This is interpreted with a broad sense in order to incorporate all financial flow. 
Clearly, one component for this is the purchase price. This could take several forms. For 
example, it could be linear (proportional) or non-linear (e.g., two-part tariff). In addition, 
other types of payment structures can be set up. For example, credit for return of goods by a 
buyer, holding cost subsidies from a supplier to a buyer, payments for inability to supply (e.g., 
due to stock-out), etc. Thus pricing may be also depend on other parameters of the contract. 
Case studies: The characteristic observed during the interviews in the decrease 
of the price through time, obliging the supplier to gain productivity every year 
or to submit initial prices including an extra margin, with the risk to be more 
expensive than the other suppliers. 
Periodicity of Ordering: This specifies how often a buyer can place orders. It could be 
fixed (for example, a buyer may be asked to place orders at the beginning of each month), or 
random (any day of the month). 
Case studies: Very different cases have been seen here, for instance: order by 
day for the firm orders, by week at mid-term, and by month at longer term. For 
others, the orders were planned by day on the whole forecasting horizon, even 
if their precise positioning will be set into question through time. 
Quantity Commitment: Quantity Commitments by a buyer could be on orders, its 
demand, or capacity of the supplier. Order Commitments take two generic forms: 
 Total Minimum Commitment: for single products, this implies that a buyer commits 
to cumulative purchases of at least a certain quantity; this is referred to as Total 
Minimum Quantity Commitment. For multiple products, this usually takes the form 
of commitments to purchase at least a certain minimum value of goods, referred to as 
Total Volume Commitment.  
 Periodical Commitment: A buyer makes a commitment to purchase a certain 
quantity every period.  
Case studies: Again, different cases were denoted by the interviews, especially 
in the flexible period: for instance, quantities cancelled during the flexible 
period were to be accepted by the customer before the end of the year in some 
cases. The goal is here to keep some flexibility without destabilizing the 
supplier. 
Chapter 2 Case Studies and Lessons Learnt 
39 
Demand Commitment: Under demand commitment a buyer commits to source a 
fraction of all his demand from a specific supplier. Let us observe that under such 
commitment, the uncertainty of the demand process is shared with the supplier.  
Case studies: To our knowledge, this specific type of partnership does not seem 
to be currently used in the aeronautic sector. 
Capacity Commitment: under capacity commitment, a buyer usually reserves a fraction 
of the supplier‟s capacity. For example, in agricultural contracts, a buyer commits to buy all 
production from certain acreage; in the semiconductor industry, often buyers purchase a 
certain fraction of the capacity of a supplier‟s foundry wafer fabrication facility.  
Case studies: Capacity commitment seems to quite rare, but has been 
mentioned by several large companies, who would like to secure the reliability 
of some critical suppliers, like those providing thermal treatment or some 
specific raw materials. It is clear that such contract seems to be based on a 
weak position of the customer regarding his supplier. 
Flexibility: Whenever a buyer makes some commitments on the quantities to be 
purchased, it is asked to the supplier to provide some flexibility allowing him to be able to 
adjust these quantities through time. The contract may specify the magnitude and frequency 
of adjustment. For example, a supplier may specify the additional (unlimited) quantities 
which may be ordered, but no more than two times during the contract horizon. In the 
contracts with restrictions on the magnitude of commitments, the extent of adjustments 
allowed may or may not be a function of the commitment made. Furthermore, the additional 
flexibility may come at extra cost to the buyer. 
Case studies: In the aeronautical domain, flexibility seems to be universally 
handled through firm, flexible and free periods in the forecasts, as defined 
above. 
Delivery Commitment: A supplier usually makes a commitment for the material 
delivery process. A commitment on the lead time would specify the delay in delivery of the 
material. Service level agreements on the lead time for the entire orders or on fractions of the 
orders are common. Of course, this is usually coupled with a mutual agreement upon 
shipment policy. A shipment policy will specify if a buyer accepts multiple shipments for the 
same order.  
Case studies: Delivery commitment usually includes an agreement about the cycle time 
for each product, but this cycle time may be real (the supplier only needs this time to 
manufacture the product) or more often, apparent. In this case, the supplier must have raw 
materials or sub-components available in order to satisfy the constraint of the cycle time. 
Quality: Quality restrictions could come in terms of defects rates, specification, etc. 
Case studies: The aeronautic sector is of course a domain where quality is of 
prime importance. Usually, the supplier engages himself to only deliver good 
parts, but quality is sometimes not a binary evaluation, and negotiation is often 
used for obtaining dispensation on non-critical points. 
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Information Sharing: This characterizes the information flow between a buyer and a 
supplier. Specifically, it outlines what type of information will be shared between the buyer 
and a supplier. For example, a buyer (retailer) may pass on the sales data to its supplier.  
Case studies: Again, very different practices have been seen, linked to the 
customer but also to the supplier. Some suppliers only send orders, and ask to 
be delivered on time. Others send additional information, like their present 
level of inventory on the concerned part, in order to show the level of priority 
of the order to their supplier (we shall come back to this point later on). Some 
suppliers give access to their customers to a web site on which the status of the 
order is actualized day by day. Information sharing on the manufacturing 
processes is also possible, but the suppliers are often reluctant to share all 
their knowledge with their customer. 
Penalties: Even if they are not mentioned in (Anupindi and Bassok 2003), penalties in 
case of late deliveries are often included in the contracts concluded in the aeronautic sector. 
Nevertheless, these penalties are seldom applied:  
Case studies: during the interviews, several logistic managers of large 
companies explained that late deliveries were the external symptom of 
organizational difficulties of the supplier. Adding penalties is only a way to 
destabilize the supplier still more, and it is usually preferred to ask him to 
launch improvement projects. Therefore, penalties seem to be more dissuasive 
than really applied in the aeronautical domain. 
1.2 Practical operations in case studies 
The usual solution to perform such supply and demand processes, which is promoted for 
coordinating the partners, is through a cascade of local MRPII systems (see Figure 1.11 in 
chapter 1). Forecasts based on the expected customer‟s demand are built by the focal 
company of the chain (usually the final assembler in the aeronautic sector) then processed 
using the MRPII principles. After the MRP step, planned orders allow to build a supply plan 
(including forecasts) which is sent to the tier n+1 partners. We will take a simple example to 
show the usages of MRP as promoted by the large companies.  
1.2.1 Use of MRP as promoted by the large companies  
As already seen, the end-products are manufactured in the aeronautic sector on the base 
of firm orders but also forecasted ones, including a firm, a flexible and a free period. The idea 
is then that, in consistence with the principles described in chapter 1, the forecasts will be 
propagated upstream the supply chain in order to allow each partner to manage its production. 
Let us take an example for illustration (see Figure 2.4): the focal company A builds his sales 
forecasts based on firm orders and expected ones at long term. If the cycle time of its product 
(for instance an aircraft) is one year, the firm period of the forecasts should be at least one 
year (but preferably more). Let us suppose that this cycle time is the addition of an internal 
assembly process equal to six months plus external supplies requiring six more months. Let us 
consider that these additional six months are divided into: two months for the internal work of 
supplier B, and four months for the supply of the raw materials (supplier C). As a 
consequence, if the customer does not confirm a forecasted order expected on month 13, 
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company A will have to cancel an internal load positioned on months 7 to 13, together with an 
order sent to supplier B due on month 5. This order was to be released on month 4 at B‟s side. 
As a consequence, supplier B will have to cancel an order he planned to send to his raw 
material supplier C next month (left part of Figure 2.4). 
 
Figure 2.4. Cycle time and firm horizon 
As shown in the previous section, the lead time of the suppliers, as well as the prices, are 
discussed during the RFQ process. Indicators aiming at measuring the performance of the 
suppliers (mainly based on a service ratio) are also defined. 
According to this “theoretical” framework, the key issue is to check that each partner of 
the supply chain (and especially the smallest ones) is able to process his forecasts and turn 
them into an internal load planning and an external supply planning using the MRP process. 
As it will be shown in next section, reality as perceived in our case studies is somehow 
different and more complex. 
1.2.2 Anomalies and additional local practices 
Many problems were identified in the previously described processes during the 
interviews. We shall not give an exhaustive list here, but shall focus on some problems which 
have influenced our study. 
I. Linked to the firm period of the forecasts 
The first issue identified during the interviews is that the parameters of the forecast 
periods, but also the practices which result from the interpretation of these parameters, may be 
quite different from one company to another. Reality appears to be often less consistent than 
the principles illustrated in Figure 2.4, since it is the market (and not the focal company) 
which decides on the lead time acceptable by the customer. This pressure set by the market is 
sometimes transmitted to the suppliers, e.g. for raw materials. 
During several years, a relative scarcity of some aeronautical alloys together with a lack 
of capacity of companies providing casting parts made that the supply time of raw materials 
increased up to 12 months in some cases. In spite of this, the firm period of the forecasts sent 
by the customer to their supplier remain constant, around 3 months, compelling the suppliers 
13
1
Month
qtity
7
1
Month
qtity
5
n
Month
qtity
1
n
Month
qtity
Final assembly
6 months
Firm horizon
12 months
Machiningof
sub components
2 months
Supply of 
raw material
4 months
Total cycle time = 12 months
ABC
Firm horizon
2 months
Chapter 2 Case Studies and Lessons Learnt 
42 
to take the risk to order materials on the base of flexible forecasts, or to be late if they were 
waiting for the corresponding orders to be confirmed.  
Example: A company manufacturing small (and highly customized) aircrafts 
has a firm horizon of 12 months, whereas its supply time for the motors is 14 
months, the variant of the motor being chosen by the customer. 
II. Protection or pressure using the periods of the forecasts 
Some (rare) companies use the difference between the firm period received from their 
customers and the one sent to their suppliers as a way to protect their smallest suppliers, who 
may have difficulties for dealing with large variation of the demand. If an SME is not 
protected from these risks, the poor delivery performance due to SME‟s capacity limitations 
may impact the performance of the customer.  
Example: A large tier 1 company mentioned that the importance of one of his 
customers obliged him to accept that all orders (even firm ones) could be 
cancelled until reception. However, the company did not set into question the 
firm horizon sent to his own suppliers, but introduced high flexibility ratios 
(±50%) in the flexible zone. In order to make this acceptable, they decided that 
if the ordered quantities decreased too much in this flexible period, they would 
anyway buy the cancelled parts by the end of the year. 
III. Load smoothing  
When SMEs are involved in a single industrial domain, as it is often the case in the 
aeronautic sector, the periods of low or high demand may be the same for their various 
customers, all submitted to the same markets, which decreases the theoretical interest of 
having diversified customers. Load smoothing may then become an important issue for the 
SMEs. During the periods when the load is important, the result is often that some orders are 
delayed (this issue is addressed in other sections). When the load is low, SMEs are looking for 
work, and it can be tempting to work in advance on some expected orders which have not yet 
been confirmed. 
Example: A supplier explained us that during a difficult period, he decided to 
work on orders belonging to the flexible period of the forecasts sent by his 
customer, even if he was not sure that these orders would be finally confirmed. 
For him, the risk was limited and the over cost linked to the late payment and 
increase of inventories was less important than the cost required to temporarily 
decrease his capacity. In addition, he wanted to show his reliability to his 
customer, which was easier with such an early production.  
IV. Protection against variations of load  
Similar to point III, many SMEs have mentioned their problems regarding load variations, 
either linked to an increase or decrease of the demand, even if this variation was consistent 
with the quantities negotiated per period. Indeed, variations of the demand from one period to 
another may be difficult to handle for SMEs, especially if similar variations come from 
multiple customers. In the case studies, we have seen some cases where this problem was 
formally taken into account by the customers willing to protect their smallest suppliers. 
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Example: A customer wanted to protect its smallest suppliers from load 
variations. As a consequence, a maximum variation between two consecutive 
periods was considered as a constraint for building the supply planning. The 
consequence was that the customer had to anticipate any variation and to 
increase his inventory level in order to cope with the demand of its own 
customers, varying more dynamically. 
V. Link between price and cycle time 
As already mentioned, satisfying urgent orders usually means to spend extra money 
(through extra hours, etc.) or to postpone other orders considered as less urgent, creating 
perturbations in the planning. However, as already noticed, in practice, most of these 
urgencies do not seem to concern parts which are urgently needed for the final product, but 
are mainly linked to local interests (e.g. the customer has to increase his service ratio for the 
next period). In some very specific cases, we have seen that the principle of a priority 
negotiation of the price and cycle time could be considered in order to address the problem of 
these urgencies. 
Example: A SME, who has a strong position because of the scarcity of his 
competence (surface treatment), had a quite original approach: it managed to 
impose to its customers that only three cycle times were possible (10 days, 15 
days, 20 days), with decreasing prices. This was also a way to deal with 
urgencies, which were considered under condition that the customer was ready 
to pay for short cycle times. 
VI. Information sharing 
Many SMEs are facing a demand that they can hardly satisfy at low cost, mainly because 
of overloads or variations. Several logistic managers at the customer‟s side were conscious 
that they were setting a hard pressure on their suppliers, but explained us that even if they 
could guess that some of the orders still had some slack time, they were themselves not 
informed of this, and were therefore unable to help their suppliers to prioritize the orders. As a 
consequence, the SMEs have to make their decisions, for instance on priority of orders, 
grouping of similar orders, adjustment of lot size, etc. only based on their internal 
considerations. Such lack of information sharing between supplier and customer may lead to 
conflicts. In the case studies, we have nevertheless seen that some customers share 
information with their suppliers in order to allow them to make their decisions to the benefit 
of both partners. 
Example: A large company in tier 1 was sending the level of its present 
inventory together with each order, in order to show his supplier what could be 
the consequence of a late order. Sharing information on the inventory level 
provides the supplier with information related to the customer’s interests when 
it is necessary for him to postpone orders, and increases his flexibility when 
constraints occur locally.  
VII. Linked to lot size  
In the process of RFQ, lot size is an important item in the contract but as previously 
stated, SMEs have to decrease their costs through time, and have so to find solutions for 
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increasing the efficiency of their production system. In order to do this, most of them consider 
first immediate but questionable solutions like increasing lot sizes, more than long term ones 
like simplifying the production system through techniques like lean manufacturing. Therefore, 
many suppliers try to group various orders from their customers in order to increase their lot 
sizes, and decrease the set-ups. 
Example: An SME specialized in turning showed us that once the production 
plan of the next months was introduced in their production management system, 
they performed an extraction and used an Access-based application for 
grouping the orders according to the diameter of the parts, which was not 
possible using their production management system. The problem was that 
their application was not taking into account the due dates, with the result of 
both early and late orders which were then negotiated individually with the 
customer. 
VIII. Industrialization/quality 
Other problems were mentioned by the visited SMEs, for instance linked to 
industrialization: many companies claimed for instance that the parts described in the RFQs 
were in some cases impossible to manufacture, because of too constraining tolerances. The 
SMEs were considering that the customers were over-constraining their design, and do not 
always assess the consequences of tolerances in terms of costs and scraps. As a consequence, 
the suppliers had to commit themselves on delays and costs whereas they were sometimes 
conscious that they would not meet either of them in the future. The position of the customers 
on this problem was of course different, since they were considering that more and more 
precise tolerances were required by nowadays products and that the SMEs have some 
problems for mastering their processes.  
IX. Usage of production management systems 
Several problems were also linked to the way the SMEs used their production 
management tools. The basic point was that the requirements of the large companies 
regarding production management tools and techniques were not understood by some SMEs, 
considering production management as an administrative work (sometimes performed by a 
secretary). Most of them had already bought and implemented a production management 
system, but it was clearly under their customer‟s pressure, and the effort to set the tool 
operational was not always done. As a consequence, the production management tools ware 
often only used to enter the customer‟s orders, then to edit manufacturing orders, without any 
planning step. In one case, the SME had recently discovered that their production 
management system was able to create a load planning, allowing them to control their 
load/capacity ad-equation at middle term, which they were not aware of. 
Limitations were also detected linked to the production management systems which were 
used, since systems dedicated to pure MTO (Make-to-Order) are still in use in some SMEs, 
whereas the production context has changed in the aeronautic sector. A consequence was for 
instance that all the forecasts were sometimes introduced in the system as firm orders, 
resulting in many difficulties for distinguishing then between real confirmed orders and 
forecasted ones. 
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1.2.3 Summary  
Even if the generality of these practices cannot be demonstrated on few examples, they 
are indeed consistent with the conclusions of the previous projects conducted by our research 
team on the subject, but also with the feelings of several consultants of the aeronautic sector, 
involved in the APOSAR project or interviewed externally.  
We have quite often seen during the interviews that people were putting some emphasis 
on other issues than purely technical ones, often speaking of trust, maturity, involvement, 
goodwill etc. Looking back to the cases we have presented, these practices are linked to 
specific situations: relative weakness of a supplier, dependence of a customer towards his 
supplier, trust (or distrust) between partners, etc. It seems to us that these conditions are 
closely attached to different types of supplier-customer relationships and cooperation 
situations in the supply chain. Therefore, the problems in supply chain cooperation are not 
only technical oriented, but depend also on the behavior of supply chain members, supplier-
customer relationship and cooperation situations.  
Two approaches are possible when considering these problems: many customers, aware 
of them, consider that they are the proof of a lack of maturity of their suppliers (but also of 
themselves). For them, the solution is then to increase maturity through “supplier 
development”. In that purpose, many projects have been launched during the last five years 
aiming for instance are disseminating the principles of MRP and lean management in the 
SMEs of the aeronautic sector. This is indeed a long term approach, and we have decided in 
this thesis to explore another direction: for us, practices are linked to actual needs, closely 
attached to relationship between supplier and customer, even if their result can be considered 
as negative. Therefore, the idea in this thesis is to accept to analyze practices which are not 
consistent with present industrial habits, in order to objectively assess their possible area of 
interest. 
2 Conclusion of chapter 2 
Chapter 1 allowed us to give some basic considerations on what is a supply chain, what 
is supply chain management, and how to coordinate partners in a supply chain. In chapter 2, 
we have analyzed some elements of case studies which allowed us to have a direct access to 
practices of large and small companies in the aeronautic sector. The specific case of SMEs in 
aeronautical supply chains has been introduced, and some of the problems linked to the 
cooperation between partners of aeronautical supply chains have been discussed. These 
studies have clearly showed us that reality is somehow different and more complex than the 
“theoretical” framework previously described.  
Since most of the problems we have identified are, in our opinion, linked to a lack of 
consideration of the partner‟s interest, we have decided to try to re-formalize some of the 
empirical practices identified during the interviews, in order to increase their efficiency and 
decrease their drawbacks. On the other hand, we have seen some good practices in the 
interview which could be considered as examples of good cooperation and provide some 
preliminary ideas for better information sharing and negotiation. Therefore, we shall try to 
include practices identified in the interviews in a negotiation process in chapter 3 and chapter 
4. 
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Indeed, these practices are dependent on what kind of relationship customer and supplier 
are holding, as well as on the situation of cooperation of the supply chain. For instance, 
looking back to the cases we have presented, we have seen that some identified practices are 
linked to specific situations: relative weakness of a supplier, dependence of a customer 
towards his supplier, trust (or distrust) between partners, etc. It is obvious that information 
sharing and mutual negotiations are dependent on the relationship that supply chain members 
are holding. Thereby, it is necessary to identify cooperation situations in supply chain, which 
are closely attached to supplier-customer relationship. We will introduce this part in chapter 5.  
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Chapter 3 
Negotiation Process in cooperation situations 
In chapter 2, we have identified some practical problems in the cooperation 
process between large companies and SMEs in the aeronautical sector, which have 
shown us the gap that may exist between “theoretical” frameworks and real 
practices. Nevertheless, some practices have provided good examples of ways to 
reduce this gap by publishing hidden problems and taking into account interests of 
both customer and supplier. Therefore, in this chapter, we firstly try to present some 
lessons learnt which bring new ideas for dealing with complex cooperation 
problems then suggest a negotiation process concerning issues which are usually 
not discussed, but may lead to a better global performance of the supply chain.  
1 Lessons learnt from interviews 
Looking back at the industrial interviews, important problems have been described in the 
purchasing of raw material/component and on the delivery of the requirements. Therefore, we 
have especially focused on the related aspects of the supply and demand process, such as 
period of forecasts, load variations, order priorities, lot sizes, or purchasing cycle times, which 
were the objects of many hidden practices, especially from the suppliers. Meanwhile, we have 
considered lessons learnt from some cases, which provided us the basic ideas of a negotiation 
process which would allow to turn these empirical / hidden practices into agreed/negotiated 
behaviors.  
Normally, the agreements between customer and supplier concluding the RFQ process 
aims at defining fixed parameters, such as periods of the forecast (which are seldom 
negotiated), purchasing price, product cycle time, delivery lot sizes, rough quantities in given 
periods, etc. However, some real situations led us to consider that when practical problems 
have to be solved, making these fixed items flexible may in some cases bring a better demand 
and supply performance. Some cases have already shown examples of such empirical 
practices, for instance by adjusting prices, cycle times or lot sizes to a given specific situation. 
Meanwhile, such adjustments may be useful not only in the RFQ process, but also in the 
operational one. Thereby, we believe that extending the negotiation process between supplier 
and customer to operational aspects could in some cases bring to better performance of the 
supply and demand process, and could accordingly contribute to build an effective 
cooperation relationship. In the next section, we propose some main items that could be 
negotiated by customer and supplier, at different levels of planning, using the MRPII method. 
We are conscious that most of these suggestions can be considered as inconsistent with 
industrial habits, or may result in increased problems rather than in better performance. 
Therefore, we shall discuss in the following chapters the conditions which would have to be 
verified for making these suggestions realistic. Nevertheless, we also think that a drastic 
increase of the performance needs some rupture with previous habits, in a similar way that 
just-in-time or lean manufacturing are in many aspects in rupture with traditional 
manufacturing methods. Therefore, we do not want to select solutions a priori because of 
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their consistence with existing behaviors, but to assess their real potential before defining in 
which situations they could be used.  
2 Basis of negotiation processes from interviews 
Our goal here is not to suggest a so-called “optimal” negotiation process, but to take 
some real empirical situations from case studies as examples, and try to include them into a 
consistent formal negotiation process, in order to check their real potential. Therefore, the 
cases mentioned are not for us a closed list, but an illustration of what can be brought by 
extending the objects of the negotiation process, which may concern quite different aspects. 
In the proposed negotiation processes, we shall first consider four items based on the case 
studies: periods of forecasts, load variation, price and cycle time, then order priority and lot 
sizes (Ming et al., 2012a). 
2.1 Period of forecast 
As mentioned previously, in the aeronautical industry, the forecasts usually consist of 
firm, flexible and free periods. Since the free period has no operational impact, we shall 
discuss here the interest of putting the length of the firm and flexible period in the proposed 
negotiation processes.  
The periods of forecasts are usually defined by the customer, and may lead to problems 
detected by the supplier (see Figure 3.1). As seen during the interviews, practical issues 
concerning the various periods of the forecasts are for instance the link between the firm 
period and the cycle time of the orders (see point I, in chapter 2, section 1.2.2); or the link 
between the lengths of the periods received by the customer, and those he sends to his 
suppliers (see point II, in chapter 2, section 1.2.2). 
In both cases, the real issue is risk: risk taken by the supplier when he orders raw 
materials or releases production orders (see point III, in chapter 2, section 1.2.2) on the base 
of the flexible period of the forecasts he receives, and risk taken by the customer when he 
accepts to send to his supplier a firm period longer than the one he himself received from his 
own customer. 
Indeed, the lengths of the periods of the forecasts are a mean to share risk (or not): as 
stated above, sending the supplier a firm period longer than the one the customer receives 
means to protect the suppliers, but sending the same firm period than the received one (minus 
the internal cycle time) means transmitting the pressure on the suppliers. Sending a firm 
period shorter than the one received would mean to try to gain some slack time by urging the 
suppliers more than really needed.  
However, the necessity of protective behaviors also depends on the actual situations at 
the supplier‟s side. If the supplier may be destabilized by variations of the demand, such risk 
sharing or protecting behaviors may be favorable for both customer and supplier. However, if 
the supplier is capable to adjust his capacity and manage the corresponding risks, protecting 
behaviors are less essential, and may lead to extra costs for the customer. Therefore, we 
propose as a global idea to put the periods of forecast into the middle term negotiation process, 
which would allow to make the length of the periods and possible variations in the flexible 
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period more flexible, being negotiated on the base of the real requirements and actual 
necessities of both customer and supplier.  
Figure 3.1 presents the suggested information flow between different levels of plans and 
the main activities defined in the negotiation on periods of forecast. The information required 
for risk assessment comes, on the customer‟s side (see right part of Figure 3.1), from a 
comparison between the MRP step and the horizon from customer‟s customer. On the 
supplier‟s side (left part of the figure), it comes for instance from a comparison between the 
load planning level (allowing to coordinate supply plan and production plan) and the periods 
of forecasts sent from the customer. Based on a risk assessment, negotiation of the periods of 
forecast may be performed if the supplier or the customer consider (independently) the 
current risks they take as unacceptable.  
 
Figure 3.1. Negotiation on Period of Forecast  
2.2 Load variation 
The second item we suggest to discuss, load variation, can generate problems at both 
customer and supplier‟s sides. The capacity of the suppliers being usually limited (especially 
because low prices are poorly consistent with overcapacity, but also because of the present 
increasing workload in the considered sector), it is certainly dangerous for the customer to 
send an irregular load to his suppliers. The allowed variations in the flexible period are 
supposed to avoid such cases, but we have seen that the contractual variations may be very 
important (we have for instance seen an example of ± 50%). In point IV of chapter 2, we have 
also seen that some customers try to limit the load variation between two consecutive periods 
even if it would be allowed by their contractual agreement. Nevertheless, this protective 
attitude is perhaps not always necessary since the supplier can perhaps be able to cope with 
this variation if the price paid by the customer covers his extra costs, linked to a temporary 
increase of its capacity or to sub-contracting. 
Therefore, instead of considering that the supplier HAS to answer to an overload if it is 
consistent with the contract, or CANNOT answer to an important overload (in consistence 
with the contract or not), overloads (same for lacks of loads) could also be negotiated, 
including setting into question the corresponding price paid by the customer. 
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On the customer‟s side, information concerning the load variation is estimated at the 
MRP level, while real problems of capacity/load are usually detected in S&OP and load 
planning level on the supplier‟s side (see Figure 3.2). According to his real situation, the 
supplier should decide whether he requests for negotiation or not. On his side, if the customer 
estimates that load variation may induce problems for his supplier, he may also request 
negotiation. 
The problem may also exist on the supplier‟s side, usually involved in several supply 
chains (see left part of Figure 3.2). In case of lack of load, the supplier could ask the customer 
to manufacture earlier some orders (see point III, in chapter 2, section 1.2.2). As a result, he 
requires his customer to accept a temporary increase of inventory due to an early delivery, and 
should encourage this by decreasing his price in order to share the consecutive over costs and 
risk. Similarly, an overloaded supplier could ask his customer to accept some delays in the 
deliveries, and could in that purpose accept to temporarily decrease his prices.  
 
Figure 3.2. Negotiation on Load Variation problems 
Therefore, we suggest to negotiate load variation problems, either resulting from 
constraints at the supplier‟s or customer‟s side, with a direct link with the price (increase if 
the problem comes from the customer, decrease if the problem comes from the supplier).  
2.3 Prices and cycle time 
As already mentioned, urgent orders are quite usual in the supply and demand process of 
the aeronautical industry. We distinguish this point from the previous one in the sense that 
overloads can be detected quite early, in the flexible period of the forecasts for instance, their 
consequence being analyzed at the S&OP level, whereas urgencies have to be handled at short 
term, often in the firm period. Urgencies are of course firstly detected at the customer‟s side, 
but when facing these urgencies, it is the supplier who is challenged through its flexibility and 
adjustment of capacity (see point VI, in chapter 2). Therefore, it can be considered as in 
Figure 3.3 that the problem of the cycle time for quick delivery is detected at the operational 
level of the supplier.  
Usually, the urgencies are processed by the supplier depending on the influence of the 
customer over him, with the result of possible disturbances on the short term planning 
propagated to other customers. Two cooperative behaviors could help to mitigate these 
problems: the first one would deal with the price, allowing the supplier to find extra capacity 
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for processing the urgent parts, whereas the second one would deal with a better negotiation 
on the priorities between the supplier and his customers. 
 
Figure 3.3. Negotiation on Price and Cycle Time  
Concerning the first point, we shall consider here that the cycle time of urgent orders is 
partially negotiable, as well as their cost (see point V, in chapter 2). When an urgent demand 
occurs, the customer should pay for the cycle time he expects according to the situation of his 
supplier; for instance, no increase of price would be required if the supplier is in an under 
loaded period but in other cases, a negotiation process on price and cycle time is suggested to 
cope with the constraints due to the supplier capacity. Indeed, an increased price paid by the 
customer may allow the supplier to increase his capacity in order to fulfill the urgent delivery 
requirements (if the raw materials are available). The second point, negotiation of orders 
priority, will be addressed with more details in the next section. 
Figure 3.3 presents the information flow during the proposed negotiation on price and 
cycle time. On the customer‟s side, the information for assessing the feasibility of an urgency 
is created in the MRP and load planning levels, while real problems dealing with such 
urgency come from the load planning and real-time scheduling levels on the supplier‟s side. 
The new price and due date which are the results of the negotiation are considered by the 
customer for assessing whether the urgency can be considered as properly addressed or not. 
2.4 Orders priority and Lot sizes 
The final item we suggest to put into the negotiation process is the orders priority and lot 
sizes. From the interviews, we have seen real cases where SMEs are trying to regroup orders 
having common features, usually in order to decrease the set-up times by increasing the lot 
sizes (but other reasons may exist). Such regrouping at the MRP level on the supplier‟s side, 
if not done properly, could possibly lead to early or delayed orders (see point VII, in chapter 2, 
section 1.2.2). Without additional information from their customers, it is also common that 
the suppliers use an internal priority for scheduling the orders at the operational level if all the 
orders cannot be fulfilled in time, as well as when urgent orders are required (see point VI, in 
chapter 2, section 1.2.2). As a consequence, tardy orders for one or several customers may 
occur. Temporal margins or safety stocks may allow the customer to face delayed delivery 
from the supplier on some of the orders, but this information is not always shared with the 
suppliers.  
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We have chosen here to group these two issues in the same point (see Figure 3.4), since 
they both deal with operational planning.  
 
Figure 3.4. Negotiation on Priority and Lot Size  
We have seen that practices have been detected in our case studies aiming at decreasing 
this problem: see the large company sharing his inventory levels (point VII, in chapter 2 
section 1.2.2), allowing his supplier to have an indirect vision of the real priority of the orders. 
This allows the supplier to make better decisions when it is necessary to postpone orders. We 
have also seen that minimum lot sizes can be agreed when the contract is established (point 
VIII, in chapter 2 section 1.2.2). In order to go one step further, we suggest to introduce these 
points in a negotiation process, at middle term (lot sizes), then short term (priorities). Again, 
extra payment would be an element of the negotiation, as in the negotiation on cycle time 
previously suggested.  
Figure 3.4 shows the information flow concerning the negotiation on priority and lot size. 
On the supplier‟s side, problems related to lot sizes are identified in the MRP step, while the 
problems linked to priorities (needing finite capacity analysis) are detected at the load 
planning and scheduling levels. On the customer‟s side, problems are only estimated since the 
customer does not have a direct access to the information allowing him to precisely know 
whether he will generate problems for his supplier or not. This estimation is based on 
information collected possibly at the MPS level, but mainly at the MRP level. If negotiation is 
performed as required by the supplier, the customer provides information regarding the 
internal priorities in order to reach mutual agreement.  
2.5 Synthesis  
Based on lessons learnt from case studies, we suggest a negotiation process across 
different stages of production, in which parameters which are usually defined in the contract 
between customer and supplier, like periods of forecast, load variation, price and cycle time 
and orders priority & lot sizes, would be considered as negotiable when problems are detected. 
Negotiation on each item should be based on an analysis of the context, e.g., firm period and 
limitations in the flexible period are negotiated only when one of the partners needs to be 
protected, etc. A satisfactory negotiation on these items could lead to a more effective 
cooperation between supply chain members, allowing to share some of the risks related to 
various aspects of the production process.  
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Nevertheless, the items in the negotiation processes as shortly described in previous 
section are not all independent. Due to the constraints at the supplier‟s side, problems of order 
priority and load variation are for instance closely linked to capacity issues. Load smoothing 
can also be performed by acting on the lot sizes at the supplier‟s side, and order priority may 
influence the short term load. Furthermore, all the suggested items in the negotiation process 
influence costs. For instance, extra costs arise from adding capacity at the supplier‟s side, 
storing products more than planned at the customer‟s side, re-planning the transportation etc. 
Accordingly, extra payment, for instance compensating an extension of capacity at short term, 
or paying for cancelled orders, may be considered. Some details on the negotiation process we 
suggest will be given in next section. These details also aim at defining conditions of tests for 
illustrating the domains of interest of such negotiations.  
3 Specified negotiation process 
The previous section has provided a general overview about each negotiated item, period 
of forecast, load variation, price and cycle time, and orders priorities and lot sizes, according 
to some practices (“good” or not) identified during the interviews described in chapter 2. It is 
not yet sufficient for clearly answering the three main questions allowing to precisely define 
such negotiation, i.e.:  
 When is there a need to negotiate these items? (Detect constraints and conflicts) 
 At which level should these negotiations be handled? (Find right levels and activities 
in the process) 
 What is needed to perform such negotiations? (Define the required information) 
Therefore, we will go further to specify each suggested negotiated item, showing the 
corresponding business process model and its sequenced activities, as well as other required 
information (Ming et al., 2012b). Aiming at achieving a simple and clear vision on the 
proposed negotiation process, we will focus on the extra costs aspects, which are of course the 
main result allowing to assess the interest of the negotiation. Details are showed in the coming 
section. We have chosen the Business Process Diagram (BPMN, 2011), which is now a 
recognized standard, for describing the negotiation processes. 
3.1 Negotiation on period of forecasts 
3.1.1 Business Process Diagram 
The Business Process Diagram of the negotiation on the periods of forecasts is 
summarized in Figure 3.5. Normally, forecasts coming from customer‟s customer are inputs 
of the S&OP plan and then used to generate the MPS (Master Production Schedule) (point ① 
in Figure 3.5). MPS gives more detailed production requirements to the MRP (Material 
Requirement Planning) module (point ②). The supply plan, one of the outputs of MRP, is 
generated based on the BOM (Bill Of Material), supply lead time, material inventory level, 
etc., according to the contractual horizons, including lengths of firm, flexible and free periods 
(point ③). 
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Figure 3.5. Business Process Diagram of period of forecast negotiation 
The supply plan is received by the supplier and considered as forecasts (point ④). The 
supplier makes then his own MRP calculation (point ⑤), with the result of his supply plan 
(not mentioned in Figure 3.5) and his load planning (point ⑥). Since he has taken into 
account his cycle time and the cycle time of his suppliers, the supplier is able to see whether 
this load planning is consistent or not, or in other terms whether he takes too much risks (for 
instance by ordering parts on the base of the flexible period of forecasts, point ⑦). 
Depending on the additional information on his customers and suppliers (such as “can they be 
urged or not? Do they have financial stability or not?”), he decides whether these risks are 
acceptable or not (point ⑧). If he considers that he takes more risks than his partners 
(customers and suppliers), he may ask for negotiation (point ⑨). 
The customer performs the same evaluation: he makes his assessment of both internal 
risks and risks he assumes to be on supplier‟s side (point ⑩). This assessment of course 
considers the received horizon of the firm period from his own customer, the horizon of the 
firm period he sends to his supplier, his internal cycle time, his supplier‟s cycle time, etc. It 
should also include his opinion on additional information like the cycle time from supplier‟s 
suppliers, the real costs of his suppliers, etc. It is clear that this information is only assessed, 
since it is usually not provided by the supplier, who would not accept to communicate his real 
costs to his customer.  
The risk taken by the customer is in some way proportional to the difference between the 
horizon he receives and the horizon he sends. It can be different for each of his suppliers, 
since two different suppliers do not need the same protection, or in other terms do not deserve 
that the customer takes the same risk (it is for instance acceptable to take risks for protecting a 
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critical supplier, but not a “common” one). Such assessment will provide a customer‟s vision 
on the allocation of risks between him and his suppliers.  
The next step is to balance the customer‟s own strength and its supplier‟s strength and 
weakness, aiming at assessing the acceptability of the risks he takes (point ⑪). For instance, 
the customer may consider that he should take lower risks if his supplier has more “strength” 
than him. Of course, this assessment is very subjective, but is indeed done daily in reality 
within less formalized processes. If, from customer‟s vision, risks are not acceptable, he will 
request for a negotiation process (point ⑫). Otherwise, the customer will accept current 
plans (point ⑬).  
Therefore, three triggers may launch negotiation: request from customer, request from 
supplier, and request from both customer and supplier. Surely, the visions of risks allocation 
and acceptability may be opposed at the customer and supplier side, mainly because a 
company knows his own problems much better than his partners‟ and may so overestimate 
them. In any case, sharing real information instead of trying to assess alone the situation of 
the partner could facilitate to reach a kind of consensus, but would certainly lead to other 
problems linked for instance to confidentiality.  
After the negotiation process, a new agreed horizon will be integrated into customer‟s 
MRP plan.  
3.1.2 Exchange of information and sequence of activities 
Figure 3.5 has provided brief answers to the first two questions: when and where the 
customer and the supplier need to negotiate on the periods of forecasts. In order to clearly 
present the activities involved in the negotiation process, as well as for answering the third 
question, we are going to present in a more formal way the information exchanged and the 
sequenced negotiation activities, modeled as an UML Sequence Diagram (OMG, 2011). We 
only focus here on two triggers: request from customer and request from supplier, since the 
third one is a combination of them.  
If the customer‟s request has triggered the negotiation process, after MRP calculation 
(1.1 in Figure 3.6) and risks assessment (1.3), the customer sends his request to decrease (or 
increase) the horizon of firm period to its supplier (1.4) and wait for response.  
We shall consider here the case of a demand for decreasing the horizon, since the other 
situation, favorable to the suppliers, will certainly be immediately accepted. By receiving 
customer‟s request, the supplier assesses the new risks he takes, and his extra cost in the 
contractual horizon (1.4.1). Based on these results, the supplier sends a proposition for a new 
horizon, which should be shorter than the contractual one (2a), and simultaneously sends 
additional conditions (2b) which, in his opinion, may compensate his extra cost. This response 
is considered by the customer who also assesses his risks and his own extra costs (1.5), trying 
to determine whether the proposed new horizon and additional conditions would satisfy the 
original intention of risks balancing, as well as the corresponding cost. If the propositions are 
both satisfactory, the new agreed horizon is chosen. Otherwise, there are two options for the 
customer:  
 Agree on the new proposed horizon, but suggest new additional conditions which are 
less favorable for the supplier (3). 
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 Send entirely new propositions if the response from the supplier is far from the 
customer’s expectation, and therefore not acceptable (4).  
 
Figure 3.6. Sequence of activities for periods of forecast negotiation (customer requested) 
By repeating the loop of assessing risks and extra cost, sending propositions, responding 
or providing new proposals, the negotiation process continues until the new horizon and 
additional conditions are agreed by both customer and supplier (5), or stops if no agreement 
can be found. After negotiation, the new horizon and conditions are applied and new MRP 
calculations are performed (5.1 and 6). New forecast may be sent to supplier‟s supplier due to 
the changes of the periods of forecasts (7). It is clear that Figure 3.6 shows one of the possible 
scenarios, but not a general negotiation process. 
Similarly, the negotiation process launched under demand of the supplier is described in 
Figure 3.7. In this process, the supplier first sends the request for increasing the firm period 
(1.2.5). Receiving such request, the customer needs to assess his risks and extra cost (1.2.5.1), 
then makes his decision on the proposition of a new firm period and the additional conditions 
(2a and 2b), which is sent back to supplier. After this, the supplier makes his decision on how 
to answer: accept the proposals, negotiate on the additional conditions (3), or propose a new 
preferred period and/or additional conditions (4). The loop of negotiation stops as soon as 
customer and supplier reach a mutual agreement (5), or see that they cannot agree.  
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Figure 3.7. Sequence of activities for periods of forecast negotiation (supplier requested) 
3.1.3 Extra cost assessment 
No matter whether negotiation is triggered by the customer or by the supplier, one of the 
main activities of the negotiation process is, as already mentioned, to assess the extra costs 
according to the additional conditions.  
On customer‟s side, it is usually a request for an increased firm period which is received, 
sent by his supplier. In that case, the customer takes the risk to store parts delivered by the 
supplier, being unsure to really need them. As a consequence, there is a corresponding extra 
carrying cost, depending on the confirmation of his own customer‟s demand. 
On supplier‟s side, a request from the customer asking to decrease the firm period is 
usually received, with as a possible result the necessity to order raw materials on the base of 
the flexible periods of forecasts, resulting in increased carrying costs if the flexible demand is 
not confirmed. 
Therefore, customer or supplier should propose additional conditions in order to 
compensate (at least partially, in a context of risks sharing) these over costs. These additional 
conditions will usually be in terms of increased/decreased price, but not necessarily. For 
instance, let us refer to the case mentioned in the interviews where a customer suggested one 
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additional condition: buying back all the cancelled orders over a year (a kind of risk sharing) 
in order to make his supplier accept the proposition of flexible period of forecast.  
Indeed, in the negotiation process, the additional conditions of the proposition may have 
various forms, depending on the details of the negotiation terms. For example, changing the 
range of variation in the flexible period is possible in the additional condition. In such case, in 
order to fulfill the customer‟s orders in time, especially in the flexible period, extra cost for 
maintaining a safe inventory inevitably exists. We have summarized the elementary costs 
which will have to be considered in order to calculate these extra costs in Table 3.1. 
Table 3.1. Elements for cost calculation in period of forecast negotiation 
Extra Cost Related elementary costs 
Inventory cost Inventory carrying cost 
 Penalty cost 
 Purchasing cost 
3.2 Negotiation on load variation 
3.2.1 Business Process Diagram 
On the customer‟s side, the negotiation on load variation is proposed after the MRP step 
has been performed (see the top part of Figure 3.8). After integrating the forecasts in the 
S&OP, then processing the MPS, the customer begins the MRP calculation (point ① in 
Figure 3.8). The customer may then consider the supply plan for each of his suppliers in order 
to identify high load variations (by comparing the load for current and previous periods) 
(point ②). For dealing with high load variation, the flexibility of the mid-term capacity of 
the supplier is essential. Therefore, the customer has to estimate the mid-term capacity on the 
supplier‟s side (point ③), as well as the costs to manage such capacity (point ④). As a 
consequence, additional information on the supplier‟s capacity, including internal regular and 
overtime capacity, external accessible capacity (subcontracting capacity) (point ⑤), and 
additional information of related costs (point ⑥) are important inputs for this estimation. 
Again, depending on the closeness of the relationship, this information can be known or 
estimated.  
Based on the estimation results, the customer needs to assess the feasibility of the load 
variation expected in the current period (point ⑦). From the customer‟s vision, if the 
supplier is capable to manage this load variation, the current plan is considered as feasible and 
the MRP result is accepted (point ⑧). Otherwise, the customer requests for a negotiation 
process, considering as doubtful the supplier‟s capability to perform satisfied delivery when 
facing the considered load variation (point ⑨).  
On the supplier‟s side, the detection of the problem of capacity is not based on estimation, 
but on the actual capacity/load situation. According to the result of the load planning (point 
⑩), the supplier identifies a possible capacity problem (point ⑪) and checks the feasibility 
(point ⑫) to address this problem (by extra hours or subcontracting in case of increase, by 
other solutions aiming at decreasing his capacity in case of decrease). Therefore, two 
important factors have to be taken into account:  
 Price paid by customer (point ⑬) 
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 Cost for extra capacity (or decrease of capacity) (point ⑭).  
 
Figure 3.8. Business Process Diagram of load variation negotiation 
From the supplier‟s vision, if the capacity change is considered as feasible, the current 
plans are accepted (point ⑮). Otherwise, the supplier will request a negotiation process and 
publish his capacity problems to the customer (point ⑯).  
Again, the negotiation process will be triggered either by a customer request, a supplier 
request or a double request (not considered here). Of course, if the problem is detected by one 
of the partners, the others have to agree on the fact that there is an actual problem. For 
instance, a customer may detect a high overload which may have no consequence for a 
supplier, if other customers of this supplier have decreased their own orders during the same 
period.  
3.2.2 Exchange of information and sequence of activities 
In order to better visualize the negotiation on load variation, Figure 3.9 shows a typical 
scenario of the customer requested negotiation process, modeled as an UML sequence 
diagram.  
After the identification of high load variation (1.3), either increased volume or decreased 
volume, the customer estimates his supplier‟s mid-term capacity and related costs (1.4). From 
the customer‟s vision, negotiation has to be launched if the supplier might be unable to deal 
with (high increased load) or would not afford (high decreased load) such high load variation, 
which would result in poor delivery performance or unvalued costs on supplier side. 
Therefore, the customer sends to his supplier a request for giving additional information on 
the problems which may be induced by this high load variation (1.5). After receiving this 
request, the supplier estimates his extra cost related to the required variation of his capacity 
(1.5.1), and sends a proposal for a new acceptable load variation and corresponding price, in 
order to ensure a satisfactory delivery and compensate his internal costs (2a and 2b). Based 
upon the supplier‟s proposal, the customer compares his own internal extra cost and the 
Chapter 3 Negotiation Process in cooperation situations 
60 
purchasing price proposed by the supplier (1.6). If the customer agrees on the proposal of new 
load variation and corresponding price, the negotiation process is concluded and an official 
message of agreement on new variation limits is sent (act 5). Otherwise, there are two 
possibilities for the customer:  
 Agree on the new load variation but negotiate on the corresponding price (3)  
 Propose new preferred load variation and price to his supplier (4)  
 
Figure 3.9. Sequence of activities for load variation negotiation (customer requested) 
After agreement, a new load planning is performed at supplier‟s side (6).  
Figure 3.10 presents a typical scenario of the supplier requested negotiation on load 
variation. At supplier‟s side, the result of the load planning provides a clear vision on the real 
situation on the total capacity/load allocation (1.2.3). Accordingly, the supplier is able to 
detect a possible capacity problem based on the capacity assigned to each customer, his 
purchasing cost and his technical solutions for increasing/decreasing his capacity (1.2.4). 
Therefore, the supplier sends a request to his customer for modifying the load variation 
(1.2.5). This request may be either to decrease load variation or increase it, in case of lack of 
load. After having received the request from the supplier, the customer assesses his extra cost 
and current purchasing price (1.3) then sends his proposal for a new load variation and 
corresponding price, also taking into account his own commitments and the orders slack time 
(2a and 2b). After receiving the customer‟s proposition, the supplier also needs to estimate his 
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extra cost (1.2.6). As in the previous situation, the price may also be negotiated together with 
the volume of the variation.  
 
Figure 3.10. Sequence of activities for load variation negotiation (supplier requested) 
If the supplier accepts the customer‟s proposition, the negotiation is over (5). Otherwise, 
two options may be possible:  
 The supplier agrees with the new load variation but wants to negotiate the 
corresponding price (4) 
 The supplier proposes a new preferred load variation and price (5) 
When the new load is known, a load planning is launched at the supplier‟s side (6). 
Since the double requested negotiation process is the merged process of the two 
described ones, we do not provide more precise description for this case here. 
3.2.3 Extra cost assessment 
During the negotiation of the load variation, the variables taken into account for extra 
cost assessment are different for the customer and the supplier, since load variation leads to 
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problems of capacity at supplier‟s side whereas they are linked with inventory levels at 
customer‟s side.  
At the customer‟s side, the load variation is directly related with the required purchasing 
quantities in the current period. Nevertheless, the customer usually keeps a slack time 
between his own deliveries and the required delivery time sent to his supplier (in addition to 
his internal cycle time). Therefore, a part of the required load variation (in case of increase) 
may be absorbed by this slack time, under condition that the customer accepts this risk. In a 
sense, he gives his own slack time to his supplier in this case. Indeed, it seems quite rare that 
the customer delays his own production process in order to help his supplier to overcome 
capacity problems if other choices are possible. If the load variation is required for allowing 
an on time delivery of the customer, increasing the purchasing price can be a solution in order 
to avoid delays. Therefore, in the proposed negotiation process, we consider that the load 
variation on customer side mainly influences his inventory level and his purchasing costs (see 
left part of Table 3.2).  
Table 3.2. Elements for cost calculation in load variation negotiation 
Customer Side Supplier Side 
Extra Cost Extra Cost 
Cost of Inventory Variation Cost for Capacity Variation 
Related Variable Related Variable 
Inventory carrying cost Regular capacity cost 
Penalty cost Overtime capacity cost 
Purchasing price Subcontracting capacity cost 
 Sales price 
At the supplier‟s side, in case of high increase, the supplier may not be able to handle and 
adjust his capacity without extra cost (extra hours or hiring of temporary workers should be 
more expensive than the normal internal capacity). External capacity can also be found 
through subcontracting or outsourcing, again with a higher cost than the use of the normal 
internal capacity. On the other hand, in case of load decrease, the supplier must still pay 
internal fixed costs, such as labor employment, machine maintenance, etc. but earns less 
revenue from his sales (unless this load decrease in compensated by other customers). 
Therefore, the assessment of the link between capacity and load at supplier‟s side is based on 
various factors, as shown in the right part of Table 3.2 (fixed costs, internal costs for 
increasing capacity, external costs, etc.). Figure 3.11 considers linear relationships, but steps 
may be present in various areas of the figure, for instance, when hiring new workers or using 
a new shift. The left part of the curve only suggests that not using the full capacity may 
increase the cost per manufactured part. 
 
Figure 3.11. Example of cost curve of capacity 
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3.3 Negotiation on price and cycle time 
3.3.1 Business Process Diagram 
The negotiation on price and cycle time is considered here for a small number of urgent 
orders, see Figure 3.12. At the customer‟s side, MRP calculation is based on S&OP and MPS, 
also taking into account the urgent orders sent by customer‟s customer (point ① of Figure 
3.12), at the level consistent with their degree of anticipation. The results of the MRP step 
will provide a clear view on the material requirements induced by these urgent orders to the 
supplier (point ②): they may have no effects on the current supply plan, or urgent material 
orders may be necessary. After load planning, the required due dates of the materials are 
confirmed (point ③), then the customer needs to estimate the feasibility of urgent orders on 
supplier‟s side (point ④), as well as the possible extra cost for the supplier (point ⑤). 
According to customer‟s vision, if the urgent orders are considered as feasible, meaning that 
the supplier is supposed to be capable to deal with such urgency, the current plan is accepted 
(point ⑥) and the urgent orders are sent to the supplier (point ⑦). Otherwise, if the 
customer thinks that his supplier is not able to deal with these urgent orders (based on 
customer‟s estimation), negotiation is requested (point ⑧).  
 
Figure 3.12. Business Process Diagram for price and cycle time negotiation 
At the supplier‟s side, the urgent orders usually arrive at the load planning or detailed 
scheduling levels (point ⑨). Based on the allocation of capacity/load towards each customer, 
the supplier needs to check whether it is feasible to deliver the urgent order(s) (point ⑩) in 
the conditions required by the customer (including price) (point ⑪). If the actual situation 
allows the supplier to adjust his capacity/load for fulfilling the urgent orders, the current plan 
is acceptable and the production process is launched (point ⑫). Otherwise, the supplier sends 
a request for negotiation (point ⑬), and notifies his customer that delivery as required is 
questionable in the present situation.  
Therefore, the negotiation on price and cycle time of urgent orders is launched by three 
possible triggers: customer request, supplier request and double request from both customer 
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and supplier. After negotiation on the urgent orders, the new agreed due date will be 
integrated in both customer and supplier‟s plans (point ⑭, ⑮). 
3.3.2 Exchange of information and sequenced activities 
Figure 3.13 shows a typical scenario for customer requested negotiation on price and 
cycle time.  
 
Figure 3.13. Sequence of activities for price and cycle time negotiation (customer requested) 
If the customer has a doubt on the supplier‟s capability of dealing with the urgent orders, 
he requests a negotiation (3), including a request for additional information on the real 
problems induced by the urgency. The request from the customer will lead to the supplier‟s 
assessment of the possible extra cost linked to this urgency (3.1). According to the real 
capability to fulfill the customer‟s urgent order, the supplier sends a response, including 
eventually the proposition of new cycle times for the urgent order(s) and the corresponding 
price(s) (4a and 4b). Receiving the answer from the supplier, the customer calculates his own 
extra cost (1.3), checking whether the proposed cycle time(s) is consistent with his actual 
requirement, and if it is still beneficial to purchase at the proposed price. If the proposal from 
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the supplier is acceptable, the negotiation process is finished (7). Otherwise, the customer has 
two options:  
 Accept the new cycle time (if the proposed cycle time is consistent with what he 
expects) but not the corresponding price (5),  
 Propose new preferred new cycle time and price (6).  
The loop of proposal/answer is continuing until customer and supplier reach mutual 
agreements on the cycle time and on the corresponding price (7), or see that there cannot by 
any agreement. When negotiation is over, the new characteristics of the urgent orders are 
integrated in the planning of both customer and supplier (7.1 and 7.2.1/7.2.2).  
The supplier‟s requested negotiation of price and cycle time is launched when the 
supplier doubts to be able to fulfill the customer‟s urgent orders. Figure 3.14 presents a 
typical scenario for this negotiation.  
The results of the load planning and scheduling provide the supplier with information on 
the actual allocation of capacity towards his different customers (1.3.3). Accordingly, the 
supplier is aware of his capability to satisfy customer‟s urgent requirements. Therefore, a 
request for increasing the cycle time or purchasing price of urgent order may be sent to the 
customer (1.3.4), stating that the current required cycle time is not feasible at supplier‟s side. 
After receiving the request from the supplier, the customer assesses his extra cost based on the 
real requirements of the urgency and on the corresponding purchasing price (1.4). If there are 
slack times between his own delivery due dates and the delivery time from his supplier, the 
customer may increase the required cycle time in order to avoid a higher purchasing price. 
Otherwise, increasing the price could be necessary to compensate the supplier‟s over costs for 
adjusting his internal capacity and ensuring on-time delivery as required by the customer. 
Therefore, the results of the internal assessment allow the customer to answer to the supplier‟s 
request through a proposition of new cycle time and corresponding price (2a and 2b). 
According to the customer‟s proposal, an assessment of the extra cost at the supplier‟s, mainly 
concerning the cost for additional capacity required by the urgency and customer‟s proposed 
price, is also performed (1.3.5). Afterwards, if the supplier considers that the proposed cycle 
time and corresponding price are acceptable, negotiation is closed by the supplier‟s agreement. 
Otherwise, the supplier proposes a new price to the customer (3), or sends a new proposition 
on preferred cycle time and price (act 4). Negotiation is going on until customer and supplier 
agree on both the required cycle time of the urgent orders and the corresponding price. After 
the negotiation, the customer sends a formal agreement response to the supplier‟s request (5) 
and the new cycle time is integrated in the supplier‟s load planning and scheduling, as well as 
in the customer‟s MRP (7 and 6/8).  
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Figure 3.14. Sequence of activities for price and cycle time negotiation (supplier requested) 
3.3.3 Extra cost assessment 
At the supplier‟s side, the extra costs are mainly concerning the possible increase of 
capacity required by the processing of the urgent orders, and eventually a cost for re-planning. 
As we mentioned in the negotiation process on load variation, the cost for increasing capacity 
is not a linear variation of the load volume (see Figure 3.11 in section 3.3.2). Finding extra 
capacity, either internally or externally, induces over costs which may sometimes vary in a 
discrete way. In order to satisfy the urgent orders, the customer‟s purchasing price should then 
increase. Therefore, the main variables in extra cost assessment are listed in the right part of 
Table 3.3. 
At the customer‟s side, the changes on the required delivery time depend on the slack 
time kept by the customer. There are two possibilities for assessing extra costs (see left part of 
Table 3.3): 
 The due date is mandatory, and an agreement has to be found on the price, 
 The due date can be negotiated, resulting in a lower increase of the price. 
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Table 3.3. Elements for cost calculation in price and cycle time negotiation 
Customer Side Supplier Side 
Extra Cost Extra Cost 
Cost for Managing Urgency Cost for Capacity Increase 
Related Elementary Costs Related Elementary Costs 
Penalty cost  Regular capacity cost 
Purchasing price Overtime capacity cost 
 Subcontracting capacity cost 
 Sales price 
3.4 Negotiation on orders priorities and lot sizes 
3.4.1 Business Process Diagram 
The negotiation on orders priority and lot sizes occurs at the operational levels, and is 
mainly related to constraints on capacity or cost (see Figure 3.15). At the customer‟s side, 
depending on the lot sizing policy, the lot size is either an input (for instance, if an 
economical lot size has been defined) (point ①) or a result (if a lot-for-lot policy is used) 
(point ②). The customer may in the last case need to check whether the supplier‟s 
constraints on lot sizes are consistent with his actual requirements (point ③). If, from the 
customer‟s point of view, there is no possible problem, the current MRP calculation is 
acceptable and a load planning and detailed scheduling can be performed (point ④, ⑤). If 
the customer considers that the current lot size is not feasible, due to the constraints of the 
supplier, a request for negotiation on lot size will be sent (point ⑥).  
 
Figure 3.15. Business Process Diagram of order priorities and lot sizes negotiations 
At the supplier‟s side, there are two major tasks: one is to check the feasibility on lot 
sizes based on the results of the MRP calculation (point ⑦); the other is to check the respect 
of the due dates based on the load planning and detailed scheduling (point ⑧).  
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In order to reduce the frequency of the set-ups, the suppliers usually regroup orders of 
similar parts coming from a single or eventually from different customers. As a consequence, 
the real production lot size may be larger than the contractual one with one customer, which 
may be necessary to meet acceptable prices. As seen during the interviews, these internal 
adjustments might occasionally result in early or delay deliveries. Therefore, if the supplier 
considers that increasing the current contractual lot size could possibly lead to some benefits 
(point ⑨), a request for negotiation on lot sizes can be sent to the customer (point ⑩).  
Similarly, if meeting all the due dates of the orders in process is not possible, and instead 
of defining internal priorities linked to the importance of each customer (point ⑪), the 
supplier can ask for a negotiation on the real priorities of the orders (point ⑩), which would 
allow him to define a schedule possibly acceptable by all the customers.  
The negotiation process on lot sizes is either launched by the customer‟s request, 
supplier‟s request or both, while problems on orders priorities are detected by the supplier. 
The corresponding negotiation process may so only be launched upon supplier‟s request.  
After the negotiation process, the new agreed lot sizes will be integrated into the MRP 
calculation of both customer and supplier (points ⑫, ⑬), and the order priorities will be 
entered into the load planning and scheduling (points ⑭, ⑮). It can be noticed that these 
two negotiations are quite different from the previous ones, since they may involve several 
customers at the same time, and would so be certainly more difficult to handle in practice.  
3.4.2 Exchange of information and sequence of activities 
Figure 3.16 shows a typical scenario of customer requested negotiation process on lot 
sizes, using a sequence diagram.  
The customer requested negotiation on lot size is based on customer‟s vision of 
supplier‟s constraints for dealing with the current lot sizes. Therefore, if the customer detects 
a possible problem, he sends a request to his supplier, asking his confirmation on the 
problems on lot sizes (1.5). After receiving the request from the customer, the supplier 
assesses his extra costs and suggests a feasible lot size and the corresponding price, based on 
a compromise between his own constraints and those of his customer (1.5.1). Then, the 
supplier sends a proposal to his customer, possibly including a new larger lot sizes and the 
corresponding (lower) price (2a, 2b). According to the supplier‟s proposal, the customer 
checks the feasibility of the suggested lot size and assesses his related extra costs (1.6). If the 
customer agrees on the supplier‟s proposal, the negotiation process is finished (5). Otherwise, 
the customer may accept the new lot sizes but negotiate the corresponding price (3). He may 
also propose both a preferred new lot size and price to his supplier (4). The loop continues 
until the customer and the supplier reach an agreement on the new lot size and on the 
corresponding price (or verify that no agreement is possible). Recalculation of the MRP step 
is performed by the supplier and customer with the new lot size (6 and 5.1).  
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Figure 3.16. Sequence of activities on lot size negotiation (customer requested) 
Figure 3.17 describes the scenario dealing with supplier requested negotiation on lot 
sizes. At the supplier‟s side, the negotiation process is triggered by real operational 
constraints aiming at decreasing the production costs. According to the results of order 
regrouping in the MRP calculation, the supplier may verify whether he may get acceptable lot 
sizes while meeting the due dates of the orders. If not, he may send a request to his customer, 
demanding larger lot sizes, in order to overcome his local constraints (1.3.3). As already 
discussed, he may also ask for new priorities between orders for solving the problem locally, 
which will be detailed later on.  
After receiving this request, the customer needs to assess the extra cost due to the 
increase of lot sizes, which will again result in an increased inventory or in problems for 
meeting his own due dates (1.3.3.1). The customer then sends a proposition of new lot size, 
and a new purchasing price which would compensate his extra cost (2a, 2b). From this 
proposal, the supplier is able to check whether the new lot sizes are acceptable according to 
his local constraints, as well as whether it is beneficial to accept the corresponding price 
(1.3.4). If it is acceptable, the negotiation process is terminated (5). Otherwise, the supplier 
may accept the proposal on lot sizes but continue to negotiate the purchasing price (3), or may 
send an entirely new proposition on lot sizes and price (4). When the agreement is reached, 
the new lot size will be integrated into the MRP by the supplier and by the customer (5.1 and 
6).  
Unlike the other items, the negotiation on order priority is only triggered by a request 
from the supplier, since the problem of priority is detected at the supplier‟s side when he 
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discovers that he cannot meet the due dates for some of the orders in progress. Let us precise 
that the problem can have external causes (machine failures, etc.) but can also be linked to the 
aspects under negotiation previously described (grouping for meeting a lot size, urgent orders, 
load variation, etc.). In that case, this negotiation process could be called as a partial solution 
to a previously described problem. 
 
Figure 3.17. Sequence of activities on lot size negotiation (supplier requested) 
Figure 3.18 shows a typical scenario for order priority negotiation, including both early 
and delayed delivery.  
In case of estimated late delivery or early one related to grouping orders, the supplier 
sends a message to his customer(s), informing him (them) on the current situation (1.2.4 and 
4).  
The problem of late deliveries can be solved thanks to an increase of the capacity, which 
refers to the negotiation process on load variation already described. We shall focus here on 
the second solution of a load/capacity balance problem, which is to move the load, and so to 
possibly postpone some orders. As stated earlier, the problem may be solved at the level of a 
single customer, but may also concern several customers in case of important overload.  
Concerning delayed delivery, the supplier will ask his customer for elements allowing 
him to assess the priorities of the orders (1.2.4). Since it can be necessary to compare the 
priorities of several customers, numerical priority levels as they are sometimes used in 
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scheduling can hardly be considered (the semantics attached to a priority level, for instance 
denoted by a number, may be very different from one customer to another). According to the 
situations, elements such as the slack time, inventory levels, or criticality of the parts could be 
considered. In order to define this “priority”, the customer will have to assess the possible 
extra costs (1.2.4.1) due to a late delivery and will provide order priorities under various 
forms (2a). These extra costs may include changes of the shipping price, depending on a 
shipping policy. They can be transmitted to the supplier as additional conditions (2b), which 
can be negotiated if the supplier considers them as not acceptable (3), based on his own costs 
(1.2.5).  
 
Figure 3.18. Sequence of activities of order priority negotiation 
Similarly, the supplier might send a message related to early delivery to his customer (3). 
In this case, the customer sends his agreement (4.2) or not (4.3) on the delivery date and its 
additional conditions (4.4). These conditions are again based on an assessment of his extra 
costs (4.1) linked to the early delivery (inventory and risks taken if the corresponding orders 
are not confirmed by his own customers). The supplier may then make other proposals either 
on the delivery date (5) or on the additional conditions (6) according to his extra cost 
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assessment (1.2.6). After the negotiation of order priority, re-planning is necessary at both 
supplier and customer‟s side (7 and 6.1).  
3.4.3 Extra cost assessment 
At the supplier‟s side, a so called “optimal” manufacturing lot size is still often defined, 
depending on the set-up costs and inventory carrying cost (see for instance Wilson‟s formula 
(Camisullis and Giard, 2008)). Nevertheless, it is now a widely accepted idea that the blind 
use of such formula may lead to increased lot sizes, and as a consequence increased cycle 
times, which are critical in a context characterized by demand uncertainty and need for 
flexibility. Therefore, limiting the work in progress is a policy often promoted by large 
companies. For instance, the lot size can be the quantity required by period (lot-for-lot) or the 
result of the grouping of the requirements on a maximum (low) number of periods. In that 
case, the companies then launch projects aiming at decreasing set-ups for making such 
policies acceptable. Nevertheless, many small companies have very basic operational 
problems, and still use the concept of economical quantities.  
At the customer‟s side, the purchasing lot size of the components depends on the 
delivery cost and inventory carrying cost. Indeed, deliveries in large quantities may be less 
expensive, but this is seldom the case in the aeronautic industry, quantities being relatively 
low and unitary prices, and consequently carrying costs, high. Therefore, customers in the 
aeronautic industry usually promote the idea of small lot sizes, even if they have to take into 
account the technical constraints of their suppliers.  
Therefore, the elements allowing to calculate extra costs are listed in Table 3.4, showing 
our primary considerations in lot sizes extra cost assessment, among which, transport cost, 
back order cost and purchasing/sale price.  
Table 3.4. Elements for cost calculation in order priorities and lot sizes negotiation 
Customer Side Supplier Side 
Extra Cost Extra Cost 
Cost for Increased Lot sizes Cost for Decreased lot sizes 
Related Elementary Costs Related Elementary Costs 
Inventory carrying cost Inventory carrying cost 
Penalty cost Set-up cost 
Material cost Material transportation cost 
Material transportation cost Penalty cost 
Purchasing cost Sales Price 
3.5 Synthesis 
So far, the negotiation processes we suggest as an illustration deal with four major, but 
not completely independent, items: periods of forecast, load variation, prices and cycle time, 
order priority and lot sizes. The main idea was to explain how to turn these characteristics, 
usually fixed by contract, into negotiable ones.  
The suggested negotiation processes have of course been defined based on practices 
identified in the case studies. These practices were often hidden, and had sometimes quite 
questionable results. The idea has been to consider them not as negative practices to remove, 
but as signs that some basic needs of the partners were not enough taken into account in the 
cooperation process. Therefore, our aim has been to turn them into official practices by 
Chapter 3 Negotiation Process in cooperation situations 
73 
including them into a negotiation process, trying to keep their positive aspects while 
decreasing their drawbacks.  
We have detailed each negotiation item, including when, where and how these 
negotiation processes could be performed. Some basic considerations on how to assess the 
corresponding costs have been given as examples. It will then be required to check whether 
this negotiation, in spite of its oddity compared to present industrial habits, could lead to a 
win-win situation. This will be done in the next chapter through some simple illustrations.  
Even from the common sense, the suggested negotiation processes are clearly not 
realistic in many situations. For instance, it is obvious that a customer accepting that his 
prices could be constantly modified according to the situation would spend more time in 
negotiation with his supplier than possibly acceptable. Similarly, it is true that a balanced 
negotiation requires an equal power of the partners which is seldom the case in reality. In 
spite of this, we have decided to make some simple simulations in order to show that these 
negotiations could bring to improvements in some cases. Furthermore, we shall investigate 
with more details the conditions for making such negotiations possible.  
4 Conclusion of chapter 3 
In the chapter, the negotiation processes we suggest deal with four major items: periods 
of forecast, load variation, prices and cycle time, and order priority and lot sizes. The main 
idea of the negotiation processes would be to turn these characteristics, usually fixed by 
contract, into negotiable ones. Our primary intention is to publish the hidden, blind constraints 
and problems through negotiation processes, helping supply chain members to cooperate with 
each other in a more open way.  
From a global point of view, we have seen that extra costs and payment were to be 
balanced during the negotiation process. Therefore, we defined the specified activities and 
some considerations for assessing extra costs during the suggested negotiation process using 
business process models and sequence diagrams. These models have clearly showed where, 
when and what we need to perform these negotiation processes.  
So far, the suggested negotiation processes have been described, but only on a theoretical 
base. Therefore, we are going to illustrate these proposals, as well as the cost related 
constraints, through numerical examples, in chapter 4.  
In addition, we have seen that the suggested negotiation process would benefit from an 
exchange of information on some critical aspects, like real lead times and real costs, which is 
highly dependent on the level of trust between partners. Therefore, qualitative aspects related 
to the type of relationship between customer and supplier will be investigated in Chapter 5. 
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Chapter 4 
Cost Assessment during the Negotiation Process  
In chapter 3, the suggested negotiation processes have been introduced, 
including issues regarding the assessment of the extra costs between customer and 
supplier. These suggestions aim at discussing some problems which are often 
hidden in the supply and demand process, by turning some of the contractual items 
into negotiable ones, which allows the supply chain members to suggest adjustments 
based on their real situations. The assessment of the extra costs, allowing 
cost/benefit and risk sharing between partners, is one of the main requirements for 
making this negotiation possible. Therefore, in this chapter, we are going to 
illustrate within a simplified but realistic framework how to calculate the various 
costs in the supply and demand process; we shall then show the possible interest of 
negotiation by comparing classical cases with the situation after the negotiation 
process. These simulations aim at helping to identify the practical situations in 
which the suggested negotiation process could be of interest.  
1. Simplified cost model  
1.1. Bases of the model 
In the considered simplified model, we have tried to summarize the different costs 
present in the supply and demand process. The objective of this cost assessment framework is 
to illustrate how such model can be the main support of the negotiation process. In that 
purpose, we have tried to consider the various components of the total cost, even if the way 
each cost is calculated is of course a simplification of reality. We consider here costs linked to 
procurement, production and delivery in a supply chain, the final goal being to decrease the 
total cost of the entire chain while balancing the risk and cost between partners. The 
considered costs are summarized in Figure 4.1.  
In the model, we consider without loss of generalization that the buyer (customer) pays 
for the transportation of the goods (considering other solutions do not set into question the 
consistence of the framework). So, a supply chain member buys components/materials from 
his suppliers, pays the material cost and transportation cost and stores the components into 
material (components) inventories before releasing production orders. As a consequence, 
purchasing costs include here the costs of the materials, of the transportation and of the 
inventories of raw materials/components (see Figure 4.1). If the supplier‟s delivery is delayed, 
a penalty cost may be charged on this supplier, which decreases the purchasing cost of the 
customer. 
Considering the items which have to be negotiated (see Chapter 3), it is important to 
include issues related to lot sizes and resource capacity in the production cost model. 
Nevertheless, we do not need here a real model of production costs. Therefore, we have 
decided to implicitly model the production system of a company as a single work center for 
each finished product, and to describe a product with a simplified bill of materials: only one 
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component is required for obtaining a finished product after a single operation on a work 
center. The internal production costs then include the cost linked to the capacity of the used 
work center (using regular or extra-hours) or linked to sub-contracting, as well as set-up costs 
and finished product inventory carrying costs (see Figure 4.1). Penalty costs for delayed 
delivery (shortage) towards the customer may also be included, due by the manufacturer. 
Each supply chain member, either supplier or customer, has the same total cost structure: 
purchasing costs and production costs, plus benefit, is equal to the sales revenue.  
Of course, it is a simple and basic cost structure, which is not sufficient to represent the 
entire cost system in a supply chain, but it is in our opinion realistic enough for illustrating 
our suggestions regarding the negotiation process. As it will be seen, the principle of the 
negotiation process remains valid if more realistic costs are used. 
 
Figure 4.1. Suggested structure of total cost 
1.2. Notations  
Let us consider the following notations: 
 Sets of entities  
{c}:  Set of customers 
{p} : Set of finished products 
{m}:  Set of component/material purchased from suppliers 
{t}: Set of periods of the horizon {t}={1, 2,…, T} 
{i}: Set of periods in which the purchased material should be delivered from 
supplier as required, and/or finished product should be delivered towards 
customers *i+  *t+. 
 Parameters of quantities  
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Qp
 t:  Quantity of the finished product p produced with the regular capacity in 
period t 
O p
 t : Quantity of the finished product p produced with the overtime capacity in 
period t 
A p
 t :  Quantity of the finished product p purchased from subcontractor in period t 
  c   
 t  i : Quantity of the finished product p delivered to the customer c in period t, 
which should have been delivered in period i 
S m
 t  i:  Quantity of the component/material m purchased from supplier, delivered in 
period t, which should have been delivered in period i 
   p
 t :  Quantity of finished product p in the finished product inventory at the end of 
period t 
  m
 t : Quantity of component/material m in the component/material inventory at the 
end of period t 
MOp: Maximum number of product p which can be produced with overtime 
capacity by period 
 Parameters of price and cost 
PP m
 :  Purchasing price of one unit of component/material m from supplier  
SP c  p
 : Sale price of one unit of finished product p to the customer c 
S  p:  Penalty cost for shortage of one unit of finished product p in one period 
S  m: Penalty cost for shortage of one unit of component/material m in one period 
R p
 : Unitary cost of using the regular capacity to produce finished product p 
  p
 :  Unitary cost of using the overtime capacity to produce finished product p 
 P  p
 :  Price of purchasing one unit of finished product p from subcontractor  
 T  m
 : Cost for one transportation (independent from the quantity) for component/ 
material m from supplier 
T m
 :  Cost to transport one unit of component/material m from supplier 
STp
 : Set-up cost to produce one lot of the finished product p 
 Functions 
MR m(t): Material cost of component/material m from supplier in period t 
MTm(t): Material transportation cost of component/material m from supplier in 
period t 
M  m(t): Material inventory carrying cost of component/material m in period t 
MPm(t): Material penalty cost (paid by supplier) of component/material m purchased 
in period t 
PHm(t): Purchasing cost of component/material m in period t 
PRp(t): Regular capacity cost to produce the finished product p in period t 
POp(t): Overtime capacity cost to produce the finished product p in period t 
PS p(t): Subcontracting cost to purchase finished product p in period t 
S  p(t): Set-up cost to produce finished product p in period t 
P  p(t): Product inventory carrying cost of finished product p in period t 
P  p(t): Product penalty cost of finished product p sold to customers in period t 
P p(t): Production cost of finished product p in period t 
SS p
 
 
 (t): Sales of finished product p sold to the customers in period t 
 Other parameters  
LSp
 : Production lot size of the finished product p 
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 p: Percentage of the cost of finished product p allowing to define the product 
carrying cost per period (cost of finished product p includes producing cost 
with regular, overtime and subcontracting capacity, plus set-up cost, and 
purchasing, transporting component/material m) 
 m: Percentage of the cost of component/material m allowing to define the 
material carrying cost per period (cost of material m includes purchasing 
and transporting component/ material m) 
MRm : Material cost of component/material m bought from supplier during the 
horizon  
MTm : Material transportation cost of component/material m from supplier during 
the horizon 
M m : Material inventory carrying cost of component/material m during the 
horizon 
MPm: Material penalty cost of component/material m paid by supplier during the 
horizon 
PHm: Purchasing cost of component/material m from supplier during the horizon 
PRp: Regular capacity cost to produce finished product p during the horizon  
POp: Overtime capacity cost to produce finished product p during the horizon 
PSp: Subcontracting cost to purchase finished product p during the horizon 
S p: Set-up cost to produce finished product p during the horizon 
P p: Product inventory carrying cost of finished product p during the horizon 
P p: Product penalty cost of finished product p paid by the manufacturer during 
the horizon 
P p: Production cost of the manufacturer for finished product p during the 
horizon 
SSp: Sales of finished product p sold to the customers during the horizon 
TTp: Total cost of the manufacturer for product during the horizon p, including 
purchasing and producing costs 
 N  
 : Benefit of the manufacturer during the horizon 
 Constraints among parameters  
1) In each period t, the number of parts produced with overtime capacity should be 
less than the maximum possible: 
O p
 t  MOp           t ,   p …………………………………………….………..(1) 
2) In period t, the quantity of available finished product p is equal to Qp
 t   O p
 t  + Ap
 t 
(produced quantities plus all the finished products purchased from the 
subcontractor), plus the stored quantity   p
 t-  available at the end of the previous 
period t-1. The delivered quantity   c  p
 t  i  plus the stored quantities   p
 t  at the end of 
period t should be the equal to the previous quantity.  
Qp
 t   O p
 t  A p
 t      p
 t    ∑∑   c  p
 t  i
i
    p
 t
c
           c   t ,   i ,   p…………(2) 
3) In period t, the stored quantity   m
 t-  of component/material at the end of the 
previous period t-1 should at least satisfy the internal material requirements to 
manufacture the finished product during period t, even taking into account the 
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overtime capacity, so considering quantity Qp
 t   O p
 t  (we suppose the coefficient 
of BOM is 1). 
   m
 t    Qp
 t   O p
 t            t ,   p ,   m………….……………...……...….….…(3) 
1.3. Total cost of the manufacturer 
1.3.1. Purchasing cost 
The purchasing cost is the sum of the material cost and transportation cost. 
1) Material cost MR m(t): in period t, the quantity Sm
 t  i of component/material m in 
each period t, is purchased from supplier, with a purchasing price PPm
 .  
MRm(t)  ∑(Sm
 t  i  PPm
 )        
i
   t ,   i,   m……….…………..……...…..…(4) 
During the periods {t} of the horizon, the total cost is the sum of the costs for each 
period:  
 MRm  ∑MRm(t)        
T
t  
   m…………..…………...…..…….………..…..…(5) 
2) Material transportation cost MTm(t): the idea is here to express that delivering 
often small quantities is more expensive than delivering large quantities less often. 
In that purpose, we define here the transportation of each quantity as the sum of a 
cost independent from the quantity plus a cost per part. 
MTm(t)    T  m
    ∑(T m
   Sm
 t  i)
i
           i    m………………...……..…...…(6) 
For all the periods of the horizon:  
 MTm  ∑MTm(t)
T
t  
           m…………..…………...…....……………...……(7) 
3) Material inventory carrying cost M  m(t) : in period t, the quantity   m
 t  of 
component/material m is stored in the material inventory. It is theoretically 
necessary to take into account the real purchasing cost of the components during 
the period (material cost per unit remains unchanged from one supplier), plus the 
total transportation cost. Since the transportation cost may changes due to the 
quantity, we shall consider an average transportation cost on the horizon by 
saying that one unit in one period costs 
MT
∑ Sm
 t  i
i
.  
M  m(t)   m     m
 t  (PPm
  
MT
∑ ∑ Sm
 t  i
it
)           t     i     m………....…....….(8) 
During the periods of {t} with a horizon of T, it is the sum of each period: 
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M  m   ∑M  m(t)
T
t  
           m…………………….………………………..….(9) 
4) Material penalty cost MPm(t) (due to a delayed delivery of component/material 
m): in period t, the quantity Sm
 t  i purchased is delivered in period t, but should 
have been delivered in period i, (i < t). The penalty cost is S  m  for one unit 
delayed. The material penalty cost for one product and one period is calculated as 
the total of the backlogs. Here, the orders should not be delivered in advance. 
MPm(t)  {
                                             
∑(S  m  (t i)  Sm
 t  i)
i
               t    i     m…..………..…(10) 
During the horizon, the total penalty is the sum of the penalty cost for each 
period: 
MPm  ∑MP m(t)
T
t  
           m………………….…………………………..….(11) 
Therefore, the purchasing cost PHm(T) on the whole horizon is:  
PH m   ∑PH m(t)
T
t  
   ∑(MRm(t)  MTm(t)  M  m(t)  MPm(t))
T
t  
           m.….(12) 
1.3.2. Production cost 
The production cost may be calculated on the base of a resource cost (which can be 
either a regular capacity cost, an overtime capacity cost, or a subcontracting cost for 
purchasing finished products), a set-up cost, an inventory carrying cost, and a penalty cost for 
delayed delivery of the finished product.  
1) Regular capacity cost PRp(t): in period t, the quantity Qp
 t of finished product p is 
produced in each period with the regular capacity, with cost R p
  for one unit. 
This regular cost is different for the various finished products, depending on the 
used work center. 
PRp(t)  Qp
 t   R p
            t    p………………………………….…….……..(13) 
On all the periods: 
PRp   ∑PR p(t)
T
t  
           p…………………..……………………………….(14) 
2) Overtime capacity cost POp(t): in period t, it is based on the quantity O p
 t  of 
finished product p which is produced by over time capacity, and the cost   p
  for 
over time capacity producing one unit of finished product p 
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POp(t)  O p
 t    p
            t     p…………….……………………...……...…(15) 
On all the periods: 
POp   ∑PO p(t)
T
t  
           p………………………..………………………...(16) 
3) Subcontracting cost PS p(t): in period t, it is based on the quantity A p
 t  of finished 
product p which is purchased from the subcontractor (only one subcontractor is 
considered here), and the purchasing cost  P p
  for one unit of finished product p. 
PS p(t)  A p
 t    P p
            t     p…………………..…………………...……(17) 
On the horizon: 
PS p   ∑PS p(t)
T
t  
           p………………..……….……………...……..…..(18) 
4) Set-up cost S  p(t): we want to show here the possible interest to group parts in 
larger lots than the defined manufacturing lot size LSp
 . Therefore, a set-up will be 
considered for each lot when no grouping is performed. Negotiation in this case 
will result in grouping several lots for decreasing the number and cost of set-ups. 
In period t, with a defined lot size LSp
  and without negotiation, the number of the 
set-ups is calculated as the ceiling function of the total quantity of each period, 
including the quantity Qp
 t of finished product p produced with the regular capacity 
and the quantity O p
 t  of finished product p, produced with overtime capacity, over 
the manufacturing lot size LSp
 . Accordingly, the set-up cost is calculated as the 
number of set-up times, multiplied by the set-up cost STp
 .  
S  p(t)  ⌈
Qp
 t   O p
 t
LSp
 ⌉   STp
            t   p………….…………………....….…(19) 
On the horizon: 
S  p   ∑ S  p(t)
T
t  
           p……………..………………………………….…(20) 
5) Product inventory carrying cost P  p(t): in period t, the quantity    p
 t  of finished 
product p is stored in the finished product inventory. For these stored finished 
products p, the carrying cost is a percentage  p of the cost of the product. The 
product cost is calculated as the capacity cost used to produce the product 
(including set-up cost) and/or the subcontracting cost used to purchase it from the 
subcontractor, plus material and transportation costs. Since the same finished 
product can be produced with different costs (e.g. using regular capacity or 
subcontracting capacity), we use the average of these costs on the period. 
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P  p(t)    p     p
 t  (
PRp(t)  POp(t)  S  p(t)  PS p(t)
Qp
 t  O p
 t  A p
 t  PPm
  
MT
∑ ∑ Sm
 t  i
it
) 
  t     i     p ……………………………...(21) 
On the horizon, the total final product carrying cost is the sum of the costs for 
each period: 
P  p  ∑P  p(t)
T
t  
           p…………………………………………….……….(22) 
6) Product penalty cost (due to delayed delivery of finished product) P  p(t): in 
period t, among the quantity of   c   
 t  i  of finished product p sold to customer c, if 
the real delivery period t is later than the required delivery period i (t > i), the 
order is in the status of backlog, and a cost S p is applied for each product unit 
for penalty. It should take into account all the customers {c}. 
P  p(t)  {
      
∑∑(S p  (t i)    c  p
 t  i )
 c
               t    i     c ,   p………(23) 
On the horizon, the total product penalty cost is the sum of the penalty costs for 
each period: 
P  p   ∑P  p(t)
T
t  
           p…………………………………..……………….(24) 
Therefore, the total production cost on the horizon is equal to:  
P  p   ∑P  p(t)
T
t  
  ∑(PRp(t)   POp(t)   PS p(t)  S  p(t)  P  p(t)  P  p(t))
T
t  
  
  p………………………(25) 
The total cost during the horizon is thereby calculated as:  
TT p   PH m   P  p   ∑PH m(t)
T
t  
  ∑P  p(t)
T
t  
          m   p………………..….(26) 
1.4. Sales  
The sale revenue SS p
 
 
 (t)  in period t has also to be calculated: the quantity   c   
 t  i  of 
finished product p is sold to the customer c, with the sale price SP c  p
  (sales price may be 
different depending on the customer c). Therefore, the sales are:  
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SSp
 
 
 (t) 
  ∑(SP c  p
  ∑   c  p
 t  i
i
)
c
           t    i    c    p………………………..…….(27) 
On the horizon, the sales revenue is the sum of the revenues for each period: 
SSp
   ∑ SS p(t)
T
t  
           p……………………………………….…….……….……….(28) 
On the horizon, the benefit is the sum of the benefits on each period: 
 N  
 
 
   SSp
 
 
   TT p           p………………….……………………………….……….(29) 
The suggested cost model is only a simplified example for calculating different kinds of 
cost in the processes of procurement, production and delivery. Even if the real cost calculation 
are in practice more complex and precise, we do believe that this cost model can illustrate 
quite realistic situations of the proposed negotiation process. In next section, we simulate 
examples of the negotiation processes and calculate the related costs in order to show the 
possible interest of negotiation.  
2. Simulations of negotiation processes 
In this section, we are going to illustrate the negotiation processes based on some simple 
numerical examples concerning the previous mentioned items: periods of forecast, load 
variation, price and cycle time, and priority and lot size. For each item, we firstly introduce 
what should occur in a “classical” context (denoted here as “normal cases”), build the 
scenario(s) and calculate the costs according to the suggested cost model. Secondly, we 
specify some typical negotiation scenario(s) on the same problem, and we compare the costs 
after negotiation and the “normal” ones. The primary purpose of these simulations is to show 
the practical possibilities of our suggested negotiation processes based on risks sharing and 
cost assessment.  
2.1. Basis of simulation 
In the simulations, we focus on a simple linear relationship, including one customer, one 
manufacturer, and one supplier (the supplier and the manufacturer may be involved in other 
supply chains, therefore their capacity may be shared with other supply chains in the same 
period, which is not explicitly modeled it here). The supplier has a purchasing lead time of 1.5 
months (6 weeks) to supply the required component A-1-1, with a lot size of 10 units. The 
supplier needs 2 weeks to produce its finished product A-1 using component A-1-1 then put it 
into his product inventory. The manufacturer purchases component A-1 from the supplier, 
stores it in his material inventory with a lot size of 10 units. Using component A-1, the 
manufacturer produces the finished product A, with an internal cycle time of 1 month and a 
lot size of 10 units. The finished product A is then sold to the final customer as required. 
Therefore, the structure of the simulated supply chain and related technical data are showed in 
Figure 4.2. 
The firm and flexible periods of the forecasts will be defined when needed according to 
the considered scenario. The forecasts are supposed to be updated every month.  
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Figure 4.2. The structure of simulated supply chain and related technical data 
The elementary prices and costs required in the processes of procurement, production 
and delivery are described in the cost model. Of course, the interest of the negotiation process 
depends on the relative values of these costs: for instance, a high penalty cost and a low 
carrying cost will lead to prefer storage than shortage. Let us underline that these simulations 
do not aim at demonstrating that negotiation is always of interest, but only that it can be 
useful in some cases. The elementary costs are defined as follows: 
For the manufacturer: 
SP c  A
 : 100 € (sale price of the manufacturer for one unit of A) 
PPA- 
 : 75 € (purchasing price of one unit of A-1 for the manufacturer) 
R A
 : 20 € (unitary cost for manufacturer to use regular capacity to manufacture A) 
  A
 : 30 € (unitary cost for manufacturer to use overtime capacity to manufacture 
A) 
 P A
 : 40 € (price for purchasing one unit of A from the subcontractor) 
S  A: 10 € (penalty cost for manufacturer to delay deliver one unit of A in one 
period)  
STA
 : 20 € (set-up cost for manufacturer to produce one lot-size of the A) 
 T A- 
 : 70 € (cost for one quantity-independent transportation of A-1 from the 
supplier) 
T A- 
 : 5 € (price for manufacturer to transport one extra unit of A-1 from the 
supplier) 
 A: 30% /year (coefficient of inventory carrying cost for finished product A) 
 A- : 30% /year (coefficient of inventory carrying cost for component A-1) 
MO A
 t : 30 units (maximum overtime capacity) 
For the supplier: 
SP c  A- 
 : 75 € (sale price of one unit of A-1 from the supplier to the manufacturer) 
PP s  A- - 
 : 50 € (purchasing price of one unit of A-1-1 for the supplier) 
R A- 
 : 10 € (unitary cost for supplier to use regular capacity to manufacture A-1) 
  A- 
 : 15 € (unitary cost for supplier to use overtime capacity to manufacture A-1) 
 P a  A- 
 : 20 € (price of one unit of A-1 from the subcontractor) 
S  A- : 1 € (penalty cost of the supplier for the shortage of one unit of A-1 in one 
period)  
STA- 
 : 5 € (set-up cost for supplier to produce one lot of A-1) 
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 T  A- - 
 : 50 € (cost for one quantity-independent transportation of A-1-1 from his 
supplier) 
T s  A- - 
 : 2 € (cost for the supplier to transport one extra unit of A-1-1) 
 A- : 25% /year (coefficient of inventory carrying cost for finished product A-1) 
 A- - : 25% /year (coefficient of inventory carrying cost for component A-1-1) 
MO A- 
 t : 40 units (maximum overtime capacity) 
2.2. Periods of forecast 
The main interest of the negotiation on the periods of forecast is to protect the supplier. 
Therefore, we shall define here a scenario that we have seen in the interviews, i.e. the case 
when the supplier has to order parts on the base of the flexible period of the forecasts he 
receives from the manufacturer (his customer). 
In this simulation, we suppose that the manufacturer receives a customer‟s forecast for 
his finished product A with 2 months of firm period and 3 months of flexible period. Based on 
the sales plan and production plan, the manufacturer sends his supply plan/forecast for 
component A-1 to his supplier, with 1 month of firm period and 2 month of flexible period. 
Since the supplier has a cycle time of 2 months (1.5 months of supply lead time for 
component A-1-1 and 2 weeks of internal cycle time for producing his finished product A-1), 
which is longer than the firm period of forecast he receives, the supplier has to order the 
component A-1-1 based on the flexible period of his forecasts, in order to fulfill the 
requirements from the manufacturer on time. Doing so, he takes the risk of variations in the 
flexible period. Another option is that the supplier does not perform his procurement process 
till the orders from the manufacturer are firmed, which certainly leads to delay delivery, and 
related penalty costs. For being able to compare the consequences of the possible decisions of 
the supplier, we shall consider possible evolutions of the forecasts successively sent to him by 
the manufacturer. 
2.2.1. Normal case 
In the “normal” cases (no negotiation), we test the following situations:  
 Case 1: the supplier orders the components on the base of the flexible period. 
As a consequence, the situations on the supplier‟s side heavily depend on the 
variations of the requirements from the manufacturer. In order to test the 
differences between situations, we consider three scenarios as following and 
calculate the costs and benefits on the supplier‟s side based on the numerical 
simulations (the calculations are performed until week 12 and the scenarios 
have the same horizon). 
 Scenario 1.1: everything is confirmed in the following forecasts (see appendix I 
and II) 
From the MRP plan of the supplier, we calculate the material cost based on the line 
of “net requirements” which also represents the purchasing from the supplier‟s 
supplier. As Figure 4.3 shows, there are 6 purchasing orders, with a quantity of 60 
units for each. Thereby, the material cost and material transportation costs can be 
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calculated. For the carrying cost of material inventory, the calculation is based on 
the line of “projected stock”. The detailed calculations for the material purchasing 
cost are:  
 
Figure 4.3. MRP of the supplier in scenario 1.1 of normal case in Period of forecast simulation 
Material purchasing cost MRA- - : 6  60  50  18000 € 
Material transportation cost MTA- - : 50 360  2  770 € 
Material inventory carrying cost M A- - : 
25 
52
  450  (50 
770
360
)  113 € 
Material Penalty cost MPA- - : 0 € 
Purchasing cost: PHA- -  18000 770 113  18883 € 
From the MPS plan of the supplier, we calculate the production cost. The line “MO 
receipt” in Figure 4.4 represents the manufacturer orders and their quantity, the 
number of set-up times, which are used to calculate producing cost (including 
regular capacity, overtime capacity, subcontracting capacity and set-up cost). The 
line of “Projected stocks” represents the inventory level and the product inventory 
carrying cost is determined based on this. By comparing the stock level and the 
firmed orders, the delay orders are clearly presented and the penalty cost paid to the 
manufacturer is identified.  
 
Figure 4.4. MPS of the supplier in scenario 1.1 of normal case in Period of forecast simulation 
The detailed calculations for production cost are: 
Regular capacity cost PRA- : 7 50  10  3500 € 
Overtime capacity cost POA- : 0 € 
Subcontracting capacity cost PSA- : 0 € 
Set-ups cost S A- : 7  5  35 € 
Product inventory carrying cost P A- : 
25 
52
  290  (
3200
320
 50 
770
360
)  87 € 
Product penalty cost P A- : 0 € 
Production cost: P A-  3500 35 87  3622 € 
Eventually, the total cost until the week 12 is: 
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Total cost: TTA-  18883 3622  22505 € 
The sales of finished product could be calculated based on the firmed order sent by 
the manufacturer and the real delivery situation from its MRP plan, see Figure 4.5 
(we will mark them under the line “PO (purchasing order) receipt” with red color). 
In this case, no delays exist; the delivery is performed as required and the Sales are 
calculated as following:  
 
Figure 4.5. MRP of the manufacturer in scenario 1.1 of normal case in Period of forecast simulation 
Sales SSA- : 320  75   24000 € 
Benefit during the horizon: 
 N  SSA-  TTA-   24000 22505  1495 € 
In this scenario, everything is confirmed in the following forecasts and the supplier 
earns some money.  
 Scenario 1.2: the following forecasts are less than expected (see appendix I and 
III) 
The changes of the requirement between the previous and the current forecasts are 
marked in red in Figure 4.6. Until week 12, the forecast is less than expected in the 
previous forecast (the previous volume is marked in the above line of the current 
volume).The calculations of the costs are similar than with the previous scenarios. 
 
Figure 4.6. MPS of the manufacturer in scenario 1.2 of normal case in Period of forecast simulation 
Material purchasing cost MRA- - : 6  60  50  18000 € 
Material transportation cost MTA- - : 50 360  2  770 € 
Material inventory carrying cost M A- - : 
25 
52
 650  (50 
770
360
)  163 € 
Material Penalty cost MPA- - : 0 € 
Purchasing cost: PHA- -  18000 770 163  18933 € 
Regular capacity cost PRA- : 6  50  10  300  € 
Overtime capacity cost POA- : 0 € 
Subcontracting capacity cost PSA- : 0 € 
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Set-ups cost S A- : 6  5  30 € 
Product inventory carrying cost P A- : 
25 
52
 290  (
3000
300
 50 
770
360
)  87 € 
Product penalty cost P A- : 0 € 
Production cost: P A-  3000 30 87  3117 € 
Eventually, the total cost until the week 12 is: 
Total cost: TTA-  18933 3117  22050 € 
Sales SSA- : 280 75   2 1000 € 
Benefit during the horizon: 
 N  SSA-  TTA-    21000 22050    1050 € 
In this scenario, the supplier loses money. A reason is that he needs to maintain a 
temporary high level of material inventory because of his purchases based on the 
flexible period of the received forecasts. Accordingly, the material carrying cost 
covers a larger part of the material cost than in the previous scenario.  
 Scenario 1.3: the following forecasts are more than expected (see appendix I 
and IV) 
In scenario 1.3, 7 purchasing orders for material were performed due to the 
increased requirements. However, there are backlogs in the material inventory, since 
the previous purchasing is based on the flexible period with less quantity than 
confirmed. New purchases are in the progress but do not have time to arrive, see 
Figure 4.7.  
 
Figure 4.7. MRP of the supplier in scenario 1.2 of normal case in Period of forecast simulation 
As a consequence, there are two orders delayed from the supplier to the 
manufacturer (see Figure 4.8): order of 40 parts required in week 6 but delivered on 
week 7; order of 40 parts required in the week 11 but delivered on time with 20 
units. The rest is delayed till week 13.  
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Figure 4.8. MPS and MRP of the manufacturer in scenario 1.2 of normal case in Period of forecast 
simulation 
However, such delays do not affect the manufacturer, due to his local inventory. The 
detailed calculations are:  
Material purchasing cost MRA- - : 7  60  50   21000 € 
Material transportation cost MTA- - : 50 420  2   890 € 
Material inventory carrying cost M A- - : 
25 
52
 420  (50 
890
420
)  105 € 
Material Penalty cost MPA- - : 0 € 
Purchasing cost: PHA- -  21000 890 105  21995 € 
Regular capacity cost PRA- : 7 50 10   3500 € 
Overtime capacity cost POA- : 0 € 
Subcontracting capacity cost PSA- : 0 € 
Set-ups cost S A- : 7 5   35  € 
Product inventory carrying cost P A- : 
25 
52
  250 (
3500
350
 50 
890
420
)   75  € 
Product penalty cost P A- : 40 (7-6) 1 40 (13-11) 1 120  € 
Production cost: P A-  3500 35 75 120  3730 € 
Eventually, the total cost until the week 12 is: 
Total cost: TTA-  21995 3730  25725 € 
Sales SSA- : 360 75  27000 € 
Benefit during the horizon: 
 N  SSA-  TTA-  27000 25725  1275 € 
 
 Case 2: the supplier only orders according to the firm period 
In the second normal scenario, we suppose that the supplier does not send purchases to 
his supplier until the orders are firmed, taking the risk of possible delayed delivery and 
corresponding penalty costs. When the forecasts from the manufacturer are confirmed 
each month, the supplier can only perform purchasing orders at the beginning of the 
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month (the earliest moment), while the materials will only arrive 6 weeks later. We 
divide the case into three scenarios, the same ones than in previous case.  
 Scenario 2.1: everything is confirmed (see appendix V). 
Material purchasing cost MRA- - : 5  60  50  15000 € 
Material transportation cost MTA- - : 50 300  2  650 € 
Material inventory carrying cost M A- - : 
25 
52
 420  (50 
650
300
)  105 € 
Material Penalty cost MPA- - : 0 € 
Purchasing cost: PHA- -  15000 650 105  15755 € 
Regular capacity cost PRA- : 6  50  10  3000 € 
Overtime capacity cost POA- : 0 € 
Subcontracting capacity cost PSA- : 0 € 
Set-ups cost S A- : 6  5  30 € 
Product inventory carrying cost P A- : 
25 
52
 260  (
3000
300
 50 
650
300
)  78 € 
Product penalty cost P A- : 40  (17 12)  1  200 € 
Production cost: P A-  3000 30 78 200  3308 € 
Eventually, the total cost until the week 12 is: 
Total cost: TTA-  15755 3308  19063 € 
Sales SSA- : 320 75   24000 € 
Benefit during the horizon: 
 N  SSA-  TTA-  24000 19063  4937 € 
Due to less purchasing, the supplier earns benefits instead of losing money, but there are 
delays even when everything is confirmed as forecasted, see Figure 4.9.  
 
Figure 4.9. MPS and MRP of the manufacturer in scenario 2.1 of normal case in Period of forecast 
simulation 
As a consequence, the delayed deliveries from the supplier have impacts on the 
manufacturer‟s side leading to two orders delayed towards to the end customer (see 
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Figure 4.9). Accordingly, the manufacturer needs to pay penalty costs for his customer. 
The penalty costs on the manufacturer‟s side are:  
Material Penalty cost MPA- : 40  (17 12)  1  200 € 
Product penalty cost P A: 15  (21 19)  10 20  (21 20)  10  500 € 
Therefore, the manufacturer has to pay his customer 500 € for penalty cost linked to 
delayed deliveries of product A, while he receives 200 € from his supplier for the delays 
o then purchased material A-1. However the received penalty cost does not compensate 
the manufacturer‟s lost and it is obvious that the manufacturer is losing money on the 
penalty costs (the manufacturer may earn benefits but pay more for penalty cost). 
 Scenario 2.2: the following forecasts are less than expected (see appendix VI) 
Material purchasing cost MRA- - : 5  60  50  15000 € 
Material transportation cost MTA- - : 50 300  2  650 € 
Material inventory carrying cost M A- - : 
25 
52
 570  (50 
650
300
)   143  € 
Material Penalty cost MPA- - : 0 € 
Purchasing cost: PHA- -  15000 650 143  15793 € 
Regular capacity cost PRA- : 6  50  10  3000 € 
Overtime capacity cost POA- : 0 € 
Subcontracting capacity cost PSA- : 0 € 
Set-ups cost S A- : 6  5  30 € 
Product inventory carrying cost P A- : 
25 
52
 290  (
3000
300
 50 
650
300
)  87 € 
Product penalty cost P A- : 0 € 
Production cost: P A-  3000 30 87  3117 € 
The total cost until the week 12 is: 
Total cost: TTA-  15793 3117  18910 
Sales SSA- : 280 75  21000 € 
Benefit during the horizon: 
 N  SSA-  TTA-  21000 18910  2090 € 
With less purchasing and decreased requirements, the supplier could still earn some 
benefits and has less backorders. In the accounting horizon, no delays exit but delays 
occur in the following periods.  
 Scenario 2.3: the following forecasts are more than expected (see appendix VII) 
Material purchasing cost MRA- - : 5  60  50  15000 € 
Material transportation cost MTA- - : 50 300  2  650 € 
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Material inventory carrying cost M A- - : 
25 
52
 370  (50 
650
300
)  93 € 
Material Penalty cost MPA- - : 0 € 
Purchasing cost: PHA- -  15000 650 93  15743 € 
Regular capacity cost PRA- : 6  50  10   3000 € 
Overtime capacity cost POA- : 0 € 
Subcontracting capacity cost PSA- : 0 € 
Set-ups cost S A- : 6  5  30 € 
Product inventory carrying cost P A- : 
25 
52
 250  (
3000
300
 50 
650
300
)  75 € 
Product penalty cost P A- : 
40  (7 6)  1 40  (17 11)  1 40  (17 12)  1  480 € 
Production cost: P A-  3000 30 75 480  3585 € 
Eventually, the total cost until the week 12 is: 
Total cost: TTA-  15743 3585  19328 € 
Sales SSA- : 360 75  27000 € 
Benefit during the horizon: 
 N  SSA-  TTA-  27000 19328  7672 € 
In scenario 2.3, the supplier performs less purchasing orders, (and only when the orders 
from the manufacturer are confirmed), but simultaneously faces increased requirements. 
As a consequence, supplier has to deal with more backorders and delayed deliveries. 
These delays induce high penalty costs and may also affect the manufacturer, leading to 
manufacturer‟s delayed deliveries towards the customer. In our simulation, this effect 
occurs. The penalty costs on the manufacturer‟s side are:  
Material Penalty cost MPA- :  
40  (7 6)  1 40  (17 11)  1 40  (17 12)  1  480 € 
Product penalty cost P A:  
20  (21 17)  10 20  (21 18) 10 20  (22 19)  10 20  
(22 10)  10  2400 € 
Obviously, the manufacturer has to pay 2400 € for penalty costs to his customer, but only 
receives 480 € from his supplier. The manufacturer is losing money on the penalty costs 
(totally, the manufacturer may earn benefits, but the penalty cost he pays is a larger 
percentage of his total costs).  
Based on the normal cases, the simulated results show us that when the supplier has to 
deal with a short length of the firmed period (less than his internal cycle time), risks 
inevitably exist. These risks are not only found at the supplier‟s side, but also may be 
identified at the manufacturer‟s side. 
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2.2.2. Negotiation case 
We shall now consider the same cases within negotiation processes. 
 Negotiation Case 1: We suppose first that negotiation has allowed the supplier to 
obtain a firm period of 8 weeks from his customer, the manufacturer. We take the 
example of increased requirement. (see appendix VIII ) 
Material purchasing cost MRA- - : 7  60  50  21000 € 
Material transportation cost MTA- - : 50 420  2  890 € 
Material inventory carrying cost M A- - : 
25 
52
 400  (50 
890
420
)  100 € 
Material Penalty cost MPA- - : 0 € 
Purchasing cost: PHA- -  21000 890 100  21990 € 
Regular capacity cost PRA- : 7  50  10  3500 € 
Overtime capacity cost POA- : 0 € 
Subcontracting capacity cost PSA- : 0 € 
Set-ups cost S A- : 7  5  35 € 
Product inventory carrying cost P A- : 
25 
52
 250  (
3500
350
 50 
890
420
)   75 € 
Product penalty cost P A- : 40  (13 11)  1  80 € 
Production cost: P A-  3500 35 75 80  3690 € 
Eventually, the total cost until the week 12 is: 
Total cost: TTA-  21990 3690  25680 € 
Sales SSA- : 360 75  27000 € 
Benefit during the horizon: 
 N  SSA-  TTA-  27000 25680  1320 € 
In negotiation case 1, it is the same requirement with normal case, the scenario 1.3. 
Comparing to the scenario 1.3, the supplier deals with longer firmed period, suffers from 
only one backorder and gains a little bit more benefits. On the manufacturer‟s side, one 
order is delayed due to the changes in his flexible period, but purchasing is already 
performed towards the supplier in the firmed period. As a consequence, the manufacturer 
could not change the purchasing orders as he wish. On this basis, the manufacturer may 
request for increasing the firmed period.  
 Negotiation Case 2: The manufacturer has only obtained partial satisfaction. The 
firm period sent by the manufacturer is 6 weeks. We continue to consider the 
example of increased requirements (see appendix IX). 
Material purchasing cost MRA- - : 7  60  50  21000 € 
Material transportation cost MTA- - : 50 420  2  890 € 
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Material inventory carrying cost M A- - : 
25 
52
 330  (50 
890
420
)  75 € 
Material Penalty cost MPA- - : 0 € 
Purchasing cost: PHA- -  21000 890 75  21965 € 
Regular capacity cost PRA- : 7  50  10  3500 € 
Overtime capacity cost POA- : 0 € 
Subcontracting capacity cost PSA- : 0 € 
Set-ups cost S A- : 7  5  35 € 
Product inventory carrying cost P A- : 
25 
52
 270  (
3500
350
 50 
890
420
)    80  € 
Product penalty cost P A- : 40  (12 11)  1  40 € 
Production cost: P A-  3500 35 80 40  3655 € 
Eventually, the total cost until the week 12 is: 
Total cost: TTA-  21965 3655  25620 € 
Sales SSA- : 360 75  27000 € 
Benefit during the horizon: 
 N  SSA-  TTA-  27000 25620   1380 € 
In negotiation case 2, the manufacturer has no backorders due to the delay delivery from 
the supplier, since the current stock would compensate some delays from the supplier.  
Through the first negotiation (case 1) we show in our simulation that the manufacturer 
may consider he is taking too much risks (anyway more than his supplier) and may insist to 
decrease the horizon of the firmed periods. Thereby in negotiation case 2, a new horizon of 
the firmed periods is agreed and risks are shared between the supplier and the manufacturer. 
From our numerical results, the supplier earns more benefits in case 2 than in case 1, and the 
manufacturer is no longer facing backorders in case 2, showing that negotiation and sharing 
risks would in that case allow a win-win situation.  
Despite, from our numerical results, the changes of inventory carrying cost and penalty 
costs due to the changes of firmed period horizon are low, the advantages of negotiation are 
still identical based on the number of backorders and the inventory level in the production 
plans. 
2.3. Load variation  
In the simulation of the negotiation process motivated by a load variation, we shall focus 
on an increased load, the inverse case being simpler to handle. We consider that an overload 
is presented in the flexible period. It is consistent with the contract, but the supplier is 
supposed to be already in overtime, due to orders coming from other customers. The supplier 
cannot fulfill all the orders with his available overtime capacity and would have to increase 
his cost by using the subcontracting capacity.  
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2.3.1. Normal case 
In the normal case, we create a situation in which the supplier has to deal with three 
consecutive orders from the manufacturer, one in the firmed period and the other two in the 
flexible period. One order in the flexible period is newly confirmed, which is not planned in 
the previous forecasts. As a consequence, there is not enough capacity to fulfill it due to the 
capacity constraints. Therefore, the supplier must search for subcontracting or invest in extra 
hours for overtime capacity in order to satisfy the manufacturer. Figure 4.10 shows the 
previous MPS of the supplier in the month of January and the current MPS in the month of 
February.  
 
Figure 4.10. MPS of the supplier in normal case in Load variation simulation  
In Figure 4.10, we can see that the previous order on week 7 (40 units) has been moved 
ahead to week 6 in the current firmed orders. As a consequence, the supplier has to finish 
producing at least 40 units in week 6 in order to deal with such changes. We want to test two 
cases: 
 Case 1: the supplier pays for subcontracting (see appendix I and X). 
Material purchasing cost MRA- - : 7  60  50  21000 € 
Material transportation cost MTA- - : 50 420  2  890 € 
Material inventory carrying cost M A- - : 
25 
52
 380  (50 
890
420
)  95 € 
Material Penalty cost MPA- - : 0 € 
Purchasing cost: PHA- -  21000 890 95  21985 € 
Regular capacity cost PRA- : (6  50 10)  10  3100 € 
Overtime capacity cost POA- : 0 € 
Subcontracting capacity cost PSA- : 40  40  1600 € 
Set-ups cost S A- : 7  5   35  € 
Product inventory carrying cost P A- :
25 
52
 250  (
3100 800
310 40
 50 
890
420
)  76 € 
Product penalty cost P A- : 0 € 
Production cost: P A-  3200 1600 35 76 80  4991 € 
Eventually, the total cost until the week 12 is: 
Total cost: TTA-  21985 4991  26976 € 
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Sales SSA- : 360 75  27000 € 
Benefit during the horizon: 
 N  SSA-  TTA-  27000 26976  24 € 
The simulated data in this case are identical with the normal case 1, scenario 1.3 in the 
negotiation of periods of forecast. Through the comparison, the production cost is 
inevitably increased due to the subcontracting cost, but the supplier reduces the numbers 
of backorders.  
 Case 2: the supplier uses only his regular capacity and pays the penalty costs.   
We suppose that the supplier chooses to only use his regular capacity and postpones the 
orders required in week 6 to week 7, since in week 7 there is enough available capacity. 
The costs are the same than in the normal case 1, scenario 1.3 in the negotiation of 
periods of forecast (see appendix I and IV). These costs are:  
Material purchasing cost MRA- - : 7  60  50   21000 € 
Material transportation cost MTA- - : 50 420  2   890 € 
Material inventory carrying cost M A- - : 
25 
52
 420  (50 
890
420
)  105 € 
Material Penalty cost MPA- - : 0 € 
Purchasing cost: PHA- -  21000 890 105  21995 € 
Regular capacity cost PRA- : 7 50 10   3500 € 
Overtime capacity cost POA- : 0 € 
Subcontracting capacity cost PSA- : 0 € 
Set-ups cost S A- : 7 5   35  € 
Product inventory carrying cost P A- : 
25 
52
  250 (
3500
350
 50 
890
420
)   75  € 
Product penalty cost P A- : 40 (7-6) 1 40 (13-11) 1 120  € 
Production cost: P A-  3500 35 75 120  3730 € 
Eventually, the total cost until the week 12 is: 
Total cost: TTA-  21995 3730  25725 € 
Sales SSA- : 360 75  27000 € 
Benefit during the horizon: 
 N  SSA-  TTA-  27000 25725  1275 € 
By comparing these two cases, it is obvious that if the supplier chooses to postpone 
orders when dealing with an increased load, he could earn more money but may pay 
penalty costs. However, the manufacturer may suffer from delayed deliveries which 
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accordingly may lead to delayed deliveries to the end customer. As a consequence, the 
manufacturer may need to pay penalty costs to his customer. 
2.3.2. Negotiation case 
In the negotiation case, we consider that the supplier manages to get a part of his over 
costs paid by the manufacturer. He makes some benefit and the manufacturer does not have 
penalties. Both of the supplier and the manufacturer may earn benefits comparing with the 
two previous cases.  
 Negotiation case 1: the manufacturer re-ranges the load and charges no penalty cost 
from the supplier.  
In the negotiation case 1, we consider that the manufacturer accepts to split the order (40 
units) required in week 6 into two orders. One of 20 units is needed in week 6, which is 
currently enough for the internal material requirement on the manufacture‟s side. The other 
one is composed of 20 units, needed in week 7. The supplier could manage to deliver them 
using the regular capacity, see Figure 4.11. Accordingly, the supplier has to use 
subcontracting capacity to produce 20 units and the manufacturer does not charge the supplier 
for penalty costs (the manufacturer has no penalty cost to pay to his customer).  
 
Figure 4.11. MRP of the manufacturer in negotiation case 1 in Load variation simulation 
The cost on the supplier‟s side is calculated as (see appendix XI):  
Material purchasing cost MRA- - : 7  60  50  21000 € 
Material transportation cost MTA- - : 50 420  2  890 € 
Material inventory carrying cost M A- - : 
25 
52
 400  (50 
890
420
)  100 € 
Material Penalty cost MPA- - : 0 € 
Purchasing cost: PHA- -  21000 890 100  21990 € 
Regular capacity cost PRA- : (6  50 30)  10  3300 € 
Overtime capacity cost POA- : 0 € 
Subcontracting capacity cost PSA- : 20  40  800 € 
Set-ups cost S A- : 7  5  35 € 
Product inventory carrying cost P A- : 
25 
52
 250  (
3300 300
330 20
 50 
890
420
)  75 
€ 
Product penalty cost P A- : 40  (13 11)  1  80 € 
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Production cost: P A-  3300 800 35 75 80  4290 € 
Eventually, the total cost until the week 12 is: 
Total cost: TTA-  21990 4290  26280 € 
Sales SSA- : 360 75  27000 € 
Benefit during the horizon: 
 N  SSA-  TTA-   27000 26280  720 € 
Comparing to the normal cases, after negotiation, the supplier earns more benefit than the 
first normal case since he uses less subcontracting capacity and pays no penalty cost. He earns 
less benefit than in the second normal case but pays no penalty cost. If the penalty cost is 
higher than the over cost on subcontracting, the supplier may earn more benefit than in the 
second normal case.  
 Negotiation case 2: the manufacturer confirms his current load and provides extra 
payment to compensate the supplier‟s over cost.  
If the manufacturer cannot split orders, he may prefer to pay some extra payment to the 
supplier (usually less than his penalty cost) in order to avoid supplier‟s delayed delivery, 
which accordingly protects himself from backlog of material. As a consequence, the supplier 
has no backorders and may earn some benefits. Based on negotiation, the manufacturer uses 
some extra payment to avoid paying penalty cost for his customer. Eventually, the 
manufacturer only needs to pay less, but maintains a good customer satisfaction rate towards 
his customer.  
For instance, in normal case 1, the supplier needs to pay 4991 € for his production cost, 
including a subcontracting capacity cost of 1600 €, but only earns 24 € for benefit. In normal 
case 2, the supplier earns 1275 € but pays 120 € for penalty costs. With the extra payment 
from the manufacturer, the supplier needs to balance his cost/benefits and service rate of 
deliveries. 
In our simulation, such conclusion of the negotiation cannot be reached since the delays 
from the supplier has no effect on the production on the manufacturer‟s side, and the 
manufacturer has no penalty cost to pay even if there are delayed deliveries of material. 
Therefore, in such case, the manufacturer will probably not agree to pay extra money to the 
supplier and the supplier will inevitable choose the most beneficial solution for him, even 
with delayed delivery. 
2.4. Price and cycle time  
The simulation of price and cycle time negotiation targets on the management of urgent 
orders, which is not planned in the firm period or flexible period of the forecast. The case we 
consider is that the current time is period 2. 
The manufacturer receives a new order from his customer, with a quantity of 30 units of 
finished product A which needs to be delivered at period 8 (firm period in the manufacturer‟s 
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received forecast). In period 7, there is only a planned inventory of 5 units, therefore, the 
manufacturer needs to produce these 30 units (due to the lot size of 10 units) in the beginning 
of period 4 (1 month of cycle time). Accordingly, 30 units of components A-1 are needed to 
be in storage at the end of period 3, but they are not available in the planned stock. As a 
consequence, the manufacturer has to send an urgent purchasing order of 300 units of 
component A-1 at current period 2, and expects the delivery in period 4 (2 weeks of cycle 
time for the supplier, if he has the raw materials), see Figure 4.12.  
 
Figure 4.12. MPS and MRP of the manufacturer in normal case in Price and cycle time simulation 
2.4.1. Normal case 
 Case 1: the supplier can fulfill the order with the current inventory, there is no extra 
cost.  
 Case 2: the supplier can fulfill the order with his overtime capacity and 
subcontracting capacity 
In this case, the supplier has only an available overtime capacity of 10 units in period 2, 
the remaining 20 units needing to be purchased from the subcontractor. The supplier 
calculates his costs for fulfilling the urgent order from the manufacturer, and finds he is 
losing money. Here, we consider that the supplier has enough material inventories for 
such urgent orders and we focus on the cost of material purchasing and producing 
finished product. Therefore, we omit the inventory carrying cost here (see appendix XII):  
Material purchasing cost MRA- - : 30  50  1500 € 
Material transportation cost MTA- - : 
50 60 2
60
 30  85 €  
Material inventory carrying cost M A- - : 0 € 
Material Penalty cost MPA- - : 0 € 
Purchasing cost: PHA- -  1500 85  1585 € 
Regular capacity cost PRA- : 0 € 
Overtime capacity cost POA- : 10  15  150 € 
Subcontracting capacity cost PSA- : 20  40  800 € 
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Set-ups cost S A- : 1  5  5 € 
Product inventory carrying cost P A- : 0 € 
Product penalty cost P A- : 0 € 
Production cost: P A-  150 800 5  955 € 
The total cost until the week 12 is: 
Total cost: TTA-  1585 955  2540 € 
Sales SSA- : 30  75  2250 € 
Benefit during the horizon: 
 N  SSA-  TTA-   2250 2540    290 € 
Therefore, he does not accept the urgent order and suggests a new delivery date.  
 Case 3: the supplier can fulfill the order using only overtime capacity, with delays 
In case 3, the supplier has only an available overtime capacity of 10 units in period 2, the 
remaining 20 units being possibly produced 2 weeks later with the overtime capacity. 
The 10 units produced early need to be in stock temporarily for 2 weeks.  
Material purchasing cost MRA- - : 30  50  1500 € 
Material transportation cost MTA- - : 
50 60 2
60
 30  85 €  
Material inventory carrying cost M A- - : 0 € 
Material Penalty cost MPA- - : 0 € 
Purchasing cost: PHA- -  1500 85  1585 € 
Regular capacity cost PRA- : 0 € 
Overtime capacity cost POA- : 30  15  450 € 
Subcontracting capacity cost PSA- : 0 € 
Set-ups cost S A- : 2 5   10  € 
Product inventory carrying cost P A- : 
25 
52
 20  (
450
30
 50 
170
60
)  15 € 
Product penalty cost P A- : 0 € 
Production cost: P A-  450 10 15  475 € 
Eventually, the total cost until the week 12 is: 
Total cost: TTA-  1585 475  2060 € 
Sales SSA- : 30  75  2250 € 
Benefit during the horizon: 
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 N  SSA-  TTA-   22 50 2060  190 € 
As a consequence, the manufacturer would not get his urgent supplies as expected and 
accordingly, urgent orders from the manufacturer‟s customer would not be fulfilled. 
Therefore, the manufacturer may earn less money, or may even lose money through 
finding other solutions to fulfill the customer‟s urgent orders. As a consequence, 
negotiation with the customer may be necessary for the manufacturer.  
2.4.2. Negotiation case  
In the negotiation case, the over costs on the supplier‟s side is paid by the manufacturer. 
On the manufacturer side, the costs are as follows: 
Material purchasing cost MRA- - : 30  75  2250 € 
Material transportation cost MTA- - : 50 30  2  110 €  
Material inventory carrying cost M A- - : 0 € 
Material Penalty cost MPA- - : 0 € 
Purchasing cost: PHA- -  2250 110  2360 € 
Regular capacity cost PRA- : 30  20  600 € 
Overtime capacity cost POA- : 0 € 
Subcontracting capacity cost PSA- : 0 € 
Set-ups cost S A- : 1  5  5 € 
Product inventory carrying cost P A- : 0 € 
Product penalty cost P A- : 0 € 
Production cost: P A-  600 5  605 € 
Eventually, the total cost until the week 12 is: 
Total cost: TTA-  2360 605  2965 € 
In order to compensate the over cost from the material purchasing, the manufacturer 
requests a higher price from the customer, 115 €, per unit. 
Sales SSA- : 30  115  3450 € 
Benefit during the horizon: 
 N  SSA-  TTA-    34 50 2965  485 € 
Therefore, the negotiation would focus on the extra payment from the manufacturer to 
the supplier for the on-time delivery for the urgent orders. If the manufacturer receives the 
orders as expected, he gets a benefit of 485 €. However, in order to fulfill the urgent order, the 
supplier loses 290 €. The ideal negotiation could be sharing benefits: the manufacturer pays 
the supplier 380 € and has a benefit of 105 €; the supplier receives an extra payment of 380 €, 
performs on-time delivery and earns a benefit of 90 €.  
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2.5. Order priority and lot size  
2.5.1. Order priority  
Let us consider that the supplier is involved into three supply chains and deals with two 
additional customers f and v, who order the finished product A-2 (the same product than A-1) 
and another kind of finished product denoted A-3. The orders from the three customers are as 
shown in Table 4.1. In our simulation, we only present the supply and demand process 
between the supplier and customer c (orders from customer f and customer v are not 
specified). 
Table 4.1. Customers firmed orders 
Order No Customer Product Quantity Material arrived Required delivery 
C1 c A-1 40 Week 8 Week 10 
C2 c A-1 40 Week 10 Week 12 
F1 f A-2 40 Week 8 Week 10 
F2 f A-2 40 Week 10 Week 12 
V1 v A-3 40 Week 8 Week 10 
V2 v A-3 40 Week 10 Week 12 
For each finished product A-1, A-2, A-3, the routing of production based on different 
and/or common activities are as shown in Table 4.2. 
Table 4.2. Routings of products 
Product Routing 
A-1 Activity 1 (4h) Activity 2 (4h) Activity 3 (4h) 
A-2 Activity 2 (4h) Activity 3 (8h)  
A-3 Activity 1 (4h) Activity 2 (4h) Activity 3 (4h) 
On the supplier‟s side, there are three workstations: machine 1, machine 2 and machine 3, 
with their capacity on different activities shown in Table 4.3.  
Table 4.3. Machines and related information 
Machine Activity Capacity Duration 
Machine1  Activity 1 40 Units 4h 
Machine2  Activity 2 40 Units 4h 
Machine3  Activity 3 40 Units 4h 
On the base of these technical data, a possible rule of production scheduling is the 
highest priority of orders from customer f, if we suppose here that the supplier considers 
customer f as more important than the others. For the orders from customer c and customer v, 
the supplier has to pay a higher penalty cost for customer v. Accordingly, if conflicts exits, 
orders from customer c are likely to be postponed. The scheduling is performed as Figure 
4.13 shows.  
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Figure 4.13. The chart of scheduling 
In Figure 4.13, it is clear that machine 3 is the critical resource which generates conflicts 
between orders V1 and C1, and V2 and C2. In order to pay less penalty cost, the supplier 
decides to delay one order from customer c, C1 and C2.  
2.5.1.1. Normal case  
In the normal case, the supplier has no information about the order priority on both the 
customer c and customer v, and as a consequence, decision of order priority is made locally 
on the supplier‟s side. The supplier chooses to postpone C1 which should be delivered on 
week 10 but is delivered actually on week 11, C2 which should be delivered on week 12 but 
is actually delivered on week 13. Due to the delayed delivery, the manufacturer has to deal 
with some backorders, see Figure 4.14 (detailed simulation, see appendix XIII).  
 
Figure 4.14. MPS and MRP of the customer c (manufacturer) in s normal case in Order priority 
simulation 
Due to the backorders, the penalty costs on the manufacturer‟s side are:  
Material Penalty cost MPA- : 40  (11 10)  1  40  (13  12)  1  80 € 
Product penalty cost P A: 20  (15 14)  10  200 € 
Therefore, the manufacturer has to pay 200 € to his customer but only receives 80 € from 
the supplier.  
2.5.1.2. Negotiation case  
In the negotiation case, the supplier receives information about the order priority from 
the customer c and customer v. Customer c prefers to keep the C1 on time and C2 would be 
postponed due to a sufficient inventory level. Customer v provides information of the 
possibility to delay V1. Thereby, based on the shared information and negotiation, the 
supplier re-schedules his production plans and postpones V1 and C2. As a result, for customer 
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c, the supplier only postpones C2 which should be delivered on week 12 but is delivered 
actually on week 13, see Figure 4.15 (for the detailed simulation, see appendix XIV).  
 
Figure 4.15. MPS and MRP of the customer c (manufacturer) in negotiation case in Order priority 
simulation 
As we mentioned, the penalty cost for customer v (4 € per unit, per period) is higher than 
for customer c (1 € per unit, per period). We suppose that for customer v, V1 is delayed for 
one period. Therefore, in the negotiation case, customers have no penalty to pay due to 
sharing information on order priority. The penalty costs from the supplier, should be: 
Material Penalty cost MPA- : 40  (13 12)  1  80 € 
Material Penalty cost MP - : 40  (11 10)  4  160 € 
Comparing the normal case and the negotiation case, the supply chain loses a total of 280 
€ for penalty costs in the normal case, but 240 € in the negotiation case. Despite the supplier 
pays more  penalty cost based the shared information of order priority, he maintains a better 
service rate with no real effects on his customers (customer c and customer v).  
2.5.2. Order grouping  
We suppose that due to internal cost or capacity constraints, the manufacturer 
provisionally needs a larger lot size for being able to group several orders from the customer 
in order to reduce his total cost.  
2.5.2.1. Normal case  
 Case 1: the manufacturer makes the grouping without effect on delivery (see 
appendix XV) 
Material purchasing cost MRA- - : 6  60  50  18000 € 
Material transportation cost MTA- - : 50 360  2  770 € 
Material inventory carrying cost M A- - : 
25 
52
 370  (50 
770
360
)  93 € 
Material Penalty cost MPA- - : 0 € 
Purchasing cost: PHA- -  18000 770 93  18863 € 
Regular capacity cost PRA- : (4  50 2  80)  10  3600 € 
Overtime capacity cost POA- : 0 € 
Subcontracting capacity cost PSA- : 0 € 
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Set-ups cost S A- : 6  5  30 € 
Product inventory carrying cost P A- : 
25 
52
 350  (
3600
360
 50 
770
360
)  105 € 
Product penalty cost P A- : 0 € 
Production cost: P A-  3600 30 105  3735 € 
Eventually, the total cost until the week 12 is: 
Total cost: TTA-  18633 3735  22368 € 
Sales SSA- : 320 75  24000 € 
Benefit during the horizon: 
 N  SSA-  TTA-    24000 22368  1402 € 
The simulated data in this case are the same than with the normal case 1, scenario 1.1 
concerning the periods of forecast. In the previous case, the supplier loses money due to 
an increase in material purchasing. However, when using a larger manufacturing lot size, 
the supplier reduces his number of set-ups times, as well as the cost for set-ups. 
Accordingly, the next material replenishment should be postponed since there is no 
requirement for material due to the stored finished products in the product inventory 
(early produced with larger lot size and less set-up times). However, the supplier needs to 
maintain a higher temporary level of inventory of finished products, with a higher 
inventory carrying cost.  
 Case 2: the manufacturer voluntarily delays some orders, the customer has no 
inventories and pays penalty costs (see appendix XVI) 
Material purchasing cost MRA- - : 6  60  50  18000 € 
Material transportation cost MTA- - : 50 360  2  770 € 
Material inventory carrying cost M A- - : 
25 
52
 530  (50 
770
360
)  158 € 
Material Penalty cost MPA- - : 0 € 
Purchasing cost: PHA- -  18000 770 158  18928 € 
Regular capacity cost PRA- : (4  50 1  80)  10  2800 € 
Overtime capacity cost POA- : 0 € 
Subcontracting capacity cost PSA- : 0 € 
Set-ups cost S A- : 5  5  25 € 
Product inventory carrying cost P A- : 
25 
52
 310  (
2800
280
 50 
770
360
)  93 € 
Product penalty cost P A- : 40  (14 12)  1  80 € 
Production cost: P A-  2800 25 93 80  2998 € 
Eventually, the total cost until the week 12 is: 
Chapter 4 Cost Assessment during the Negotiation Process 
106 
Total cost: TTA-  18928 2998  21926 € 
Sales SSA- : 320 75  24000 € 
Benefit during the horizon: 
 N  SSA-  TTA-   24000 21926  2074 € 
The supplier performs these activities since the benefit he gets is more than his penalties. 
But the delays do have effect on the following actions on the manufacturer‟s side (see 
Figure 4.16). The case shows the typical problems of order grouping with no attention to 
the due date.  
 
Figure 4.16. MPS and MRP of the manufacturer in normal case in Order grouping simulation 
2.5.2.2. Negotiation case 
After negotiation, the agreed lot size is supposed to be in between the one of the previous 
cases (supplier adopts 80 units for covering the two coming orders) and the classical lot size 
(the manufacturer requires 40 units in each purchasing order).  
If the manufacturer accepts to receive 80 units for each delivery, there is a temporary 
increase for his inventory and a related carrying cost. The supplier performs early production 
using a larger lot size, and delivers the parts shortly after producing, with less inventory 
carrying cost.  
On the other hand, if the manufacturer considers that 80 units for each delivery is less 
beneficial due to the higher temporary inventory level, the manufacturer may agree to accept 
60 units. Therefore, the negotiation on the lot size also needs to balance the related costs.  
Afterwards, if the coming orders are confirmed as they are in the flexible period, it is a 
win-win situation for the supplier and the manufacturer; the supplier using a lower sale price 
avoids an important finished product inventory cost and the manufacturer spends some 
material inventory cost to gain a lower purchasing price in return. If the orders are not 
confirmed, the risk has been shared since the parts were less expensive for the manufacturer: 
they have both shared benefit and risk. 
3. Conclusion of chapter 4 
In this chapter, we have shown some numerical simulations of our examples of suggested 
negotiation processes. For each process, we have compared the normal case(s) and the typical 
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negotiation-based case(s), in order to show that the negotiation processes may lead to a win-
win situation, under some conditions. The simulations are very simple but illustrate our main 
ideas on the proposed negotiation process. Since the real situations may be more complex 
than the simulated ones, other conditions would surely provide more strict and mature factors 
for making decisions in the negotiation process.  
Chapter 4 provides illustrations of the suggested negotiation processes described in 
Chapter 3. The simulations gave us an overview on the cost-related constraints of the 
negotiation process. Through these examples, it is shown how the supply chain member share 
information, risks, and related costs by publishing constraints or launch protections activities, 
aiming at achieving win-win situations. If not, negotiations are hardly to reach mutual 
agreements. Nevertheless, these cases are not common in practice, since they require trustful 
and reliable relationships between partners. How to identify these suitable relationships is, in 
our opinion, another critical factor for adopting negotiation processes. Therefore, we shall 
investigate in Chapter 5 the various types of cooperation situations which may exist between 
partners, in order to better identify in which cases our negotiation processes seem to be 
realistic.  
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Chapter 5 
A Model of Cooperation Situations 
The analysis of real situations performed in Chapter 2 shows that 
cooperation in supply chains is a very complex issue, with a lot of differences 
between theoretical frameworks as listed in chapter 1 and a more complex and 
confusing industrial reality, illustrated in chapter 2. Based on some practices 
identified from the case studies, we have suggested that negotiation processes 
considering interests of both the supplier and the customer could help to obtain a 
better cooperation. However, many authors emphasized that other issues than 
purely technical ones define a relationship, like trust, maturity, involvement, 
goodwill etc., which are important factors for negotiation. Therefore, in this chapter, 
we suggest a taxonomy of the cooperation situations, based on what we consider as 
the most critical and widely used factors influencing cooperation. As a second step, 
we try to match the identified situations with each negotiation process described in 
Chapter 3, in order to show the situations required for making the suggested 
negotiation process realistic in practical cases. 
1 Literature view on the definition of cooperation situations  
Information sharing, joint-planning, cooperation and strategic partnerships over the entire 
supply chain are now universally considered as conditions for building more efficient and 
reactive supply chains. Therefore, how to synchronize local activities through global 
processes is an actual difficulty that supply chain members have to face. Substantial efforts 
have been described in the literature on the technical aspects that help supply chain members 
to cooperate using different tools, management strategies and practical methods, as Chapter 1 
mentioned. On the other hand, supply chains have more and more complex structures, and 
may involve partners from different domains, sizes, countries, accordingly from different 
cultures. In that context, it is widely recognized that the performance of the supply chain 
cooperation is not only a technical matter, but is also concerned with behavioral issues 
(Möllering, 2003). As a consequence, the qualitative factors conditioning the cooperative 
relationships between partners are object or an increasing attention from both academics and 
practitioners. 
1.1 Cooperation in Supply Chains: beyond the technical view  
Firms are increasingly building cooperative relationships with their supply chain partners 
in order to achieve efficiency, flexibility, and competitive advantages (Nyaga et al. 2010). 
Many studies suggest that cooperative relationships are associated with the improvement of 
the performance of the supply chains (Heide and John, 1990; Ganesan, 1994; Kalwani and 
Narayandas, 1995; Cannon and Perreault, 1999). Kalwani and Narayandas (1995) note that 
manufacturers seek for long-term relationships with fewer suppliers to secure valued 
resources and technologies, harness supplier skills and strengths, and gain from quality and 
process improvements. Holland (1995) has shown that companies are moving towards 
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cooperative relationships in an effort to make the supply chain as a whole more competitive. 
Maloni and Benton (1997) suggest that it is essential for a firm‟s survival to have cooperative 
relationships with its suppliers. Chung et al. (2005) state the idea that one way to build an 
efficient supply chain is to integrate the supply chain activities by developing cooperative 
relationships between firms. Daugherty et al. (2006) found that firms engaged in cooperative 
relationships achieved improved visibility, higher service levels, increased flexibility, greater 
end-customer satisfaction, and reduced cycle times.  
It is therefore often considered in the literature that customer-supplier relationship plays 
an important role in the performance of supply chains. Accordingly, substantial works target 
on the quality and measurement of customer-supplier relationship by specifying the positive 
or negative factors influencing cooperation. Within this literature, some studies have 
suggested taxonomies of those relationships. In the following section, we are going to 
introduce some popular and widely used factors influencing customer-supplier relationship, as 
well as the existing taxonomies on the field.  
1.2 Influencing factors  
Customer-supplier relationships have been undergoing massive changes at national and 
international levels (Bidault et al., 1998; Tan, 2001; Zheng et al., 2007; Giunipero et al., 2008; 
Soosay et al., 2008). Esposito and Passaro (2009) consider that these changes relate to the 
object of transaction between customer and supplier (from parts to components, then to 
complex systems); the firm‟s functions in the supply relationship (production, but also design, 
planning, marketing...); the supplier‟s skills as required by the customer (not only technical 
but also managerial or related to logistics,); and the level of trust and cooperation which 
sustains these relationships. Many other authors have investigated the various kinds of factors 
influencing supply chain relationship, sometimes summarized by the concept of “relationship 
atmosphere” (Hallén and Sandströn, 1991). For Andersen and Kumar, (2006), the 
“relationship atmosphere” addresses six specific dimensions: power/dependence balance, 
trust/opportunism, understanding, cooperativeness/competitiveness, closeness/distance, and 
commitment. More precise frameworks have also been suggested; for instance, a total of 
eighteen key “relationship indicators” have been identified by Meng (2010). The “top 10” 
relationship indicators are trust, objectives, teamwork, risk allocation, communication, 
continuous improvement, business attitude, problem solving, procurement system, and senior 
management commitment. 
Table 5.1 suggests a brief summary of the concepts identified in a panorama of the 
literature. Even if many other articles can of course be found on the subject, we do think that 
these ones are already quite representative and give a quite comprehensive view on the 
subject. Trust, commitment, dependency and power are therefore the concepts most often 
considered by the authors interested in qualitatively analyzing the relationships between 
Supply Chains members. Among these factors, power and trust are often considered and are 
usually seen as the main factors driving the relationships in the supply chains. They will be 
analyzed in more details in the next sections. 
1.2.1 Power  
Power is often considered as a way to mitigate risks. As confirmed in real situations 
described in Chapter 2, risks in supply chains are usually associated either to product demand 
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or to product supply, due to capacity limitations or supply disruptions (Johnson, 2001). Indeed, 
to limit such risks, the first solution for the customer is to “control” the supplier, since control 
mechanisms may reduce opportunistic behaviors (Liu et al., 2010). Control requires power 
and the relative power of an organization over another is the result of the net dependency of 
the one on the other (Caniëls and Gelderman, 2010).  
Table 5.1. Factors influencing supply chain relationships in the literature 
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Carter and Jennings 2002    √          √ 
Johnston et al. 2004         √     √ 
Fynes et al. 2005    √   √  √     √ 
Benton and Maloni 2005             √  
Andersen and Kumar 2006 √  √ √  √   √ √  √ √ √ 
Ireland and Webb 2007         √    √ √ 
Su et al. 2008 √      √       √ 
Zhao et al. 2008    √         √  
Narasimhan et al. 2009         √    √  
Nyaga et al. 2010    √       √   √ 
Hausman and Johnston 2010    √          √ 
Liu et al. 2010  √  √        √ √ √ 
Ren et al. 2010    √   √  √  √    
Lee et al. 2010    √     √     √ 
Meng 2010  √   √  √       √ 
Cheng 2010        √      √ 
Total  2 2 1 9 1 1 4 1 7 1 2 2 6 12 
 Power description  
According to Belaya and Hanf (2009), power is often referred to as the “ability” or 
“capacity” to do something in the psychological context. They furthermore specify that this 
ability or capacity is used for modifying the behavior of other individuals or organizations. 
For instance, Dahl (1957) defines power as follows: “A has power over B to the extent that he 
can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do”. Emerson (1962) defines power as 
the ability of one firm to influence the intentions and actions of another firm and 
Ratnasingham (2000) refers to it as the capability of a firm to exert influence on another firm 
to act in a prescribed manner. Power is therefore linked to behavior. Lewin (1951) states that 
the power of person A over person B is determined in terms of the force A could bring to bear 
on B and the resistance B could offer. Mathematically, the power of A over B is defined as 
“the quotient of the maximum force that A could (or possibly could) induce on B and the 
maximum resistance that B could offer”. Homans (1974) also states that A‟s power over B is 
the extent to which A can affect B‟s behavior (through exchange).  
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Many other definitions could be found and quoted with various points of views. The 
examination of all these definitions of power from different perspectives allows to conclude 
that power generally refers to the ability, capacity or potential to get others do something, to 
command, to influence, to determine or to control the behaviors, intentions, decisions or 
actions of others in the pursuit of one‟s own goals or interests against the will of the power 
target, as well as to induce changes, to mobilize resources, or to restructure situations. 
 Power source 
On the other hand, some works have concentrated on tracing the source of power in order 
to better understand the influence of power on customer and supplier relationship. Reward 
and coercive attitudes, early introduced by French and Raven (1959), remain the clearest and 
most widely recognized of such power sources, indicating the ability of the powerful partner 
to mediate dividends (such as increased business or shared benefits coming from cost 
reductions) or punishment (such as decreased business or dictated cost reductions) to the 
target. Reward power depends on the ability of the power holder to offer rewards to others 
(Zhao et al., 2008; Liu et al., 2010). Coercive power enables an individual to punish others.  
Beyond such traditional considerations, other sources of power may also have a 
prominent role in the supply chain (French and Raven, 1959; Rawwa et al., 1997; Yeung et al., 
2009). “Expert power” derives from skills or special knowledge in a specific subject, or refers 
to the perception that one firm holds information or expertise (such as product or process 
leadership) that is valued by another firm. “Referent power” implies that one firm desires 
identification with another for recognition by association, or depends on an ability to be 
attractive to others and on the charisma and interpersonal skills of the power holder. 
“Legitimate power” stems from a legitimate right to influence, and an obligation to accept this 
influence, which include both its traditional (inherent) and legal forms; it represents the final 
two power bases and infers that the target believes in the right of the source to wield influence 
(such as via a sales contract) (Maloni and Benton, 2000; Flynn et al., 2008).  
To facilitate power exploration, many researchers have attempted to get a simplified 
view through dichotomization of the different power sources into categories, such as 
coercive/non-coercive (Cather and Howe, 1989; Kim, 2000; Hu and Sheu, 2005), 
mediated/non-mediated (Brown et al., 1995; Zhao et al., 2008), coercive-mediated/ reward-
mediated (Benton and Maloni, 2005), and economic/non-economic (Belaya and Hanf, 2009) 
(see Table 5.2). Coercive sources of power arise from punishment, while non-coercive 
sources arise from rewards or high quality assistances. Mediated power represents influencial 
efforts that are deliberately engaged (or threatened) by the power source to guide target 
response, including coercive, reward, and legal legitimate bases. Non-mediated power sources 
(expert, referent, and legitimate resource) are not specifically exercised or threatened to 
manipulate the target.  
 Power & Dependence 
Since power is related with influence and decision control among partners, understanding 
power requires to understand the issue of dependence. Quite a few researchers have used in 
their study the concept of dependence in order to conceptualize power (see for instance (Kale, 
1986); (Kim et al., 2004); (Bunduchi, 2007)). In the study of Kale (1986), dependence is 
defined as the degree to which the target firm needs to maintain its relationship with the 
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source in order to achieve its desired goals. Kim et al. (2004) state that power fundamentally 
resides in the dependence of one actor on another. Bunduchi (2007) also views power in terms 
of dependence and access to critical resources. Belaya and Hanf (2009) suggest a more 
precise relationship between power and dependence: they state that although both actors are 
mutually dependent in an exchange, it does not mean that they are always equally dependent 
on each other. The less dependent actor will maintain a power advantage, resulting in a power 
imbalance. In essence, asymmetric dependence between two actors in an exchange relation 
constitutes the essence of the concept of power dependence  
Table 5.2. Dichotomization of power resource (Belaya and Hanf, 2009) 
Coercive 
Coercive 
VS 
Non-coercive 
Expert 
Legal Legitimate 
Referent 
Reward 
Traditional Legitimate 
Mediated 
Coercive 
Legal Legitimate 
Reward 
VS 
Non-mediated 
Expert 
Referent 
Traditional Legitimate 
Economic 
Coercive 
Reward 
VS 
Non-economic 
Expert 
Legal Legitimate 
Referent 
Traditional Legitimate 
Coercive-mediated 
Coercive  
Legal legitimate 
VS 
Reward-mediated 
Reward 
Expert 
Referent 
Traditional Legitimate 
Therefore, dependence is also widely studied in order to better understand its relation to 
power (Narasimhan et al., 2009). According (El-Ansary and Stern, 1972), dependence 
between two firms is a function of three elements. Firstly, the percentage of one Firm A‟s 
business conducted with a Firm B and the proportion of Firm A‟s profit contributed by Firm 
B. Secondly, the commitment Firm A has to Firm B in terms of the latter‟s marketing 
strategies. Thirdly, the difficulty in effort and cost faced if either firm decides to exit the 
relationship. A balanced inter-dependency is considered as the extent to which supply chain 
partners believe that their business relationship is necessary. As inter-organizational 
interdependency increases, the need for coordination, cooperation and collaboration also 
increases and information sharing becomes more important (Mentzer et al., 2001). 
Besides, authors have argued on the advantages brought by power. For instance, non-
coercive power provides numerous relational advantages, including the ability to overcome 
lack of consensus and reach fast decisions, promote innovation and change to address 
environmental opportunities and threats (Cox, 2001), influence the adoption of advanced 
information technologies (Hart and Saunders, 1997), and provision of legitimacy and stability 
to a network (Oliver, 1990). On the contrary, Ireland and Webb (2007) suggest that power 
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differentials between partners create opportunities for more powerful firms to act 
opportunistically by exercising coercion.  
 Power in supply chains 
Based on the general definition of power, its sources and relationship with dependence, 
power is a multi-dimensional construct encompassing an influence that can be used to evoke 
desired actions from partners (Ireland and Webb, 2007). Particularly in supply chain 
relationship research, power has been defined as the ability of one member of a supply chain 
to influence or control the decisions and behavior of other persons, groups, or organizations 
(Payan and McFarland, 2005). The ability of one supply chain member to fulfill another 
supply chain member‟s goals is one of the possible foundations of power. Nevertheless, 
power retains the potential to upset the mutuality of supply chain relationships and 
subsequently presents a barrier to the win-win integration process (Maloni and Benton, 2000; 
Benton and Maloni, 2005). For many authors, mutual dependence and power appear to be 
foundations of a cooperative relationship, allowing to develop and maintain long term 
relationship (Narasimhan et al., 2009; Cheng, 2010). 
In supply chain relationships, one party may decide to reduce its dependence on the other; 
however, strategic partners may accept dependence as a trade-off for the benefits that accrue 
from such relationship. If power and dependence are asymmetrically distributed, the 
relationship will not only be difficult to manage, but the benefits for the most dependent firm 
will be hardly realized, which may encourage opportunistic behavior (Easton, 2002; Cousins, 
2002). Coercive power may not be sufficient in uncertain environments. In case of uncertainty, 
more initiative is expected from partners in order to cope with unexpected events or situations, 
and initiative seldom comes from a controlled partner. As a consequence, companies try to 
develop trust and commitment at their partner‟s, which may lead to better performance when 
dealing with uncertainties. Nevertheless, the power-dependence dimension cannot be ignored 
when seeking to evaluate strategic supply chain relationships, but needs to be addressed as a 
multi-dimensional concept (Johnsen et al., 2008). 
1.2.2 Trust  
The customer can try to cope with the risks linked to the necessity to synchronize actions 
with its suppliers by dependence and power, while keeping a clear distance with them. This 
strategy is called “arm‟s length relationship” in the literature, and can be compared to the 
“formal contracted rules and procedures” considered by Williamson (1985). Many works 
have addressed that traditional arm‟s length relationship is efficient in stable environments, 
but not sufficient to face unstable and uncertain situations (Heide and Jogn, 1990; Gadde and 
Snehota, 2000). As a consequence, trust and commitment are necessary when uncertainties 
occur, since all the cases of cooperation cannot be listed in the contract, or even cannot be 
controlled.  
 Trust description 
Trust is defined as the confidence in the reliability and integrity of the other party, and 
the ability to predict the actions of the other party in the relationship, as well as the belief that 
the other party will not act opportunistically (Anderson and Narus, 1990; Morgan and Hunt, 
1994). Moorman et al. (1993) define trust as the willingness to rely on an exchange partner in 
Chapter 5 A Model of Cooperation Situations 
115 
whom one has confidence. Ganesan (1994) states that trust refers to the extent to relationship 
which partners perceive each other as credible and benevolent. Sako and Helper (1998) 
consider trust as an expectation held by an agent that its reading partner will behave in a 
mutually acceptable manner. Trust implies an expectation or an attitude; it occurs gradually in 
the interaction of both parties (Su et al, 2008). Lee et al. (2010) define trust as the extent to 
which firms believe that supply chain partners will fulfill their responsibility to each other in 
good faith. 
According to Sako (1992) and Fynes et al., (2005), three types of trust may be 
distinguished: contractual trust, competence trust and goodwill trust, based on keeping 
promise, confidence in partner‟s competence and commitment to maintain a trading 
relationship. With contractual trust, each party adheres to specific written or oral agreements. 
Competence trust is built on each other‟s capabilities to carry out their tasks. When goodwill 
trust is reached, the parties express their willingness to do more than what is formally 
expected. Two dimensions of trust are also discussed in (Johnston et al., 2004): trust as the 
belief that the other party is dependable or reliable on one hand, and belief that the other party 
would act in the best interest of his partner even if there is no way to check it on the other 
hand. 
 Trust, Commitment and other related factors 
Trust is usually considered as linked to specific behaviors. The most widely mentioned 
one is commitment. Some researchers propose that trust contributes to commitment by 
contributing to joint actions (Anderson et al., 1994; Reichheld, 1996). Authors state that 
commitment entails vulnerability, and parties may only cooperate with trustworthy partners 
(Hallen et al., 1991). Morgan and Hunt (1994) define commitment as a partner‟s belief that an 
ongoing relationship with another is so important as to warrant maximum efforts at 
maintaining it. These statements indicate that commitment and trust are closely related. 
Morgan and Hunt (1994) find that opportunistic behavior also results in decreased 
relationship commitment through the mediating effect of trust, where a party in a dyadic 
exchange relationship becomes less committed to the relationship as it loses trust in the other 
party.  
We can see that authors sometimes use different concepts to interpret quite similar 
statements, but in most of the identified studies, the preponderant importance of confidence, 
trust, commitment and benevolence for cooperation is underlined, these different notions 
expressing the level of perception of the supply chain member‟s about the dependability and 
reliability of the other members (Hausman and Johnston, 2010), based on their capability, 
actions and behaviors. This perception undoubtedly affects the level of commitment, informal 
agreement, willingness to cooperate, communication, information sharing, opportunistic 
actions and certainly operational processes (Carter and Jennings, 2002; Johnston et al., 2004). 
For instance, some works indicate that trust is a deterrent to opportunistic behavior. When 
trust is embedded in the relationship, opportunistic behavior is unlikely to occur because 
partner firms eschew short-term individual gains in favor of the long-term interests of the 
partnership (Beamish and Banks, 1987). Trust reduces opportunism in downstream supply 
chains (Cavusgil et al., 2004), improves supply chain responsiveness (Handfield and Bechtel, 
2002), and increases the potential for beneficial supply chain alliances (McCutcheon and 
Stuart, 2000). Some other authors augured that trust is at best an adherence to the contract, 
and may be undermined by opportunistic behavior (Meng, 2010). Empirical findings suggest 
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that trust enhances a partner‟s willingness to cooperate (Wiertz et al., 2004). Information 
sharing is quite commonly considered as an essential condition for making trust possible, 
allowing therefore to maintain long term and collaborative supply chain relationship (Nyaga 
et al., 2010; Ren et al., 2010). The study described in (Lee et al., 2010) shows that trust has a 
significant positive effect on operational and strategic information sharing, as well as on 
operational and strategic cooperation, accordingly reducing uncertainty and risk increases. 
 Customer’s trust and supplier’s trust 
According to Ryssel and Ritter (2000), customer‟s trust is the extent to which a customer 
believes that the supplier is honest, benevolent, and competent. Customers trust their suppliers‟ 
reliability, i.e. they believe that the supplier stands by its word, fulfills promised role 
obligations, and is sincere. Customer trust has for instance been addressed by MacKenzie 
(1992) who demonstrated that customer trust is influenced positively by customer perception 
of product and service performance, which may be measured through operational activities. 
In reverse, supplier‟s trust in the customer is based on the supplier‟s observation of 
customer‟s dependability and benevolence (Johnston et al., 2004). Suppliers trust their 
customers, primarily through the contract which binds them, which also represents an 
important source of trust from the customer to his supplier (MacDuffie and Helper, 2006). 
The repeated interactions between customer and supplier are also a factor which enables the 
supplier to develop trust in the customer (Jap and Anderson, 2003). As such, customer‟s trust 
can serve as antecedent of supplier‟s trust (Zhang et al., 2010).  
An important reason for unsuccessful relationships is the lack of trust between the 
partners. The establishment of trust is considered as the basic requirement for long-term 
successful relationships by both researchers and practitioners (Walter et al., 2002). 
Development of trust enhances later cooperation within the relationship that ultimately 
influences performance (Rodriguez and Wilson, 2002; Johnston et al., 2004). In B2B 
(Business To Business) relationships, trust can influence the behaviors of both parties 
involved in a relationship. Partnership will be further developed only when trust is sufficient. 
The higher the degree of trust, the easier the development and maintenance of the partnership 
will be (Su et al., 2008). Corsten and Kumar (2005) suggest that trust results in greater 
openness between suppliers and retailers and thus greater knowledge and appreciation of each 
other‟s contribution to the relationship. Trust is important in achieving behavioral and 
performance objectives in inter-firm partnerships, especially in cross-border relationships 
where hierarchical control may not be viable (Cheung et al., 2010).  
1.2.3 Interaction between factors 
The precise depictions of influencing factors and their inter-relationships have shown 
that Trust/Commitment, Power/Dependency are often considered as the most fundamental 
factors when addressing the relationship in supply chains. Indeed, commitment is clearly seen 
as a consequence of trust, while dependency proceeds from the partner‟s power. Additionally, 
trust and power are often considered as the basic pillars of relationship, which influence many 
of the other listed aspects, like commitment, cooperativeness, opportunism, etc. Therefore, the 
identification of the links between trust and power, the most basic and important factors of the 
relationship, will help to specify a global picture of the interaction between different 
influencing factors.  
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According to Ireland and Webb (2007), trust and power exist as different means through 
which a firm seeks to promote desired behaviors in a partner. Trust and power are 
complementary and opposing components of social behavior. The complementary nature of 
trust and power extends from the ability of one to substitute to the other when one fails to 
achieve desired results. Hémont et al. (2010) suggest that trust is often seen as an alternative 
to power, since trust decreases the required level of monitoring of the relationship and is an 
antecedent to cooperative behavior. However, there are constraints in such complementary or 
alternative relationship. For instance, coercive power and goodwill trust hardly exist 
simultaneously in customer and supplier relationship, and other forms of trust may 
concurrently exist with coercive power at any point in time. Similarly, non-coercive power 
may exist at the same time as goodwill trust, as well as other forms of trust. It is also possible 
that an excessive use of either non-coercive or coercive power may undermine trust in a 
relationship (Ireland and Webb, 2007). We have seen some good examples of this in the case 
studies in chapter 2.  
In our opinion, trust and power are rather antagonist concepts, but are nevertheless 
loosely attached in a dynamic independence. Therefore, the identification of the dynamics 
between trust and power is definitely important for analyzing the relationships in supply chain, 
as well as the cooperation situations.  
1.3 Cooperation taxonomies  
Suggesting classifications is a common way for better understanding complex 
phenomena. Since the types of relationships between partners of a supply chain do influence 
the performance of the chain, several taxonomies have been suggested in the literature for 
different kinds of purposes. Since these types of relationships clearly condition the 
applicability of the negotiation processes suggested in Chapter 3, we shall analyze these 
classifications in the newt sub-sections. 
1.3.1 Möllering‟s taxonomy 
On the base of 196 cases, and considering trust and performance as discriminating 
factors, Möllering (2003) defines three clusters of partners based on trust and performance. 
The first type of partners (Cluster 1) is called “traditional wary traders”. It represents 
more than half of the respondents (55.6%) in the database. They display much lower levels of 
trust and performance than the respondents in the other two clusters. 
“Committed flexible partners” is the label given to Cluster 2 representing 30.1  of the 
sample. These partners have very high levels of trust and performance. Strong reciprocity 
means that they are very likely to see their suppliers as partners with whom they have mutual 
interests. 
The third cluster is described as “controlled routine partners”. Like the committed 
flexible partners before, this group of buyers (14.3%) is characterized by high trust and 
performance (including reciprocity) and they can therefore be called “partners”. The 
difference is, however, that the partnership relies heavily on formality and strict following of 
agreed terms. The exchanges between buyer and supplier are very much like a highly reliable 
but unstoppable routine. Figure 5.1 shows a graphic representation of cluster characteristics. 
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Figure 5.1. Taxonomy from Möllering (2003) 
Nevertheless, the independence of the two factors trust and performance may be set into 
question, since performance is considered as being linked to trust by many authors (Andersen 
and Kumar, 2006; Johnston et al., 2004; Möllering, 2003).  
1.3.2 Hallikas‟s taxonomy 
Hallikas et al. (2005) suggest a classification of supplier relationship built after a 
questionnaire (see Figure 5.2). The classification is based on the concept of dependency risk: 
buyer dependency risk (low or high) and supplier dependency risk (low or high). Buyer 
dependency risk is measured through the value added to the customer and the replaceability of 
the supplier in the relationship. Supplier dependency is similarly measured through the hold-
up and demand risk of the supplier. 
 
Figure 5.2. Taxonomy from Hallikas et al. (2005) 
The authors state that the higher the mutual dependency, the stronger the exploitation of 
cooperation practices of risk management and learning. When the dependency is asymmetric, 
and when the relationship is not so strategic, cooperation risk management has a remarkably 
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weaker role. Accordingly, they defined four types of relationships: strategic relationship, non 
strategic relationship, captive buyer, and captive supplier. After analyzing 42 questionnaires, 
the theoretical “captive buyer” category was still empty, showing of course the usual power of 
the buyers, or their reluctance for building such unfavorable relationship. 
1.3.3 Marcotte‟s taxonomy 
A classification close to the previous one is suggested in (Marcotte et al., 2009), based on 
the supply chain‟s power on the company (low or high) and the company‟s power on the 
supply chain (low or high) (see Figure 5.3), introducing the idea that power of A over B may 
be independent from power of B over A. The taxonomy considers the integration of a partner 
in the chain, but not a simple point-to-point buyer-supplier relationship as in (Hallikas et al., 
2005). Moreover, the definition of the categories gives additional information.  
A partner is strategic when the supply chain and the company power are balanced; there 
is a mutual interest to cooperate. This case is usually considered as the ideal one for building a 
collaborative link (Geyskens et al., 1996). Nevertheless, the relationship may be difficult to 
build, since it has to be based on mutual respect and none of the partners can impose its 
methods to the other. 
A partner is dependent when his power over the chain is inferior to the supply chain 
power over him. Therefore, the chain may impose its constraints on this partner. This 
situation remains very ambiguous: for many authors (and for large companies), it is the 
perfect situation since the large companies, who are often the focus partners of the supply 
chain, can influence their smallest partners by imposing them “good” practices and tools 
(Vaaland and Heide, 2007; Harland et al., 2007). On the other hand, many authors notice that 
power prevents the growth of trust, leading only to an appearance of adoption of the new 
practices (Johnson et al., 1990; Skinner et al., 1992, Brown et al., 1995; Thakkar et al., 2008; 
Hémont et al., 2010). 
 
Figure 5.3. Taxonomy from Marcotte et al. (2009) 
A non strategic partner is involved in a relationship in which both power and 
involvement are low. The partner is independent from the chain, and vice versa. In that case, 
each entity has an opportunistic behavior, which does not allow the emergence of a 
collaborative relationship (Liu et al., 2010). 
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A constraining partner is a supplier whose power over the chain is superior to the supply 
chain power over him. This kind of partnership is described in (Hallikas et al., 2005) on the 
customer‟s side as a “captive buyer”. In that case, the constraints set by the supplier should be 
taken into account by the chain. This case, which can often be met in real industrial situations, 
is poorly compatible with theoretical practices described in Chapter 1. 
On the base of this taxonomy, different models of cooperation are suggested in (Marcotte 
et al., 2009), showing that the links between objectives, constraints and decision variables of 
the company and of the supply chain (represented by the customer) may vary according to the 
identified situations. 
1.3.4 Liu‟s taxonomy 
Another typical taxonomy is presented in Liu et al. (2010) aiming at the measurement of 
relationship quality (see Figure 5.4), based on two axes: trust and commitment, with two 
levels, high and low. Four types of relationship are therefore defined.  
Type I (high level trust and high level commitment) is a “buddy” relationship, meaning 
that both parties in an exchange relationship have close ties, a willingness to sacrifice their 
own interests for long-term common interests, and a commitment to long-term cooperation. 
Type II (high trust and low commitment) is a “relier” relationship. A “relier” means that 
both parties in an exchange relationship may be willing to sacrifice their own interests for 
long-term common interests to some extent, but for some reason they are not willing to 
commit to long-term cooperation. 
 
Figure 5.4. Taxonomy from Liu et al. (2010) 
Type III (low trust and low commitment) is an “arm‟s-length” relationship. As already 
stated, arm‟s-length means that both parties will have low levels of mutual trust and 
commitment. Parties in such a formal relationship care little about their partner‟s feelings, are 
unwilling to sacrifice their own interests, and do not wish for long-term cooperation. 
Type IV (low trust and high commitment) is an “initiative” relationship. An “initiative” 
means that both parties will be willing to maintain long-term relationships, but mutual trust 
between them has not yet been established. 
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These four distinct contexts are coupled with control mechanisms involving both 
coercive and non-coercive power in order to achieve better coordination between the partners. 
Nevertheless, the independence of the two axis of the suggested model again remains 
questionable: indeed, many authors agree on the fact that trust and commitment are closely 
linked (see for instance (Andersen and Kumar, 2006; Essig and Amann, 2009; Hémont et al., 
2010)).  
1.3.5 Synthesis of these taxonomies  
The existing taxonomies described above again show that many authors consider 
Trust/Commitment and Power/Dependency as critical factors for the research on relationships 
in supply chains. In the various types of relationship shown by these taxonomies, other 
influencing factors can be introduced thanks to their interaction with Trust/Commitment and 
Power/Dependency, such as willing of cooperation, degree of information sharing, balance 
between local decision making and global objectives. In that context, it seems that taxonomies 
based on Trust/Commitment or/and Dependency/Power are able to provide an overview on 
the customer-supplier relationship, since these factors are fundamental elements which could 
allow to assess the others.  
To be more precise, some taxonomies focus on identifying one influencing factor on both 
customer and supplier side, such as Hallikas‟ taxonomy suggests to concentrate on the risks 
due to dependence, or Marcotte‟s taxonomy targets the distribution of power in the supply 
chain. Nevertheless, using one simple influencing factor may be insufficient to identify 
complex and various customer and supplier relationships. For instance, if non-coercive power 
or mutual dependence exists in the supply chain, other factors, like the level of trust, or degree 
of information sharing, will play an important role in order to differentiate various types of 
relationships. Some other taxonomies provide two axes (such as trust and performance in 
Möllering‟s taxonomy, trust and commitment in Liu‟s taxonomy) in order to better describe 
different type of relationship, which appear to be more fruitful than concentrating one single 
factor. However, the relationship or dependence between the two axes is questioned by the 
works of other authors, since the used pairs of factors, trust and performance, trust and 
commitment are often considered as closely linked. For instance, trust contributes to 
commitment; a good commitment relationship requires a well built trust construction. 
Taxonomies of relationship should preferably be based on influencing factors considered as 
independent or loosely linked. In addition, the measurement of the adopted factors is currently 
limited to “high” and “low”. Such rough categories may not be sufficient for describing 
complex phenomena. For instance, power can be on the side of the supplier, on the side of the 
customer, or balanced, leading to at least three categories. The number of levels could still 
increase if the strength of the power is considered. Therefore, the levels of the adopted factors 
may require additional precision in order to describe more complex situations.  
Using the existing taxonomies, we have tried to categorize the situations observed in 
chapter 2; however it appeared as difficult to identify and explain some of the cases we have 
encountered. Therefore, we believe that some new elements should be added to the exiting 
taxonomies in order to better model complex cases. Details will be introduced in the next 
section.  
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2 A model of cooperation situations 
The model of cooperation situations that we suggest aims at describing more precisely 
different cooperation situations in supply chains, according to various types of customer-
supplier relationships. As mentioned in Chapter 2, cooperation between supply chain 
members is not only technically oriented; behavioral issues based on customer-supplier 
relationship are essential to be taken into account.  
2.1 Bases of the suggested taxonomy  
2.1.1 Dimensions 
According to the panorama of the literature summarized in Table 5.1, Trust, Power, 
Dependency and Commitment are the concepts which seem to be the most widely used for 
explaining the relationships between partners in Supply Chains. As discussed above, trust and 
commitment are considered as linked by most authors. Similarly, power and dependency are 
the two opposite sides of the same phenomenon. Besides, from the limitation of existing 
taxonomies, it seems more meaningful to define a taxonomy based on multiple factors by 
choosing rather independent ones. On the other hand, the real situations observed in Chapter 2 
have shown us that conflicts in customer and supplier relationship may be linked to the 
dynamics of trust and power. For instance, a more powerful customer could build a trustful 
foundation with its supplier through supplier development program, or may force his supplier 
to accept his constraints, which will reduce the supplier‟s trust on the customer.  
Therefore, as a first step, we have chosen to consider two influencing factors, object of a 
relative consensus: trust and power, and try to analyze the dynamics of relationships based on 
these two factors. From the literature view and existing taxonomies, and also looking at the 
real observed situations, it seems that trust and power are the most foundational and widely 
used factors, which can be considered as rather independent, or at last loosely attached. Other 
factors, such as commitment, information sharing, opportunism, etc. are closely influenced or 
related with trust and power. In that context, we believe that a taxonomy with the two 
dimension of trust and power is a good candidate for identifying and analyzing the supply 
chain relationship, as well as for positioning the conflicts and dysfunctions towards 
operational activities.  
Concerning the number of levels to consider, we do think that the usual categories 
“low/high” are not sufficient for describing complex phenomena. For instance, a customer 
may have no specific feeling towards its supplier. Similarly, the distribution of the power 
between customer and supplier may be balanced or unbalanced. It is also possible to 
subdivide the mentioned categories by more than the traditional two degrees (low/high) of the 
factors, etc. As a consequence, the number of considered levels will be increased. In order to 
better justify the categories we have chosen for the included factors, we will address them 
separately and try to link them to real observed situations.  
2.1.2 Categories of Power 
At least three different cases should be distinguished for describing the power: the 
customer holds power over its supplier; the supplier is more powerful than the customer; there 
is a balanced distribution of power between customer and supplier.  
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Many works in the literature of supply chains concentrate on customer‟s power over 
supplier, since customers have usually a dominant status in the customer-supplier relationship. 
Customer power is considered as the ability of a customer to influence the decisions of a 
manufacturer in a supply chain (Brown et al., 1983, 1995; Goodman and Dion, 2001). Power 
at the customer‟s side has links with resource dependence and resource allocation 
(Christensen and Bower, 1996). Customer power can be divided into different types (French 
and Raven, 1959), and each type of customer power impacts other factors, like trust, and 
furthermore influences the customer and supplier relationships. Nevertheless, power at the 
supplier‟s side seems to be seldom considered in literature, but is described in some real 
applications (Marcotte et al., 2009). We have seen some cases in Chapter 2 where the supplier 
has a dominant position in the supply chain relationship, due to his competence on some 
techniques that can be hardly replaced.  
Aiming at making the proposed taxonomy clear and understandable, we are going to 
consider these three cases as our categories of power. 
2.1.3 Categories of Trust 
Trust between customer and supplier may lead to three main situations: distrust, 
indifferent feelings and trust. As power, trust is for us an asymmetric factor, since customer 
and supplier may have different criteria for giving their trust to their partner.  
For instance, the customer is more oriented on operational activities, such as quality of 
product, purchasing cycle time, service performance etc., while the supplier has more 
consideration on the contract, interaction with his customer and whether the customer trusts 
him or not, as well as the degree of customer‟s trust. Therefore, it can be interesting to 
separately discuss the trust at the customer and supplier sides.  
2.2 Description of the model 
In the context of our two dimensions and their suggested categories, we propose a 
taxonomy of relationships between customer and supplier shown in Figure 5.5. In the 
dimension of power, the categories are stated as “the supplier depends on the customer”, “the 
customer depends on the supplier” and “mutual dependency”. Concerning the dimension of 
trust, the major categories are “distrust”, “indifference”, and “trust”. Since trust may be 
considered as nonsymmetrical according to different authors, we suggest to describe the 
taxonomy by two separated figures, one describing the supplier‟s side, the other the 
customer‟s side, in order to be able to represent more complex situations. For instance, a 
situation in which the customer depends on the supplier, the supplier is indifferent and the 
customer trusts the supplier can be described in this framework by situation 2 at supplier‟s 
side (left part of Figure 5.5), combined with situation 4 at customer‟s side (right part of Figure 
5.5). Globally, an overall situation of cooperation will so be identified by the combination of 
the customer‟s situation and supplier‟s situation. We are going to specify these cooperation 
situations in the next part.  
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2.2.1 Distrusting partners  
In each graph of Figure 5.5, the bottom line represents situations of distrust between 
supply chain members, which has very different consequences according to who holds the 
power.  
Situation 1 at supplier‟s side may be considered as favorable for the supplier, since the 
lack of trust may be compensated by his own power over the customer. This is a way to 
prevent opportunistic behaviors (Liu et al., 2010). The symmetric situation is Situation 6 at 
customer‟s side. Due to his power over the supplier, the customer could control his supplier 
and impose his own objectives or constraints, which may reduce the risks coming from the 
relation with a distrusted supplier.  
 
Figure 5.5. Taxonomy of customer and supplier situation 
On the opposite, Situation 3 appears as rather unconformable on both sides, since the 
supply chain members, supplier or customer, are dependent on a distrusted partner. The 
behaviors become in this case rather unpredictable. 
In Situation 6 at supplier‟s side and Situation 1 at customer‟s side, both companies will 
certainly try to decrease the risk of the relationship through precise contracts, allowing to 
compensate the lack of trust on a partner on which the company has no power. The main 
attitude between supply chain members will so certainly be the “no exception” policy 
(Möllering, 2003). No initiative outside the contract is expected from the distrusted partner. 
2.2.2 Indifferent partners  
The middle line of the two taxonomies, denoting an indifference between customer and 
supplier, is the perfect field for the so called “arm‟s length” policy (Forker and Stannack, 
2000; Möllering, 2003). Like in the bottom line, the contract will be the base of the 
relationship, even if at a lower degree than for line 1, since the partner is not suspected to 
have a selfish (nor benevolent) attitude. Therefore, the balance of power and degree of 
interdependency will emphasize the interest of having a good customer-supplier relationship.  
Chapter 5 A Model of Cooperation Situations 
125 
Situation 2 in both supplier‟s and customer‟s side may represent the situations in which 
supplier is more powerful and may impose his objectives and constraints in the contract. The 
symmetric situations are Situation 8 in both sides, the customer being a dominant partner who 
has more power to lead agreements and contracts.  
2.2.3 Trusting partners 
The top lines denote the trust of the considered company for his partner, either trust from 
the customer‟s side, from the supplier‟s side, or both. Trust allows to reject the “no exception” 
attitude (Möllering 2003) and decreases the level of required monitoring of the relationship 
(Andersen and Kumar, 2006). Relationship may become relatively informal while the contract 
is not anymore an absolute reference, with the result of a better flexibility and reactivity of the 
relationship, leading to the increased performance usually associated with trust (Johnston et 
al., 2004). In such situations, adverse impacts of imbalanced power may correspondingly be 
weak. Therefore, Situations 7 in the two sides can be considered as the ideal situation of 
cooperation, required for implementing the negotiation framework described in Chapter 4. 
Situation 4 and Situation 9 in both sides need more flexibility to deal with “exceptions” or 
“uncertainties” and the level of trust between customer and supplier would help to find mutual 
agreed solution for managing constraints.  
2.2.4 Asymmetric trust between partners 
In the suggested model, we consider that trust is asymmetrical, based on observations 
during the interviews. Therefore, combined situations crossing the previous three lines 
(distrust, indifference and trust) may exist in real cases.  
Situation 4 at supplier‟s side and Situation 1 at customer‟s side represent a combined 
situation in which the supplier is a dominant partner and trusts his customer. However, the 
customer questions the supplier‟s behaviors on its service. On the opposite, Situation 1 at 
supplier‟s side and Situation 4 at customer‟s side is a situation in which the more powerful 
supplier distrusts its customer. Such relationship is obviously unstable since the supplier has 
the possibility (power) and motivation (distrust) to break the relationship. 
Situation 9 at supplier‟s side and Situation 6 at customer‟s side is another unstable 
combined situation. The customer is the powerful partner but distrusts his supplier‟s 
capability to well satisfy his requirements. If the customer thinks that the situation can be 
improved, he may try to develop the competence of his supplier in order to increase his own 
trust, but this effort will certainly not be important if the supplier has no specific interest 
(which would have given him some power). On contrary, Situation 6 at supplier‟s side and 
Situation 9 at customer‟s side represent the combined situation in which a powerful customer 
trusts his supplier while the supplier doubts of the benevolence or goodwill of his customer. 
In such situation, the customer may have a poor motivation for taking into account the 
supplier‟s constraints, which may be the reason of the supplier‟s lack of trust.  
3 Matching between real situations and suggested taxonomy 
In this section, we will give some examples of real situations, as they were identified 
during the interviews, which will be positioned in our taxonomy (Ming et al., 2011). 
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3.1 Situations from the supplier point of view 
We shall not consider here all the situations of the left part of Figure 5.5 one by one, but 
check how real situations may be positioned in the left table of Figure 5.5, sometimes with 
some accuracy, other times as a set of possible situations. 
Many illustrations of situations linked to the right column of the left table of Figure 5.5 
have of course been met during the interviews, since the power is usually on the customer‟s 
side, especially when the suppliers are SMEs. For instance: 
 An already mentioned supplier wanted to create a close relationship with one of its 
important customers. In that purpose, he wanted to have a very good service ratio. 
Considering that the firm period of the forecasts was too low for being sure to be on 
time, he preferred to release the orders on the base of the flexible period sent by the 
customer, taking the risk that some cancellations may occur (situation : supplier 
trusts customer). 
 The supply time of some alloys and casting parts used in the aeronautic industry may 
be long (up to 12 months). This supply time is often longer than the fixed period of 
the forecast. In that case, the supplier may send firm orders for the raw materials on 
the base of the flexible period of the forecasts, taking therefore a risk, denoting his 
trust for his customer (Situation 9). Some suppliers refused to do it, but did not dare 
to clearly discuss this issue with their customer, showing that they are in Situation 6. 
This led to delays, unexpected by the customer but perfectly foreseeable. Sometimes, 
the supplier refuses the situation and discusses possible issues with the customer: this 
attitude may denote Situations 1, 2, 3 or 5 (poor trust, balanced power or power on 
the supplier‟s side). 
 Supplier development is a good way to assess trust. The SMEs have sometimes 
entered the programs under the insistence of their customer (right column: supplier 
depends on customer), but see this as a real opportunity (Situation 9: they trust their 
customer). In other cases, the suppliers have entered the programs while thinking that 
the methods on which they would be trained (MRP or Lean) were not applicable for 
them (Situation 6: they do not trust the customer, but depend on him). For some 
SMEs, lean manufacturing is indeed considered as a way used by their large 
customer for decreasing their autonomy: instead of giving priorities to the orders, 
some customers ask for instance their suppliers to process the orders in FIFO 
(Situation 6). In some cases, a real negotiation was engaged on the object of the 
training (denoting Situations 3, 5 or 8). 
 Some customers know that their technical skills give them some power over their 
customers, but enter the development programs on a voluntary base in order to still 
increase the relationship (Situations 4 or 7). 
 Similar figures were observed in another context: the large companies of the sector 
want to impose that their smaller suppliers buy production management systems (in 
order to be able to use the MRP method and to have a better visibility on the future). 
In addition, they ask for proofs of correct use of these systems (showing their 
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distrust). Most of the time, the SMEs were very doubtful on the possible results, but 
accepted to buy and implement the products (Situations 6 or 8). 
 In many cases, the suppliers group the orders sent by their customers in order to 
decrease their set-up times. In some cases, these groups were made without taking 
into account the due dates, with the result of early and tardy orders. For the suppliers, 
customers have slack times that they do not communicate, so these delays are not 
really important (bottom line of the matrix: no trust in the due dates). Nevertheless, 
they do not clearly discuss the problem with the customers, since they know this 
attitude would not be appreciated (Situation 6: dependence). 
Column 1 (customer depends on the supplier) of course denotes more unusual situations. 
Nevertheless, the following cases were encountered: 
 A small supplier has a very specific position in the supply chain of a large customer: 
he has a high and rare technical skill and very low costs, because of a light 
infrastructure. The customer wanted him to buy a production management tool, since 
his ratio of service was poor. The supplier refused: he was already overloaded, and 
the customer cannot find another supplier with comparable prices... The relationship 
is clearly here in Situation 1 or 2 for the supplier. 
 A SME specialized in surface treatment has also a quite interesting position: its 
technical skills being rare (left column: the customer depends on him), it has been 
able to impose to its customers that the price of the treatments depends on the cycle 
time: if the parts are urgent, the customer has to pay more. Using that strategy, the 
supplier has seen a considerable decrease in the number of urgent parts, which was 
one of his goals (Situation 1: no trust in the urgency of the orders). 
 Again on the urgency: since more than 30% of the orders he received were AOG 
according to its customers, a supplier located at the end of the process (therefore 
inheriting from all the upstream hazards) decided to systematically refer to the final 
assembler for checking the status of the parts. It appeared that 60% of the orders 
were not real AOG: the customers of tiers 1 or 2 were using this status for trying to 
increase their own ratio of service for their customer... (Situation 1: no dependence, 
no trust). 
The situations of the middle line and column of the matrix are often considered as a goal 
by the suppliers. Indeed, people in SMEs usually trust persons more than organizations (see 
for instance (Andersen and Kumar, 2006) for investigations on the role of personal trust in 
SCM), but because of the turnover of the large companies, they prefer a relationship based on 
clear contractual bases than on a person-to-person agreement. Additionally, many of them do 
not want to depend too much on a customer, and as a consequence would prefer Situations 2 
(which requires to have a specific interest for the customer) or 5. 
Such balanced situations have also been identified in the process of answer to Requests 
For Quotation. The parts object of the request may be difficult to produce. For the suppliers, 
the reason is mainly that the designers at the customers‟ side have less technical competences 
than before, while for the customers, it is the sign of an increase of complexity of the parts. In 
this situation, some suppliers manage to negotiate with the customers, showing that they are 
in a situation of mutual dependency and that they want a clear contract (Situation 5: mutual 
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dependency and indifference leading to emphasize the role of the contract). Others, who 
depend heavily on the customer but trust him, choose to answer to the request in spite of their 
doubts, considering that the customer will afterwards help them to industrialize the parts 
(Situation 7: mutual dependency and trust).  
3.2 Situations from the customer point of view  
The situations as seen by the customers have been identified by interviews of large 
companies, but also, indirectly, during discussions with the suppliers, and especially with 
SMEs. Many of the discussed problems indeed denote situations belonging to the bottom line 
(customer distrusts supplier) of the right table of Figure 5.5 (customer‟s point of view): 
 A customer had some doubts on the ability of one of his suppliers to buy casting 
parts. In order to decrease the risk, the customer decided to create a safety stock and 
without notice to the supplier, ordered himself several parts to the supplier‟s supplier. 
The consequence was that the supplier of the casting parts, who was overloaded, 
preferred to fulfill the large company‟s demand. Therefore, the supplier was indeed 
unable to get the parts. It is interesting to notice that the customer had in that case 
created the situation he wanted to prevent. This denotes Situation 1 or 3: the 
customer clearly distrusts the supplier (bottom line), and would work with other 
suppliers if possible (therefore, Situation 6 is improbable). 
 Proofs of trust can also be found: in order to give to one of his suppliers the 
information allowing him to manage his internal priorities, a customer was used to 
send his level of inventory together with the orders. In case of capacity problem, the 
supplier was able to decide which parts to prioritize, according to its customer‟s 
interest (Situation 4 or 7: the customer trusts the supplier, and does not dominate 
him). 
 Many customers perform regular audits at their supplier‟s, in spite of the time lost by 
the supplier because of the multiplication of these audits: Situation 6 (the customer 
does not trust the supplier, who cannot refuse the audits). 
 Situation 6 was also easy to identify when a representative of a large company 
claimed in a public meeting that the SMEs do not have to discuss the content of the 
development programs, since the large companies know what the best is for them... 
 Situation 1 of the customer has already been illustrated by one of the examples 
detailed in previous section: the customer depends on its supplier because of his 
technical skills and low prices, but knows that he is not reliable. 
 The criteria of selection of the suppliers are also a good way to identify a situation. 
In most cases, large companies want to represent a significant ratio of their supplier‟s 
income (for having some influence on them) but not too much (for being able to 
decrease their orders if needed without setting into question the viability of the 
supplier). This denotes a clear strategy to privilege situations belonging to the middle 
column. Their final goal is to work with reliable partners (by promoting the use of 
methods and tools allowing their partners to better manage their production): at least 
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Situation 5 is targeted (mutual dependency, indifference), even if Situation 7 is 
preferred (mutual dependency, the customer trusts the supplier). 
 During the interviews, the large companies gave us many examples of problems 
coming (according to them) from the low level of competences of small companies 
on production management, leading to a global distrust on this aspect (middle line of 
the table). This is consistent with (Lenny Koh and Simpson, 2005) for instance, who 
points out the reluctance of small companies to invest on information technology, 
and more specifically on planning tools. At short term, this poor trust may be 
compensated by power in Situation 6. Nevertheless, even if the power of the supplier 
on his customer has only positive aspects for the supplier, the power of the customer 
on its supplier may create responsibility concerning the survival of the supplier. 
Therefore, Situation 3 (mutual dependency) is preferred to Situation 6 (the supplier 
depends on the customer). 
 According to our experience, the link of large companies with SMEs seems to be 
often based on personal relationships, since the contact for the SME‟s is often the 
Director, who is usually very stable (the company belongs to him in many cases). 
Therefore, a SME has a reputation for a customer (good or bad) which is known by 
all the employees of the customer. As a consequence, large companies put a lot of 
emphasis on their trust on their small partners (mainly on the director) and less on 
the contracts. Such relationship is often unbalanced, the large companies being 
considered as unstable by the small ones, because of their turnover and perpetual 
restructuration. Indeed, trust is known as a condition for flexibility and adaptability 
(Andersen and Kumar, 2006), which are properties looked for by large customers, 
but not by small suppliers, looking for stability which can be brought by contracts. 
4 Matching with the negotiation processes 
As previously stated in Chapter 3, the suggested negotiation processes aim at helping to 
increase the performance of relationship by turning hidden problems into negotiation items, 
which may lead to a better supply chain cooperation. Nevertheless, it was clear that making 
these processes realistic requires an intensive exchange of information, including data usually 
considered as confidential, like internal lead time, capacity or costs. Nevertheless, the survey 
on the literature shows the potential impact of an increased trust between partners. Therefore, 
after analyzing the costs related constraints of the negotiation process in Chapter 4, we are 
going to go further, indicating the cooperation situation or supply chain relationships which 
are in our opinion consistent with the negotiation framework we have suggested.  
The primary goals of our suggestion are to allow supply chain members to publish some 
hidden problems and address them in an open negotiation processes. 
The first steps of the negotiation processes deal with detecting problems, which we 
consider as an initiative attitude. On the other hand, the negotiation on load variation and lot 
sizes triggered by the supplier is considered as a cooperative attitude, since it aims at 
publishing constraints and problems to the customer. The supplier‟s requested negotiation on 
price and cycle time is different, since fulfilling urgent orders is not the supplier‟s obligation. 
Thereby the negotiation on the price and cycle time is necessary for both customer and 
supplier. It appears to us that the different characteristics of these items lead to various 
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relations with the cooperation situations as we identified them. We shall try in next section to 
match each negotiation process with the cooperation situations in which it may occur.  
4.1 Customer’s side 
In the customer‟s point of view (see the right part of Figure 5.6), if the customer distrusts 
or feels indifference towards his supplier, a strict execution of the contract is certainly the 
common way to perform cooperation in the supply chain. In our proposals, except for price, 
cycle time and lot sizes, the other suggested items are usually fixed in contract. However, 
negotiation on these items needs a high level of trust. Even for urgent orders management, a 
complex issue which is outside the terms of the contract, good performance of negotiation on 
price and cycle time requires a long-term and better managed relationship, in which trust in a 
prerequisite. Thereby, we suggest to launch negotiation processes in the top line (customer 
trusts supplier). We have highlighted the corresponding cells with white background and 
numbered each negotiation process in Figure 5.6.  
In Situation 9, the supplier depends on the customer. The load variation, changes and 
urgent orders on customer‟s side have very important effects on his supplier. At the same time, 
the supplier is trustworthy to fulfill the customer‟s requirements by doing all his best. Thereby, 
when customer‟s requirements are out of supplier‟s capabilities, and due to supplier‟s 
dependency on the customer, the supplier can hardly communicate his constraints to his 
customer. As a consequence, hidden problems may occur and poor delivery performance 
might exist. Therefore, it is the customer‟s role to launch the negotiation process when he 
detects possible problems, in order to avoid cooperation disturbance. We so suggest 
negotiation on load variation-customer request (④) and negotiation on lot sizes-customer 
request (⑧) in Situation 9. On the other hand, if the customer and the supplier are mutually 
dependent (Situation 7), these two negotiation processes are also very likely to be launched by 
the customer. Therefore, we locate ④ and ⑧ at the sideline of Situation 7 and Situation 9 
(Figure 5.6, right part).  
Negotiation on price and cycle time-customer request (⑥) may also be considered as a 
protection-oriented activity. The fulfillment of urgent orders is uncertain. The power of the 
customer (Situation 9) might prevent the supplier from communicating his constraints and 
real situation to his partner. However, it is not the case if the supplier is dominant (Situation 
4), or even in the case of mutual dependency (Situation 7), since satisfying urgent orders is 
not an obligation for the supplier.  
Negotiation on the period of forecast-customer request (②) targets at sharing risks with 
the supplier. It is not a protection activity but a communication problem dealing with benefits. 
At the customer‟s side, it concerns the horizon of firm period of forecast, which is fixed by 
contract. Therefore, it is clear that the dominant member has the power to launch such 
negotiation. Therefore, we put it into Situation 9.  
In Situation 4, the customer depends on the supplier, since the supplier holds a dominant 
position, meaning that supplier‟s constraints become very important for the customer. In the 
meantime, the customer believes that his supplier would like to fulfill his obligations in the 
cooperation. Accordingly, the problems and constraints published by the supplier are real 
ones, which the supplier is not capable to overcome by himself. Therefore, the customer 
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should contribute to solving these problems. As a consequence, we suggest negotiation on 
orders priorities (⑨) in Situation 4. Even in a mutual dependency (Situation 7) ⑨ would also 
be launched due to the trustfulness of the customer towards his supplier. Therefore, we locate 
⑨ at the sideline of Situation 4 and Situation 7.  
 
Figure 5.6. Matches of negotiation process and cooperation situation 
4.2 Supplier’s side 
In our opinion, if the supplier distrusts or feels indifference towards his customer, the 
contract will be the base of the cooperation, whereas a strict execution of the contract is in our 
opinion a barrier against a better cooperation and negotiation on the occurring problems. 
Therefore, we also limit our suggested negotiation processes to the top line (supplier trusts 
customer) (see the left part of Figure 5.6).  
From the supplier‟s point of view, things are less complex, since negotiations launched 
by the supplier are always aiming at publishing operational problems, except for the 
negotiation on period of forecast-supplier request (①). As previously mentioned, this case 
needs power to re-allocate risks between customer and supplier. Thereby, we suggest to locate 
① in Situation 4.  
In the situations of the top line, the supplier trusts his customer, believing that the 
customer will be ready to take into account his constraints and perform protection-oriented 
activities. Accordingly, when the customer is more powerful (Situation 9), protection-oriented 
negotiation would be launched by the customer and the constraints on the supplier side would 
be openly communicated to the supply chain. Therefore, in our proposal, it is supplier‟s duty 
to publish his real constraints and possible problems towards his customer, when the 
supplier‟s delivery performance has critical effects on the customer (Situation 4), while the 
customer might not see these hidden problems, due to the power of the supplier. As a 
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consequence, we suggest negotiation on load variation-supplier request (③) and negotiation 
on lot sizes-supplier request (⑦) in Situation 4.  
For similar reasons, negotiation on price and cycle time-supplier request (⑤) is proposed 
in Situation 4, as well as in the situation of mutual dependency (Situation 7). For us, only the 
power from the customer (Situation 9) might prevent to launch ⑤. Therefore, we put ⑤ at the 
sideline of Situations 4 and 7.  
So far, the presented matches between the suggested negotiation processes and 
cooperation situations are only theoretical considerations. Other matches may also exist, 
depending on specific cases. Furthermore, the cooperation situation between customer and 
supplier is not static but dynamic, according to evolutions linked to the real performance of 
cooperation. For instance, decrease of the cycle time by the supplier due to new investments 
may bring this supplier to a more dominant position; long lasting satisfactory delivery 
performance from the supplier‟s side may lead to a more trustful and stable relationship 
between supplier and customer. On the opposite, poor performance or selfish behavior by one 
of the partners will inevitably result in a decrease of trust. Thereby, the evolution of the 
situations is not only a factor that impacts the results of negotiation, but also, at middle or 
long term, an output of the negotiation process.  
5 Evolution of the situations 
The situations of cooperation are clearly object of an evolution, controlled or not. We do 
not try here to make an exhaustive list of possible evolutions, but we shall emphasize that the 
suggested typology may help to have a better view on the situations and problems which may 
occur. Meanwhile, an efficient negotiation based on mutual consideration and information 
sharing may lead to a positive evolution of the situations. Since many different cases may 
occur, we shall only describe here typical evolutions as an illustrative example (see Figure 
5.7). 
On the supplier side, a relationship typically begins in Situation 8 (or Situation 5 if the 
supplier has some rare competence or even Situation 2 if he has a critical one). In a more or 
less formalized way, the goal of the supplier will be to evolve from the right column to the 
central one, providing a better balance of power (arrow 1 in the supplier matrix). In that 
purpose, the supplier may rely on his technical skills (by becoming competent on processes 
which are important for his customer), or on other aspects of performance which are also 
important for his customer (reliability or reactivity for instance).  
Typically, the customer is in Situation 8 at the beginning of the relationship (he has 
preferably chosen a customer on whom he has some power). In order to increase the 
reliability of his supplier, he will eventually suggest him a supplier development program. If 
the supplier accepts and if the program is a success (i.e. the performance indicators of the 
supplier evolve positively), the situation may evolve from 8 to 9 (increase of trust). 
Nevertheless, if the supplier has succeeded in creating a privileged relationship, the arrival 
situation can be 7 (mutual dependency), either directly (arrow 3) or indirectly (arrows 2 and 4, 
related with negotiation). If the development program is a success, and if the supplier gets 
rewards (new orders, etc.), it is probable that trust from the supplier towards his customer will 
increase in parallel (arrival in Situation 7 by arrow 5 on the supplier matrix). 
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On the other hand, the evolution of the situation may be less favorable. If the 
performance of the customer through time is low, his customer will pass from Situation 8 to 
Situation 6 (arrow 6 - distrust), which is highly unstable (there is no interest to keep a 
distrusted partner if he is not critical). As seen in the previous sections, in some rare cases, the 
customer may also move to Situation 3 (arrow 7) or even 1 (arrow 8) (denoting that even if 
part of his performance is poor (on the reliability for instance), the supplier has gained some 
power on the customer (often through critical competences or low prices)).  
 
Figure 5.7. Classical evolutions of the situations of cooperation 
6 Conclusion of chapter 5 
In this chapter, we firstly introduced a literature survey on cooperation situations 
focusing on the behavioral/qualitative aspects, which are strongly influenced by the type of 
customer-supplier relationship. We have then analyzed in more details the factors that directly 
influence the different types of relationships in a supply chain. Among these factors, trust, 
commitment, power and dependency are the most widely considered in the literature. Many 
works have showed that these factors may influence others, like trust could impact the levels 
of commitment, informal agreement, willingness to cooperate, communication, information 
sharing, opportunistic actions and so on. 
We have also analyzed some existing taxonomies, which provide different solutions for 
classifying supply chain relationships, using one or several factors. Some taxonomies appear 
to be too simple for describing the situations seen during our case studies, whereas others may 
be questioned by their choice of dependent axes, such as trust and commitment, which are 
often considered as linked. Additionally, existing taxonomies are generally using simple 
levels like high/low for describing their factors. 
In this context, we have suggested a taxonomy with two dimensions, trust and power. 
These two factors are widely used, and have rather independent relations. Afterwards, we 
have tried to define levels allowing to address positive, neutral and negative levels of the 
considered factors. For the dimension of power, we made the hypothesis that power is a 
symmetrical feeling for both customer and supplier, since power is more relevant than 
dependency, which may also be considered as symmetrical in supply chains. Therefore, at the 
first step, the proposed levels of power have been defined as “the customer depends on the 
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supplier”, “the supplier depends on the customer” and “mutual dependency”. For the 
dimension of trust, we proposed to consider the possibility of an asymmetrical relationship, 
since customer and supplier may hold quite different criteria for giving their trust towards the 
other. Besides, we define “distrust”, “indifference”, and “trust” as the levels of trust at both 
customer and supplier side, assessed independently.  
The suggested taxonomy provides a model of cooperation situations. From both 
customer and supplier side, there are nine different cooperation situations. Some of these 
situations have already been observed in chapter 2 and are consistent with the negotiation 
process suggested in chapter 3. Therefore, we matched the suggested negotiation processes 
with these situations, trying test the usefulness of the taxonomy of the cooperation situations, 
on the opposite for locating the situations requited by the negotiation processes. Finally, we 
briefly presented some possible evolutions of the situations, showing that the suggested 
typology may help to have a better view on the dynamics of the relationship. 
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Conclusion 
Cooperation between partners within supply chains is becoming more and more 
important for nowadays enterprises. In that context, classical problems deal with how to 
synchronize local and global objectives, in a way which satisfies all the SC members. From 
case studies, we have shown that large companies have set a huge effort on promoting 
processes suggesting “best practices” through supplier development in their supply chains. 
However, SMEs may have difficulties for adopting these rather rigid frameworks, due to their 
specificity but also to local constraints, which may be hidden or under-estimated by their 
customers. Furthermore, the literature on supply chain so that our own experience show that 
the performance of cooperation in a supply chain context is not only a technical problem, but 
requires as a pre-requisite given attitudes like trust, power, commitment, dependence, etc. 
Based on this context, we suggest negotiation processes for a cooperative supply chain, 
aiming at turning some of the usually hidden constraints into negotiable items, leading to a 
better risk sharing between partners, and helping supply chain members to achieve win-win 
cooperative situations.  
The basic ideas contained in our proposal come from cases studies in the aeronautic 
industry. If the relatively low number of visited companies does not allow to fully guarantee 
the generality of the identified problems and situations, it is consistent with the results of 
previous projects on the same domain (see for instance (Affonso, 2008)) and shows that some 
existing problems are not yet fully taken into account by the practices which are presently 
promoted by large companies. 
Negotiation processes have been suggested in relation with four items: periods of 
forecast, load variation, price and cycle time, and order priority and lot sizes. These items are 
not a closed list of what can be negotiable but aim at providing examples of the fact that, 
paradoxically, taking into account the partner‟s constraints may in some cases finally lead to a 
win-win situation. Brief introductions of the suggested negotiation processes are presented in 
form of Business Process Diagram and detailed activities in each process are addressed 
through UML Sequence Diagram, showing some typical scenarios on use cases of the 
negotiation processes.  
In order to make our suggestion realistic, we have firstly specified the detailed processes 
and then test their practical feasibility, on one hand through the assessment of extra costs and 
on the other hand matching them with identified cooperation situations, in which such 
negotiation process may exist. The extra cost assessment concerning the results of negotiation 
allows to check whether the negotiation is feasible and beneficial and provides cost-based 
constraints allowing to better understand when such processes may be of interest. From the 
behavioral point of view, realistic negotiation processes depend on the current holding 
relationship between the supplier and the customer. Opportunistic behaviors, exaggerated 
constraints publishing, untrue information sharing, etc. are inevitably barriers towards our 
proposal. Therefore, we have identified the situations in which the suggested negotiation 
process would be better performed, showing the behavioral constraints which should be 
satisfied as a pre-requisite to negotiation.  
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Despite the fact that our suggestions may seem to be against the common industrial 
habits (including e.g. continuous negotiation on prices and cycle times), the suggested 
negotiation processes are quite consistent with some practices identified during the industrial 
interviews. In any case, our goal is not to suggest a so-called “optimal” negotiation process, 
but to take some real empirical situations from case studies as examples, and try to include 
them into a consistent formal negotiation process, in order to check their real potential. 
Furthermore, the numerical simulations of cost assessment and the identified suitable 
cooperation situations are first elements showing the potential interest of the suggested 
cooperative processes.  
The negotiation processes we presented in this thesis are not yet mature models; 
improvements are surely necessary, for instance for adding more negotiable items, 
formalizing the triggers of each negotiation process and specifying with more details the 
information required to perform the processes. In addition, we have briefly presented cost-
related constraints helping to better understand when negotiation could be beneficial. 
However, more factors should be taken into account in real applications. For instance, after 
balancing total cost and benefits, it may be shown to the supplier that, according to purely 
quantitative indicators, it is more beneficial to delay an order. However, cumulative delays 
over a long term horizon will inevitably impact the performance indicators of the supplier and 
also the degree of trust from his customer. Therefore, balancing different quantitative factors 
with more qualitative ones should be added into the negotiation process. 
From the technical point of view, a multi-agent based approach would be a good way to 
implement the negotiation processes in order to validate them more thoroughly, and would 
also allow to eventually transform the suggested negotiation processes into a business 
intelligence system. Locally, the basic requirements are to allow the agents to access the 
information they need through the ERP system, using as forecast, load, inventory level, etc. 
and to send back the results of the negotiation into the ERP/MRPII system (e.g., new lead 
times, new costs, etc.). On the other hand, due to the autonomy of the supply chain members, 
it is not realistic that the agents at the supplier would access all the information on the 
customer‟s side, but more likely that they can communicate with other agents on the 
customer‟s side. Therefore, agents should be located locally, access local information, receive 
externally sent information and communicate with the agents on the other side. Since the 
information systems at the supplier and the customer are usually different, the agents on both 
sides could be themselves slightly different, which may lead to have to consider some 
problems linked to interoperability. 
We are conscious that the suggestions discussed in this thesis may be considered as a 
way to cope with “bad habits” instead of eliminating them. In a meeting where suppliers and 
customers were supposed to discuss on cooperation issues, we have for instance heard a 
representative from large companies saying that discussing what could be done in the SMEs 
was not of interest, since the good methods to disseminate were all known. Nevertheless, we 
do think that one of the objectives of a research work may be to consider other ways of 
thinking than those which are widely accepted. We would have reached our objective if this 
work opens new discussions on the subject. 
 
 
 137 
References 
Affonso, R.S., 2008. Proposition d‟un cadre de modélisation pour la coordination d‟entreprise 
dans la chaîne logistique. Doctoral dissertation. Institut National Polytechnique de 
Toulouse, France.  
Akkermans, H.A., Bogerd, P., Yücesan, E., van Wassenhove, L.N., 2003. The impact of ERP 
on supply chain management: exploratory findings from a European Delphi study. 
European Journal of Operational Research, 146, pp. 284-301.  
Albino, V., Carbonara, N., Giannoccaro, I., 2007. Supply Chain operation in industrial 
districts: a simulation analysis. European Journal of Operational Research, 177 (1), pp. 
261-280. 
Andel, T., 1997. Information supply chain: set and get your goal. Transportation & 
Distribution, 8 (2), pp. 33-36. 
Andersen, P.H., Kumar, R., 2006. Emotions, trust and relationship development in business 
relationship: A conceptual model for buyer-seller dyads. Industrial Marketing 
Management, 35, pp. 522-535.  
Anderson, J.C., Håkansson, H., Johanson, J., 1994. Dyadic business relationships within a 
business context. Journal of Marketing, 54 (4), pp. 42-58. 
Anderson, J.C., Narus, J.A., 1990. A model of distributor firm and manufacture firm working 
partnership. Journal of Marketing, 54, pp. 42-58.  
Anthony, R., 1965. Planning and control systems: a framework for analysis. Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press. 
Anupindi, R., Bassok, Y., 2003. Supply contracts with quantity commitments and stochastic 
demand, in Quantitative models for supply chain management. Springer.  
Appiah-Adu, K., Signh, S., 1998. Customer orientation and performance: a study of SMEs. 
Management Decision, 36 (6), pp. 385-394.  
Arend, R.J., Wisner, J.D., 2005. Small business and supply chain management: is there are fit? 
Journal of Business Venturing, 20 (3), pp. 403-436. 
Arshinder, A.K., Kanda, A., Deshmukh, S.G., 2007. An integrative framework for 
coordination in supply chain. POMS 18th Annual Conference, May, Dallas. 
ASLOG, 2006. Association française pour la LOGistique. Available online 
http://www.aslog.org.  
Bahinipati, B.K., Kanda, A.S. Deshmukh, G., 2009. Horizontal collaboration in 
semiconductor manufacturing industry supply chain: An evaluation of collaboration 
intensity index. Computers and Industrial Engineering, 57 (3), pp. 880-895. 
Beamish, P.W., 1987. Joint ventures in LDCs: partner selection and performance. 
Management International Review, 27 (1), pp. 23-37. 
Beamon, B.M., Chen, V.C.P., 2001. Performance analysis of conjoined supply chain supply 
chains. International Journal of Production Research, 39, pp. 3195-3218. 
Belaya, V., Hanf, J. H., 2009. Power struggle in the food chain? Lessons from empirical 
studies on power influences in chains and marketing channels. 113th EAAE seminar “A 
resilient European food industry and food chain in a challenging world”, September, 
Greece.  
Benton, W.C., Maloni, M., 2005. The influence of power driven buyer/seller relationship on 
supply chain satisfaction. Journal of Operations Management, 23, pp. 1-22. 
Reference 
138 
Bernstein, N.A., 1967. The co-ordination and regulation of movements. Oxford: Pergamon 
Press. 
Bidault, F., Despres, C., Butler, C., 1998. The drivers of cooperation between buyers and 
suppliers for product innovation. Research Policy, 26 (7-8), pp. 719-732. 
Bowersox, D.J., Closs, D.C., 1996. Logistical Management: The Integrated Supply Chain 
Process, McGraw-Hill Series in Marketing, New York: The McGraw-Hill Companies. 
BPMN, 2011. Documents Associated with Business Process Model and Notation (BPMN) 
Version 2.0, http://www.bpmn.org.  
Brown, J.R., Lusch, R.F., Muehling, D.D., 1983. Conflicts and power-dependence relations in 
retailer-supplier channels. Journal of Retailing, 59 (4), pp. 53-80. 
Brown, J.R., Lusch, R.F., Nicholson, C.Y., 1995. Power and relationship commitment: their 
impact on marketing channel member performance. Journal of Retailing, 71 (4), pp. 
363-392.  
Bruun, P. Mefford, R.N., 2004. Lean production and the Internet. International Journal 
Production Economics, 89 (3), pp. 247-260. 
Brynojolfsson, E., 1994. Information assets, technology, and organization. Management 
Science, 40 (12), pp. 1645-1662. 
Bunduchi, R., 2007. Trust, power and transaction costs in B2B exchanges - A socio-economic 
approach. Industrial Marketing Management, 37 (5), pp. 610-622. 
Camarinha-Matos, L.M., Afsarmanesh, H., 2008. Collaborative networks-Reference modeling. 
New York: Springer. 
Camarinha-Matos, L.M., Afsarmanesh, H., Galeano, N., Molina, A., 2009. Collaborative 
networked organizations-concepts and practice in manufacturing enterprise. Computer 
& Industrial Engineering, 57 (1), pp. 46-60. 
Camisullis, C., Giard, V., 2008. A new need for safety stocks in a supply chain dedicated to 
customized mass production. Supply Chain Forum: an international journal, 9, pp. 88-
96. 
Caniëls, M.C.J., Gederman, C.J., 2007. Power and interdependence in buyer supplier 
relationships: a purchasing portfolio approach. Industrial Marketing Management, 36, 
pp. 219-229. 
Cannon, J.P., Perreault, W.D., 1999. Buyer-seller relationships in business markets. Journal of 
Marketing Research, 36 (4), pp. 439-460.  
Carter, C.R., Jennings, M.M., 2002. Social responsibility and supply chain relationships. 
Transportation Research, Part E, 28, pp. 37-52. 
Castelfranchi, C., 1998. Modelling Social Action for AI Agents. Artificial Intelligence, 103, 
pp. 157-182. 
Cather, D.A., Howe, V., 1989. Conflict and Channel Management in Property-Liability 
Distribution Systems. The Journal of Risk and Insurance, 56, pp. 535-543. 
Cavusgil, S.T., Deligonul, S.Z., Zhang, C., 2004. Curbing foreign distributor opportunism: an 
examination of trust, contracts, and the legal environment in international channel 
relationships. Journal of International Marketing, 12 (2), pp. 7-27. 
Chen, I.J., Paulraj, A., 2004. Towards a theory of supply chain management: the constructs 
and measurements. Journal of Operations Management, 22 (2), pp. 119-150.  
Cheng, J.H., 2010. Inter-organizational relationships and information sharing in supply chains. 
International Journal of Information Management, 31(4), pp 374-384. 
Reference 
139 
Chopra, S., Meindl, P., 2004. Supply Chain Management-Strategy, Planning and Operation, 
2nd Edition. New Jersey: Prentice Hall. 
Christensen, C.M., Bower, J.L., 1996. Customer power, strategic investment, and the failure 
of leading firms. Strategic Management Journal, 17, pp. 197-218.  
Christopher, M.L., 1992. Logistics and Supply Chain Management. London: Pitman 
Publishing. 
Christopher, M.L., 1998. Logistics and Supply Chain Management: Strategies for Reducing 
Cost and Improving Service, 2nd Edition. London: Financial Time Management.  
Christopher, M.L., 2005. Logistics and Supply Chain Management: creating value-added 
networks, 3rd Edition, Great Britain: Pearson Education.  
Chung, Y.-K., Cho, S.-H., Kim, S.-C., 2005. Building co-operative supply chain in auto parts 
manufacturing industry. Proceedings of the Fifth International Conference on 
Electronic Business, Hong Kong, December, pp. 921-924. 
Cooper, M.C., Lambert, D.M., Pagh, J.D., 1997. Supply chain management: more than a new 
name for logistics. The International Journal of Logistics Management, 8 (1), pp. 1-14.  
Corsten, D., Kumar, N., 2005. Do suppliers benefit from collaborative relationships with large 
retailers? An empirical investigation of efficient consumer response adoption. Journal 
of Marketing, 69 (3), pp. 80-94. 
Cousins, P.D., 2002. A conceptual model for managing long-term inter-organisational 
relationships. European Journal of Purchasing and Supply Management, 8 (2), pp. 71-
82. 
Coviello, N.E., McAuely, A., 1999. Internationalization and the smaller firm: a review of 
contemporary empirical research. Management International review, 39 (3), pp. 223-
256.  
Cox, A., 2001. Managing with power: strategies for improving value appropriation from 
supply relationships. Journal of Supply Chain Management, 37, pp. 42-47. 
CPFR, 2000. The next wave of supply chain advantage: collaborative planning, forecasting 
and replenishment-CPFR. Syncra Systems Inc. and Industry Directions Inc., Available: 
http://www.syncrasystems.com and http://www.industrydirections.com. 
Crawford, K., Cox, J., 1990. Designing performance measurement systems for just in time 
operations. International Journal of Production Research, 28 (11), pp. 2025-2036. 
Dahl, R.A., 1957. The concept of power. Behavioral Science, 2, pp. 201-215. 
Dangayach, G.S., Deshmukh, S.G., 2001. Manufacturing strategy - literature review and some 
issues. International Journal of Operations and Production Management, 21 (7), pp. 
884-932.  
Daugherty, P.J., Richey, R.G., Roath, A.S., Min, S., Chen, H., Arndt, A.D., Genchev, S.E., 
2006. Is collaboration paying off for firms? Business Horizons, 49, pp. 61-70. 
Davis, R., 2008. ARIS Design Platform: Advanced Processes Modeling and Administration. 
Springer. 
De Kok, A.G., Graves, S.C., 2003. Handbook in operations research and management 
science-Supply Chain Management: Design, Coordination and Operation 11. 
Amsterdam: Elsevier.  
de Treville, S., Antonakis, J., 2006. Could lean production job design be intrinsically 
motivating? Contextual, configurational, and levels-of-analysis issues. Journal of 
Operations Management, 24 (2), pp. 99-123. 
Reference 
140 
Dillenbourg, P., 1999. What Do You Mean by Collaborative Learning? Collaborative-
Learning: Cognitive and Computational Approaches. Amsterdam: Pergamon Press. 
Dillenbourg, P., Baker, M., Blaye, A., O‟Malley, C., 1996. The evolution of research on 
collaborative learning. Learning in humans and machine: Towards an interdisciplinary 
learning science. Oxford: Elsevier. 
Disney, S.M., Towill, D.R., 2003. The effect of vendor managed inventory (VMI) dynamics 
on the Bullwhip Effect in supply chains. International Journal Production Economics, 
85, pp. 199-215.  
Easton, G., 2002. Marketing: A critical realist approach. Journal of Business Research, 55 (2), 
pp. 103-109. 
EEC, Commission of European Community, 1991. Motor Vehicle Parts and Accessories. 
Nace 353 Office for Official Publications of the EC, November, Luxemburg. 
El-Ansary, A., Stern, L., 1972. Power measurement in the distribution channel. Journal of 
Marketing Research, 9 (1), pp. 47-52. 
Ellram, L.M., 1991. A managerial guideline for the development and implementation of 
purchasing partnerships. International Journal of Purchasing and Materials 
Management, 27 (3), pp. 2-8. 
Ellram, L.M., Cooper, M.C., 1990. Supply Chain Management, Partnerships, and the Shipper-
Third-Party Relationship. The International Journal of Logistics Management, 1 (2), pp. 
1-10. 
Emerson, R. M., 1962. Power-Dependence Relations. American Sociological Review, 27, pp. 
31-41. 
Esposito, E., Passaro, R., Raffa, M., Zollo, G., 1996. „Firms‟ cooperative strategies: evidence 
from transport aircraft industry. In: Cox, A., Editor, Innovation in Procurement 
Management. Boston: Earlsgate Press, pp. 33-62. 
Esposito, E., Passaro, R., 1997. Material requirement planning and supply chain at Alenia 
Aircraft. European Journal of Purchasing & Supply Management, 3 (1), pp. 43-51. 
Esposito, E., Passaro, R., 2009. The evolution of supply chain relationships: An interpretative 
framework based on the Italian inter-industry experience. Journal of Purchasing & 
Supply Management, 15, pp. 114-126. 
Essig, M., Amann, M., 2009. Supplier satisfaction: Conceptual basics and explorative 
findings. Journal of purchasing and supply management, 15, pp. 103-113. 
Estampe, D., Lamouri, S., Paris, J.-L., Brahim-Djelloul, S., 2011. A framework for analyzing 
supply chain performance evaluation models. International Journal of Production 
Economics, doi:10.1016/j.ijpe.2010.11.024.  
EVALOG, 2006. Global EVALOG frame of reference. Available online 
http://www.galia.com.  
Feld, W.M., 2000. Lean manufacturing: Tools, Techniques, and How to use them. London: 
The St. Lucie Press. 
Flynn, B.B., Zhao, X.D., Huo, B.F., Yeung, J.H.Y., 2008. We‟ve got the power! How 
customer power affects supply chain relationships. Business Horizons, 51, pp. 169-174.  
Forker, L., Stannack, P., 2000. Cooperation versus competition: do buyers and suppliers 
really see eye-to-eye? European journal of purchasing and supply management, 6, pp. 
31-40. 
French, J. R., Raven, B., 1959. The Bases of Social Power. Studies in Social Power, Dorwin 
Cartwright, ed. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 
Reference 
141 
Fugate, B., Sahin, F., Mentzer, J.T., 2006. Supply chain management coordination 
mechanisms. Journal of Business Logistics, 27 (2), pp. 129-161.  
Fynes, B., Voss, C., Búrca, S.de, 2005. The impact of supply chain relationship quality on 
quality performance. International Journal of Production Economics, 96 (3), pp. 339-
354.  
Gadde, L.-E., Snehota, I., 2000. Making the most of supplier relationships. International 
Marketing Management, 29 (4), pp. 305-316. 
Ganesan, S., 1994. Determinants of long-term orientation in buyer-seller relationships. 
Journal of Marketing, 58 (2), pp. 1-19. 
Geyskens, I., Steenkamp, J.E.M., Scheer, L.K., Kumar, N., 1996. The effects of trust and 
interdependence on relationship commitment: A trans-Atlantic study. International 
Journal of Research in Marketing, 13, pp. 303-317. 
Ghobadian, A., Gallear, D.N., 1996. Total quality management in SMEs. Omega, 24 (1), pp. 
83-106. 
Gilmour, P., 1999. Benchmarking supply chain operations. International Journal of Physical 
distribution & Logistics Management, 5 (4), pp. 259-266.  
Giunipero, L.C., Hooker, R.E., Joseph Matthews, S., Yoon, T.E., Brudvig, S., 2008. A decade 
of SCM literature: past, present and future implications. Journal of Supply Chain 
Management, 44 (4), pp. 66-86. 
Goldratt, E.M., 1988. Computerized shop floor scheduling. International Journal of 
Production Research, 26 (3), pp. 443-455. 
Goldratt, E.M., 1990. What is this thing called the Theory of Constraints? NY: North River 
Press. 
Goldratt, E.M., Cox, J., 1984. The Goal: A process of ongoing improvement. NY: North 
River Press. 
Goldratt, E.M., Fox, R., 1986. The Race. NY: North River Press. 
Goodman, L.E., Dion, P.A., 2001. The determinants of commitment in the distributor-supplier 
relationship. Industrial Marketing Management, 30 (3), pp. 287-300. 
Govil, M., Proth, J.-M., 2001. Supply chain design and management: strategic and tactical 
perspectives. London: Academic.  
Grabot, B., Ming, Y., Houé, R., 2010. From technical to human aspects of coordination in 
aeronautical supply chains. 3rd International Conference on Information Systems, 
Logistics and Supply Chain, April, Casablanca, Morocco.  
Grant, R.M., 1996. Prospering in dynamically-competitive environments: Organizational 
capability as knowledge integration. Organization Science, 7 (4), pp. 375-387. 
Groves, F., 1985. UCC Occasional Paper. University of Wisconsin Centre for Cooperatives. 
Gruat La Forme, F.-A., 2007. Référentiel d‟évaluation de la performance d‟une chaîne 
logistique: Application à une entreprise de l‟ameublement. Doctoral Dissertation. 
Institut National des Sciences Appliquées de Lyon, France.  
Hallén, L., Johanson, J., Seyed-Mohamed, N., 1991. Interfirm adaptation in business 
relationships. Journal of Marketing, 55 (2), pp. 29-37. 
Hallén, L., Sandströn, M., 1991. Relationship atmosphere in international business. In S.J. 
Paliwoda (Ed.). New perspectives on international marketing, London.  
Reference 
142 
Hallikas, J., Puumalainen, K., Vesterinen, T., Virolainen, V-M, 2005. Risk-based 
classification of supplier relationship. Journal of Purchasing and Management, 11, pp. 
72-82. 
Handfield, R.B., Bechtel, C., 2002. The role of trust and relationship structure in improving 
supply chain responsiveness. Industrial Marketing Management, 31 (4), pp. 367-382. 
Harland, C.M., Caldwell, N.D., Powell, P., Zheng, J., 2007. Barriers to supply chain 
information integration: SMEs adrift of elands. Journal of Operations Management, 25, 
pp. 1234-1254. 
Harris, J.K., Swatman P.M.C., Kurnia S., 1999. Efficient Consumer Response (ECR): a 
survey of the Australian grocery industry. International Journal of Supply Chain 
Management, 4, pp. 35-42.  
Hart, P., Saunders, C., 1997. Power and trust: critical factors in the adoption and use of 
electronic data interchange. Organization Science, 8, pp. 23-42. 
Hausman, A., Johnston, W.J., 2010. The impact of coercive and non-coercive forms of 
influence on trust, commitment, and compliance in supply chains. Industrial Marketing 
Management, 39 (3), pp. 519-526. 
Heide, J.B., John, G., 1990. Alliances in industrial purchasing: the determinants of joint 
action in buyer-supplier relationships. Journal of Marketing Research, 27 (1), pp. 24-36. 
Hémont, F., Grabot, B., Mayère, A., 2010. Cooperation in Supply Chains: from practical 
problems to conceptual models, APMS‟2010, October, Como, Italy. 
Hill, R.M., Omar, M., 2006. Another look at the single-vendor single-buyer integrated 
product-inventory problem. International Journal of Production Research, 44 (4), pp. 
791- 800.  
Holland ,C.P., 1995. Cooperative supply chain management: the impact of interorganisational 
information systems. Journal of Strategic Information Systems, 4 (2), pp. 117-133. 
Homans, G., 1974. Social behaviour: Its elementary forms. New York: Harcourt Brace 
Jovanovich. 
Hord, S.M., 1986. A synthesis of research on organizational collaboration. Educational 
Leadership, 43 (5), pp. 22-26.  
Hu, T.-L., Sheu, J.-B., 2005. Relationships of channel power, noncoercive influence strategies, 
climate, and solidarity: A real case study of the Taiwanese PDA industry. Industrial 
Marketing Management, 34, pp. 447-461. 
Huang, G. Q., Lau, J.S.K., Mak, K. L., 2003. The impacts of sharing production information 
on supply chain dynamics: a review of the literature. International Journal of 
Production Research, 41 (7), pp. 1483-1517. 
Huang, S.H., Sheoran, S.K., Keskar, H., 2005. Computer-assisted supply chain configuration 
based on supply chain operations reference (SCOR) model. Computers & Industrial 
Engineering, 48, pp. 377-394. 
Huin, S.F., Luong, L.H.S., Abhay, K., 2002. Internal supply chain planning detriments in 
small and medium sized manufactures. International Journal of Physical Distribution & 
Logistics Management, 32 (9), pp. 771-782.  
Ireland, R.D., Webb, J.W., 2007. A multi-theoretic perspective on trust and power in strategic 
supply chains. Journal of Operations management, 25, pp. 482-497.  
Jap, S., Anderson, E., 2003. Safeguarding interorganizational performance and continuity 
under ex post opportunism. Management Science, 49, pp. 1684-1701. 
Reference 
143 
Jensen, S.H., Jensen, K.H., 2007. Implementing lean manufacturing in SME companies. 
International Conference on Economic Engineering and Manufacturing Systems, 
October, Brasov. 
Johnsen, T.E., Johnsen, R.E., Lamming, R.C., 2008. Supply relationship evaluation: The 
relationship assessment process (RAP) and beyond. European Management Journal, 26, 
pp. 274-287. 
Johnson, J.L., Sakano, T., Onzo, N., 1990. Behavioral relations in across-culture distribution 
systems: influence, control and conflicts in US-Japanese marketing channels. 
International Journal of Business Studies, 21 (4), pp. 639-655. 
Johnston, D.A., McCutcheon, D.M., Stuart, F.I., Kerwood, H., 2004. Effects of supplier trust 
on performance of cooperative supplier relationship. Journal of Operations 
Management, 22, pp. 23-38.  
Kaipia, R., Holmström, J., Tanskane, K., 2002. VMI: What are you losing if you let your 
customer place orders? Production Planning & Control, 13 (1), pp. 17-25.  
Kale, S. H., 1986. Dealer Perceptions of Manufacturer Power and Influence Strategies in a 
Developing Country. Journal of Marketing Research, 23 (4), pp. 387-393. 
Kalwani, M.U., Narayandas, N., 1995. Long-term manufacturer-supplier relationships: do 
they pay off for supplier firms? Journal of Marketing, 59 (1), pp. 1-16. 
Kampstra, R.P., Ashayeri, J., Gattorna, J.L., 2006. Realities of supply chain collaboration. 
International Journal of Logistics Management, 17 (3), pp. 312-330. 
Kelle, P., Akbulut, A., 2005. The role of ERP tools in supply chain information sharing, 
cooperation, and cost optimization. International Journal Production Economics, 93-94, 
pp. 41-52.  
Kim, H., Hoskisson, R. E., Wan, W. P., 2004. Power Dependence, Diversification Strategy, 
and Performance in Keiretsu member Firms. Strategic Management Journal, 25, pp. 
613-636. 
Kim, K., 2000. On interfirm power, channel climate, and solidarity in industrial distributor-
supplier dyads. Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 28 (3), pp. 388-405. 
Klepper, G., 1990. Entry into the market for large transport aircraft. Europe Economic 
Reviews, 34, pp. 775-803. 
Konijnendijk, P.A. 1994. Coordinating marketing and manufacturing in ETO companies. 
International Journal of Production Economics, 37 (1), pp. 19-26. 
Krause, D.R., Hanfield, R.B., Tyler, B.B., 2007. The relationship between supplier 
development, commitment, social capital accumulation and performance improvement. 
Journal of Operations Management, 25, pp. 528-545. 
Krause, D.R., Hanfield, R.B., Tyler, B.B., 2007. The relationship between supplier 
development, commitment, social capital accumulation and performance improvement. 
Journal of Operations Management, 25, pp. 528-545. 
La Londe, B.J., Masters, J.M., 1994. Emerging Logistics Strategies: Blueprints for the Next 
Century. International Journal of Physical Distribution and Logistics Management, 24 
(7), pp. 35-47. 
Laaksonen, T., Pajunen, K., Kulmala, H.I., 2008. Co-evolution of trust and dependence in 
customer-supplier relationships. Industrial Marketing Management, 37, pp. 910-930. 
Lambert, D.M., 2008. Supply Chain Management: Processes, Partnerships, Performance, 3rd 
Edition. Supply Chain Management Institute.  
Reference 
144 
Lambert, D.M., Cooper, M.C., 2000. Issues in Supply Chain Management. Industrial 
Marketing Management, 29, pp. 65-83. 
Lambert, D.M., Cooper, M.C., Pagh, J.D., 1998. Supply chain management: implementation 
issues and research opportunities. The international journal of logistics management, 9 
(2), pp. 1-19.  
Lambert, D.M., Knemeyer, A.M., Gardner, J.T., 2004. Supply chain partnerships: model 
validation and implementation. Journal of Business Logistics, 25 (2), pp. 21-42. 
Lamming, R., 1996. Squaring lean supply with supply chain management. International 
Journal of Operations & Production Management, 16 (2), pp. 183-196.  
Lamothe, J., Hadj-Hamou, K., Aldanondo, M., 2004. Product family and supply chain design 
with large demand diversity: a simultaneous approach for integrating both points of 
view. In: Supply Chain Design and Management, Collection Applied Optimization. 
Kluwer Academic.  
Larsen, S.T., 2000. European logistics beyond 2000. International Journal of Physical 
Distribution and Logistics Management, 30 (6), pp. 377-387. 
Lau, J.S.K., 2007. Information sharing in supply chains: improving the performance of 
collaboration. Berlin: Erich Schmidt. 
Lauras, M., 2004. Méthodes de diagnostic et d‟évaluation de performance pour la gestion de 
chaînes logistiques: application à la coopération maison-mère – filiales internationales 
dans un groupe pharmaceutique et cosmétique. Doctoral Dissertation. Institut National 
Polytechnique de Toulouse, France. 
Lauras, M., Parrod, N., Telle, O., 2003. Proposition de référentiel pour la notion d'entente 
industrielle: trois approches dans le domaine de la gestion des chaînes logistiques. 
Revue Française de Gestion Industrielle, 22 (4), pp. 5-30.  
Lee, B.C., Kim, P.S., Hong, K.S., Lee, I., 2010. Evaluating antecedents and consequences of 
supply chain activities: an integrative perspective. International Journal of Production 
Research, 48 (3), pp. 657-682. 
Lee, H.L., Billington, C., 1993. Material management in decentralized supply chains. 
Operations Research, 41, pp. 835-847. 
Lee, H.L., Whang, S., 2000. Information sharing in a supply chain. International Journal of 
Manufacturing Technology and Management, 1 (1), pp. 79-93.  
Lee, Y.H., Jeong, C.S., Moon, C., 2002. Advanced planning and scheduling with outsourcing 
in manufacturing supply chain. Computers & Industrial Engineering, 43, pp. 351-374.  
Leenders, M.R., 1966. Supplier development. Journal of Purchasing, 24, pp.47-62. 
Lendermann, P., Gan, B.P., McGinnis, L.F., 2001. Distributed simulation with incorporated 
APS procedures for high-fidelity supply chain optimization. Proceedings of the 33nd 
conference on simulation, December, USA.  
Lenny Koh, S.C., Simpson, M., 2005. Change and uncertainty in SME manufacturing 
environments using ERP. Journal of Manufacturing Technology Management, 16 (6), 
pp. 629-653. 
Levy, D.L., 1997. Lean Production in an International Supply Chain. Sloan Management 
Review, winter, pp. 94-102. 
Liu, Y., Li, Y., Zhang, L.N., 2010. Control mechanisms across a buyer-supplier relationship 
quality matrix. Journal of Business Research, 63, pp. 3-12.  
Reference 
145 
MacDuffie, J.P., Helper, S., 2006. Collaboration in supply chains with and without trust. 
Adler, P. (Ed.), The Firm as Collaborative Community, Re-constructing Trust in the 
Knowledge Economy. Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
MacKenzie, H. F., 1992. Partnering Attractiveness in Buyer-Seller Relationships. PhD 
dissertation, University of Western Ontario, London, Ontario, Canada. 
Mahmood, M.A., Gemoets, L.A., Solis, A., 2003. Supply chain management. Encyclopedia of 
Information System 4, Elsevier Science, pp. 315-327. 
Malone, T. W., Crowston, K., 1990. What is Coordination Theory and How Can it Help 
Design Cooperative Work Systems? Proceedings of the 3rd Conference on Computer-
Supported Cooperative Work, October, USA, pp. 357-370 
Malone, T. W., Crowston, K., 1994. The Interdisciplinary Study of Coordination. ACM 
Computing Surveys, 26, pp. 87-119. 
Malone, T. W., Crowston, K., Lee, J., Pentland, B., Dellarocas, C., Wyner, G., Quimby, J., 
Osborn, C.S., Bernstein, A., Herman, G., Klein, M., O‟Donnell, E., 1999. Tools for 
Inventing Organizations: Toward a Handbook of Organizational Processes. 
Management Science, 45, pp. 425-443. 
Maloni, M.J., Benton, W.C., 1997. Supply chain partnerships: opportunities for operations 
research. European Journal of Operational Research, 101 (3), pp. 419-429. 
Maloni, M.J., Benton, W.C., 2000. Power influences in the supply chain. Journal of Business 
Logistics, 21 (1), pp. 42-73. 
Marcotte, F., Grabot, B., Affonso, R., 2009. Cooperation models for supply chain 
management. International Journal Logistics Systems and Management, 5 (1-2), pp. 
123-153. 
McCutcheon, D., Stuart, F.I., 2000. Issues in the choice of supplier alliance partners. Journal 
of Operations Management, 18, pp. 279-301. 
Meng, X.H., 2010. Assessment framework for construction supply chain relationships: 
Development and evaluation. International Journal of Project Management, 8 (7), pp. 
893-707.  
Mentzer, J.T, DeWitt, W., Keebler, J.S., Min, S., Nix, N.W., Smith, C.D., Zacharia, Z.G., 
2001. Defining Supply Chain Management. Journal of Business Logistics, 22 (2), pp. 
1-26. 
Miller, T., 2001. Hierarchical operations and supply chain planning, Springer. 
Min, H., Zhou, G.H., 2002. Supply Chain Modeling: past, present and future. Computers & 
Industrial Engineering, 43, pp. 231-249.  
Min, S, Mentzer, J.T., 2004. Developing and measuring supply chain concepts. Journal of 
Business Logistics, 25 (1), pp. 63-99. 
Ming, Y., Houé, R., Grabot, B., 2009. Coordination in Supply Chains: from case studies to 
reference models. International Conference on Advances in Production Management 
Systems, APMS09 (IFIP), September, Bordeaux, France. 
Ming, Y., Grabot, B., Houé, R., 2011. A taxonomy of the situations of cooperation in supply 
chains, submitted to Production Planning and Control, July, submitted. 
Ming, Y., Grabot, B., Houé, R., 2012a. Towards a collaborative MRP for supply chain 
coordination. International Conference on Industrial Technology, ICIT12 (IEEE), 
March, Kos Island, Greece, submitted.  
Reference 
146 
Ming, Y., Grabot, B., Houé, R., 2012b. MRP-based negotiation in customer-supplier 
relationship. 14th IFAC Symposium on Information Control Problems in Manufacturing, 
INCOM20 (IFAC), May, Bucharest, Romania, submitted.  
Möllering, G., 2003. A typology of supplier relations: from determinism to pluralism in inter-
firm empirical research. Journal of Purchasing & Supply Management, 9, pp.31-41.  
Monden, Y., 1993. Toyota Production System: An Integrated Approach to Just-In-Time. 
Industrial Engineering and Management Press. 
Monden, Y., 1998. Toyota Production System-An Integrated Approach to Just-In-Time, 3rd 
Edition. Engineering & Management Press. 
Moorman, C., Deshpande, R., Zaltman, G., 1993. Factors affecting trust in market research 
relationships. Journal of Marketing, 57, pp. 81-101. 
Morgan, R.M. Hunt, S.D., 1994. The commitment-trust theory of relationship marketing. 
Journal of Marketing, 58 (3), pp. 20-38. 
Morley, C., 2000. La modélisation des processus: typologie et proposition utilisant UML. 
Actes des journées ADELI : processus et systèmes d‟information, December, France. 
Morrissey, W.J., Pittaway, L., 2004. A study of procurement behavior in small firms. Journal 
of Small Business and Enterprise Development, 1 (2), pp. 254-262.  
Nahmias, S., 2001. Production and Operations Analysis, 4th Edition. New York: McGraw 
Hill. 
Narasimhan, R., Nair, A., Griffith, D.A., Arlbjørn, J.S., Bendoly, E., 2009. Lock-in situations 
in supply chain: A social exchange theoretic study of sourcing arrangements in buyer-
supplier relationships. Journal of Operations Management, 27, pp. 374-389. 
Narasimhan, R., Swink, M., Kim, S. W., 2006. Disentangling leanness and agility: An 
empirical investigation. Journal of Operations Management, 24 (5), pp. 440-457. 
Nishioka, Y., 2005. Advanced Planning and Scheduling (APS) Conceptual Definition and 
Implementation. PSLX Consortium White Paper.  
Nix, N., Zacharia, Z.G., Lusch, R.F., Bridges, W.R., Thomas, A., 2004. Keys to effective 
supply chain collaboration: a special report from the collaborative practices research 
program. Available online http://www.cpfr.org. 
Nokkentved, C., 2000. Collaborative Processes in e-Supply Networks: Towards Collaborative 
Community B2B Marketplaces. Research Report, PricewaterhouseCoopers. 
Nyaga, G.N., Whipple, J.M., Lynch, D.F., 2010. Examining supply chain relationship: Do 
buyer and supplier perspectives on collaborative relationship differ? Journal of 
Operations Management, 28, pp. 101-114.  
O‟Gorman, C., 2001. The sustainability of growth in small- and medium-sized enterprises. 
International Journal of Entrepreneurial Behaviour and Research ,7 (2), pp. 60-70. 
Oliver, C., 1990. Determinants of interorganizational relationships: integration and future 
directions. Academy of Management Review, 15, 241-265. 
Oliver, K.R., Webber, M.D., 1992. Supply chain management: Logistics catches up with 
strategy. Logistics, the strategic issues, pp. 63-75. 
OMG. 2011. Documents Associated With UML Version 2.4. www.omg.org/spec/UML/2.4.  
Orlicky, J., Plossl, G., 1994. Orlicky‟s Material Requirement Planning, 2nd Edition. New 
York: McGraw Hill. 
Panitz, T., 1996. A Definition of Collaborative vs. Cooperative Learning. National Teaching 
and Learning Forum 2. 
Reference 
147 
Panitz, T., 1997. Collaborative versus Cooperative Learning-A Comparison of the Two 
Concepts which will help us Understand the Underlying Nature of Interactive Learning. 
Cooperative Learning and College Teaching. 
Parrod, N., 2005. Analyse d‟un processus de coopération entre donneur d‟ordres et sous-
traitant au sein d‟une chaîne logistique projet: Une approche par simulation. Institut 
National Polytechnique de Toulouse, France. 
Payan, J.M., McFarland, R.G., 2005. Decomposing influence strategies: argument structure 
and dependence as determinants of the effectiveness of influence strategies in gaining 
channel member compliance. Journal of Marketing, 69 (3), pp. 66-79. 
Pérez, J., 1997. TOC for world class global supply chain management. Computers & 
Industrial Engineering, 33 (1-2), pp. 289-293. 
Pujo, P., Kieffer, J.P., 2002. Concepts fondamentaux du pilotage des systèmes de production, 
Chapitre de l‟ouvrage fondements du pilotage des systèmes de production. Hermès 
Science.  
Quayle, M., 2003. A study of supply chain management practices in UK industrial SMEs. 
Supply Chain Management - An International Journal, 8 (1), pp. 79-86. 
Raposo, A.B., Magalhães, L.P., Ricarte, I.L.M., Fuks, H., 2001. Coordination of 
Collaborative Activities: A Framework for the Definition of Tasks Interdependencies. 
The 7th International Workshop on Groupware-CRIWG, September, Germany. 
Ratnasingam, P., 2000. The influence of power on trading partner trust in electronic 
commerce. Internet Research, 10 (1), pp.56-63. 
Rawwas, M.Y.A, Vitell, S.J., Barnes, J.H., 1997. Management of Conflict Using Individual 
Power Sources: A retailer‟s Perspective. Journal of Business Research, 40. pp. 49-64. 
Reichheld, F. F., 1996. Learning from customer defection. Harvard Business Review, 74 (2), 
pp. 56-67. 
Ren, S.J.F., Ngai, E.W.T., Cho, V., 2010. Examining the determinants of outsourcing 
partnership quality in Chinese small- and medium-sized enterprise. International 
Journal of Production Research, 48 (2), pp. 453-475. 
Rodriguez, C.M., Wilson, D.T., 2002. Relationship bonding and trust as a foundation for 
commitment in U.S.-Mexican strategic alliances: a structural equation modeling 
approach. Journal of International Marketing, 10 (4), pp. 53-76. 
Rokkan, A.I., Heidi, J.B., Wathne, K.H., 2003. Specific investments in marketing 
relationships: expropriation and bonding effects. Journal of Marketing Research, 40 (2), 
pp. 210-224. 
Roschelle, J., Teasley, S.D., 1995. The Construction of Shared Knowledge in Collaborative 
Problem Solving, Computer Supported Collaborative Learning. Heidelberg: Springer-
Verlag. 
Ryssel, R., Ritter, T., 2000. Trust, commitment and value-creation in inter-organizational 
customer-supplier relationships. Proceedings of the Sixteenth IMP-Conference, Bath, 
UK. 
Sahin, F., Powell, R.E., 2005. Information sharing and coordination in make-to-order supply 
chains. Journal of Operations Management, 23 (6), pp.579-598. 
Sako, M., 1992. Prices, Quality and Trust: Inter-firm Relations in Britain and Japan. 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Sako, M., Helper, S., 1998. Determinants of trust in supplier relations: evidence from the 
automotive industry in Japan and the United Sates. Journal of Economic Behavior & 
Organization, 34, pp. 387-417. 
Reference 
148 
Salcedo, S., Grackin, A., 2000. The e-value chain. Supply Chain Management Review, 3 (4), 
pp.63-70. 
Sansolo, M., 1993. Efficient Consumer Response. Progressive Grocer, 72 (11), pp. 47-50. 
SCOR, 2008. Supply Chain Operations Reference Model: version 9.0. Supply Chain Council 
Inc. Available online http://www.supply-chain.org.  
Scott, C., Westbrook, R., 1991. New strategic tools for supply chain management. 
International Journal of Physical Distribution & Logistics Management, 21 (1), pp. 23-
33. 
Seifert, D., 2002. Collaborative Planning, Forecasting, and Replenishment. Germany: Galileo 
Press. 
Seifert, D., 2003. Collaborative planning, forecasting, and replenishment - How to create a 
supply chain advantage, American Management Association. 
Shah, R., Ward, P. T., 2003. Lean manufacturing: Context, practice bundles, and performance. 
Journal of Operations Management, 21 (2), pp. 129-149. 
Shah, R., Ward, P. T., 2007. Defining and developing measures of lean production. Journal of 
Operations Management, 25 (4), pp. 785-805. 
Shore, B., Venkatachalam, A. R., 2003. Evaluating the information sharing capabilities of 
supply chain partners: A fuzzy logic model. International Journal of Physical 
Distribution and Logistics Management, 33 (9), pp. 804-824. 
Simatupang, T.M., Sridharan, R., 2002. The collaborative supply chain. International Journal 
of Logistics Management, 13 (1), pp. 15-30. 
Simatupang, T.M., Wright, A.C., Sridharan, R., 2002. The knowledge of coordination for 
supply chain integration. Business Process Management Journal, 8 (3), pp. 289-308. 
Singh, B., 1989. Invited Talk on Coordination Systems. Organizational Computing 
Conference, November, USA. 
Skinner, S.J., Gassenheimer, J.B., Kelley, S.W. 1992. Cooperation in supplier-dealer relations, 
Journal of Retailing, 68(2), pp. 119-134. 
Skjoett-Larsen, T., 2000. European logistics beyond 2000. International Journal of Physical 
Distribution & Logistics Management, 30 (5), pp. 377-387. 
Soosay, C.S., Hyland, P.W., Ferrer, M., 2008. Supply chain collaboration: capabilities for 
continuous innovation. Supply Chain Management: An International Journal, 13 (2), pp. 
160-169. 
Stadlter, H., 2005. Supply chain management and advanced planning-basics, overview and 
challenges. European Journal of Operational Research, 163, pp. 575-588. 
Stadtler, H., Kilger, C., 2007. Supply chain management and advanced planning: concepts, 
models, software, and case studies, 4th Edition. Berlin: Springer.  
Stank, T.P., Crum, M.R. Arango, M., 1999. Benefits of interfirm coordination in food 
industry supply chains. Journal of Business Logistics, 20 (2), pp. 21-41. 
Steckel, J.H., Gupta, S., Banerji, A., 2004. Supply chain decision making: will shorter cycle 
times and shared point-of-sale information necessarily help? Management Science, 50 
(4), pp. 458-464. 
Su, Q., Song, Y.T., Li, Z., Dang, J.X., 2008. The impact of supply chain relationship quality 
on cooperative strategy. Journal of Purchasing & Supply Management, 14, pp. 263-272.  
Swaminathan, J.M., Smith, S.F., Sadeh, N.M., 1998. Modeling supply chain dynamics: A 
muti-agent approach. Decision Science, 29 (3), pp. 607-632. 
Swaminathan, J.M., Tayur, S.R., 2003. Models for supply chains in e-business. Management 
Science, 49 (10), Special Issue on E-Business and Management Science, pp.1397-1406. 
Reference 
149 
Tan, K.C., 2001. A Framework of supply chain management literature. European Journal of 
Purchasing and Supply Management, 7 (1), pp. 39-48. 
Taylor, C.C., 1957. Objectives of Farmer Cooperatives: by a Sociologist. Agricultural 
Cooperation, selective readings. University of Minnesota Press. 
Telle, O., 2003. Gestion des chaînes logistiques dans le domaine aéronautique: aide à la 
coopération au sein d'une relation donneur d'ordres – fournisseur. Doctoral dissertation. 
Institut National Polytechnique de Toulouse, France.  
Thakkar, J., Kanda, A., Deshmukh, S.G., 2008. Supply chain management in SMEs: 
development of constructs and propositions. Asia Pacific Journal of Marketing and 
Logistics, 20 (1), pp. 97-131. 
Trentesaux, D., 2002. Pilotage hérérarchique des systèmes de production. Habilitation à 
diriger des recherches. Université de Valenciennes et du Hainaut-Cambrésis, France.  
Turbide, D., 1998. Advanced planning and scheduling (APS) systems. Midrange ERP 
Magazine, February.  
Tyndall, G., Gopal, C., Partsch, W., Kamauff, J., 1998. Supercharging Supply Chains: New 
Ways to Increase Value Through Global Operational Excellence. NY: John Wiley & 
Sons. 
Tyson, L., 1992. Who‟s Bashing Whom? Trade Conflict in High Technology Industries 
Institute for International Economics. Washington DC.  
Vaaland, T.I., Heide, M., 2007. Can the SME survive the supply chain challenges?. Supply 
Chain Management: An International Journal, 12 (1), pp. 20-31. 
von Axelson, J., 2009. Developing lean production implementation methodology for SME 
learning networks. The 16th International Annual EurOMA Conference, June, Sweden. 
Wallace, T.F., 2004. Sales & Operations Planning: the how-to handbook, 2nd edition. 
T.F.Wallace & Company.  
Walter, A., Holzle, K., Ritter, T., 2002. Relationship functions and customer trust as value 
creators in relationships: a conceptual model and empirical findings for the creation of 
customer value. Proceedings of the Eighteenth IMP- Conference, Dijon, France. 
Warnecke, H.J., Hüser, M., 1995. Lean production. International Journal of Production 
Economics, 41, pp. 37-43.  
Welsh, J., White, J., 1981. A small business is not a little big business. Harvard Business 
Review, July-August, pp. 18-32. 
Whang, S. J., 1995. Coordination in operations: a taxonomy. Journal of Operations 
Management, 12 (3-4), pp. 413-422.  
Wiertz, C., De Ruyter, K., Keen, C., Streukens, S., 2004. Cooperating for service excellence 
in multichannel service systems: An empirical assessment. Journal of Business 
Research, 57(4), pp. 424-436. 
Willamson, O.E., 1985. The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. NY-Free Press. 
Womack, J.P., Jones, D.T., Roos, D., 1990. The Machine That Changed the World. R.A. 
Rawston Associates.  
Xu, L., Beamon, B.M., 2006. Supply Chain Coordination and Cooperation Mechanisms: An 
Attribute-Based Approach. Journal of Supply Chain Management, 42 (1), pp. 4-12.  
Yeung, J.H.Y., Selen, W., Zhang, M., Huo, B., 2009. The effects of trust and coercive power 
on supplier integration. International Journal of Production Economics, Special Issue 
on Operations Strategy and Supply Chains Management, 120 (1), pp. 66-78.  
Yu, Z.X., Yan, H., Cheng, T.C.E., 2001 Benefits of information sharing with supply chain 
partnerships. Industrial Management & Date Systems, 101 (3), pp. 114-119. 
Zenor, M.J., 1994. The profit benefits of category management. Journal of Marketing 
Research, 31 (2), pp. 202-214.  
Reference 
150 
Zhang, C., Viswanathan, S., Henke Jr., J.W., 2010. The boundary spanning capabilities of 
purchasing agents in buyer-supplier trust development. Journal of Operations 
Management, 29 (4), pp. 318-328.  
Zhao, X.D., Huo, B.F., Flynn, B.B., Yeung, J.H.Y., 2008. The impact of power and 
relationship commitment on the integration between manufacturers and customers in a 
supply chain. Journal of Operations Management, 26, pp. 368-388.  
Zheng, J., Knight, L., Harland, C., Humby, S., James, K., 2007. An analysis of research into 
the future of purchasing and supply management. Journal of Purchasing and Supply 
Management, 13 (1), pp. 69-83. 
 
 
 
 
 151 
Appendix: Detail simulation of the negotiation 
process 
In this appendix, we present all the numerical simulations of each scenario in the 
practical illustrations of negotiation process in chapter 4.  
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Appendix I: Period of forecast, Normal case 1, forecast, in the month of January  
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Appendix II: Period of forecast, Normal case 1, scenario 1.1 
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Appendix III: Period of forecast, Normal case 1, scenario 1.2  
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Appendix IV: Period of forecast, Normal case 1, scenario 1.3 
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Appendix V: Period of forecast, Normal case 2, scenario 2.1 
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Appendix VI: Period of forecast, Normal case 2, scenario 2.2 
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Appendix VII: Period of forecast, Normal case 2, scenario 2.3 
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Appendix VIII: Period of forecast, Negotiation case 1 
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Appendix IX: Period of forecast, Negotiation case 2 
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Appendix X: Load Variation, Normal case 1 
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Appendix XI: Load Variation, Negotiation case 1 
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Appendix XII: Price and cycle time, Normal case 2 
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Appendix VIII: Order priority, Normal case 
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Appendix XIV: Order priority, Negotiation case 
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Appendix XV: Order grouping, Normal case 1 
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Appendix XVI: Order grouping, Normal case 2 
 
 
 
 
